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Thesis Abstract 
 
This thesis engages with the politics of gender equality in the context of 
democratisation processes in the Middle East, with specific reference to an often-
neglected case study, i.e. Jordan. By analysing the gender dimension of representation 
and political participation, my thesis contributes to the literature on gender quotas, 
social change and gender mainstreaming in the region, and does so from a bottom-up 
perspective, bringing in women’s lived experiences. More specifically, I investigate 
how the international gender equality rhetoric is understood and translated into 
practice in the context of women’s political empowerment. I also problematise the 
role of women’s organisations in advocating gender justice.  
Drawing on original ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Jordan between 2010 
and 2011, my case study focuses on the experiences of female candidates in the 
parliamentary elections of November 2010, the role of local and international 
organisations in empowering women in politics, and the influence of the authoritarian 
regime on the promotion of women’s rights. Analysing the intersections between 
diverse dynamics involved in the promotion of gender justice in Jordan, I argue that 
gender equality is often instrumentalised and/or treated as an add-on in local, national, 
regional and international policies. In addition, while analysing the reasons behind the 
adoption of gender quotas, I stress the need to look at the sociocultural and political 
context in which quotas are introduced. In the specific setting of gender justice 
advocacy, my research findings indicate that the association of women’s rights 
promotion with government-related or royal-supported organisations may be 
problematic, especially when the role of the state is being discredited and challenged 
in the wake of the recent uprisings (2011 and 2012). Finally, in the context of gender 
equality rhetoric, I suggest that it might be more productive for practitioners and 
researchers to employ an intersectional approach that not only addresses women’s 
multifaceted and diverse gender interests, but also recognises that gender-based 
struggles are frequently linked to neoliberalism and neocolonial policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
To pursue any kind of social change, there is a need of a strong 
political will. Without that will, any idea, suggestion or strategy will 
remain no more than ink on paper (Randa, Amman, 8 March 2011). 
 
Randa, a Jordanian gender expert who collaborates with several local and 
international organisations in the Middle East, bemoans the often-contested lack of 
political will on the part of the government to undertake reforms that will guarantee 
an amelioration of social conditions. Randa refers to a type of contestation that is still 
at the centre of what over the past three years have become commonly known as the 
‘Arab uprisings’.1 Although each country has its own specific socio-political and 
economic context, an overriding characteristic of the recent uprisings has been a 
popular desire to challenge what Randa calls the ‘lack of political will’ and to change 
the political status quo. In a historical moment when the politics, governance and 
policies of several Middle Eastern countries have been – and at the time of writing are 
still being – challenged, discredited and contested, questions of political (in)stability 
are more central than ever. Starting from the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 
January 2011,2 debates on democracy and democratisation have been embedded in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 After the first demonstrations started in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, journalists in the West 
started to refer to this historical phenomenon as the ‘Arab Spring’. Marc Lynch (2011) coined this term 
in an article in Foreign Policy, although he came to regret it later (Lynch, 2012). The use of the terms 
‘Arab’ and ‘spring’ has been problematic, although they have been widely used in Western media in 
particular. Regarding the former, not all the people involved in the uprisings have been ‘Arab’, but 
there is an ‘inclination to think of the “Arab world” as a unified entity’ (Dalacoura, 2012: 63). 
Regarding the term ‘spring’, Massad (2012) has contested its use because it ‘was not simply an 
arbitrary or even seasonal choice of nomenclature, but rather a US strategy of controlling their aims 
and goals’. The discussion moved on to the use of the term ‘revolution(s)’ instead, given that most 
people in the region, according to Khouri (2011), prefer to use the term ‘thawra’, which means 
‘revolution’. The political semantics of the terms used, in particular with reference to revolution(s) and 
uprisings, have been discussed by scholars (among others, see the book edited by Haddad et al., 2012) 
who have tried to trace their meanings historically. During my time in Jordan I often heard the words 
‘demonstration(s)’ (muzahra) and ‘uprisings’ (intifadah). In light of the ongoing debates around the use 
of these terms, I prefer the word ‘uprisings’ to refer to this specific historical phenomenon. In 
particular, given the multiplicity of political situations in the Middle East, the term ‘uprisings’ allows 
me to encompass diverse socio-political realities within one concept; while the term ‘revolution(s)’ 
may be appropriate to the Egyptian context, this is not the case for Jordan. 
2 The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17–18 December 2010 in Tunisia led to nationwide 
protests and the occupation of public spaces, and consequently to the defection of the army, the erosion 
of Ben Ali’s security forces and the departure of the leader himself on 14 January 2011 (Hudson, 2012: 
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and oriented around the socio-political events in many countries in the region,3 
including Jordan.4  
My being in the region, and in Jordan in particular, during the first months of the 
uprisings inevitably had an impact on my research. Having chosen Jordan as my case 
study country (for reasons that I will elaborate later in this introduction), I first arrived 
at the end of October 2010. Little did I know what was going to happen in the region 
in the next few months. Of course, I did not expect to have such close experience of 
the uprisings. I stayed in Jordan until the end of June 2011, and went back for a three-
week visit in November of the same year; my feelings shifted constantly, from 
extreme excitement, respect and hope to sentiments linked to frustration and 
confusion – sentiments I intend to illustrate throughout my thesis. 
What interested me the most during the events in Egypt, Tunisia, and later Jordan 
and the region more widely, were not only the demands for reform and change 
coming from people in the streets, or the questions of democracy and democratisation 
posed by scholars and journalists, but also the participation of women. While 
discussions of ‘gender and the Arab spring’ started to take place while I was in 
Jordan, the focus was often on the supposed paradox perceived by Western media and 
policy forums (Pratt, 2013): women were participating in demonstrations in large 
numbers, but women and women’s rights were under-represented in the emerging 
political institutions. As Nicola Pratt (2013) has recently pointed out, building 
political discourses on this supposed paradox risks homogenising women’s 
experiences across the region, without proper consideration of the very specific and 
different socio-political and cultural contexts of each country and community. Rather, 
in line with arguments advanced by Pratt and other scholars (Kandiyoti, 2011, 2012 
and 2013; Al-Ali, 2012; Winegar, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 2012; Ali-Agrama, 2012; 
Hafez, 2012; Lust, 2011), my interest was not limited to women’s participation in the 
demonstrations per se, but also extended to the gender-specific implications and 
consequences of the uprisings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21). In Egypt, after 18 days of ‘massive’ protests and demonstrations in Tahrir Square in Cairo and in 
other Egyptian cities, President Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 (Hudson, 2012: 21). 
3 Countries such as Yemen, Libya, Syria, and recently even Turkey. 
4 As I will explain in greater detail throughout the thesis, demonstrations in Jordan calling for 
economic reform and the end of corruption actually started before January 2011. The uprisings in 
Egypt and Tunisia during the first months of 2011 also affected people’s willingness to participate 
more actively in the Friday demonstrations in Jordan. 
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The interests and motivations behind this thesis do not only resonate with the 
policy debates I have been following over the past three years, or with the socio-
political context in which I was living while in Jordan, but have certainly also been 
shaped by my previous academic and professional experience. It can be difficult to 
explain my academic background to people who do not know me very well. I have 
always believed in and loved academic research, but after five years of law school in 
Italy, I felt that I was not following my ‘true path’. I sensed that my critical way of 
thinking was not being encouraged as much as I would have liked. I felt the need on 
the one hand to be more academically ‘alive’, and on the other to be more connected 
to lived experience. Thanks to an enriching opportunity to conduct research at the 
Center for Women in Politics and Public Policy (CWPPP)5 at the University of 
Massachusetts in Boston, USA, I started to find the links between academia and 
activism that I was looking for. As a research assistant at the CWPPP, I dealt with the 
creation and organisation of activities for the promotion of women in politics in Iran. 
That particular project consisted in a leadership training programme for Iranian 
women organised in collaboration with Dr Fatemeh Haghighatjoo,6 a former member 
of Iranian parliament who was forced into political exile in 2004 and fled to the USA. 
As my friendship with Fatemeh became stronger on a personal and political level, I 
was soon inspired by her strength and determination to support women in Iran to gain 
confidence and awareness in both their private and public lives. Fatemeh’s approach 
pushed me to investigate and interrogate her belief that women need to be educated 
with a gender perspective in order to promote social change once they enter politics. 
Subsequently, I became increasingly enthusiastic and motivated to understand the 
significance of ‘gendering’ leadership trainings programmes like those we had 
organised, on both a practical and theoretical level. Most importantly, in light of the 
tensions between Fatemeh’s background and the US context where she was living and 
working, I became fascinated by the relationships between different cultures, 
perspectives and politics in the context of the advancement of women’s political 
participation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Centre is committed to advancing women’ participation in public life. It was founded in 1994, 
(http://www.umb.edu/cwppp [accessed 9 April 2013]). 
6 Dr Haghighatjoo served in the Iranian parliament from 2000 until 2004, and was the first to resign 
when the anti-reform Guardian Council banned more than 2000 reformist candidates from the seventh 
parliamentary elections. For an insightful analysis of Fatemeh’s story, see Mir-Hosseini (2004). 
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Thus my interest in gender studies grew out of my belief in possible, if limited, 
social change, and out of my opportunity to analyse the intersections between diverse 
interests in the promotion of women’s political participation – and most importantly, 
out of the opportunity to address and come into contact with women’s experiences. 
Following my direct involvement with Iranian women, when I started my PhD I had 
originally intended to focus my research on Iran. But the timing was unfortunate. The 
political crisis in that country in 2009,7 and the difficulties of access for foreign 
researchers, forced me to shift my attention elsewhere. 
What connects my experience at the CWPPP with my PhD in gender studies and 
my fieldwork in Jordan is the gendered lens through which I started to address and 
analyse socio-political events. Thus, recalling Randa’s attention to the ‘strong 
political will’ and Fatemeh’s desire to ‘gender’ leadership training, I ask: to what 
extent did questions of democratisation, reform and participation involve a gender 
perspective among journalists, activists, practitioners and people in the streets?  
In the next section I aim to introduce my main research questions and the academic 
contribution I hope to make with this thesis. I will also clarify some theoretical 
underpinnings, which will lead me to explain my methodological position. Finally, I 
will reflect on my experience of fieldwork, including the methods I employed and 
some of the limitations and ethical issues I encountered. 
 
Focus and significance of my research 
 
Throughout this thesis I aim to address the continuum of demands for social change in 
the region by analysing the gender dimension of democratisation and participation. 
Specifically, I ask how and to what extent gender justice is linked to democratisation 
processes in Jordan, with specific reference to women’s political participation. My 
case study focuses on the experiences of female candidates in the parliamentary 
elections of 9 November 2010, the role of local and international organisations in 
empowering ‘women in politics’, and the influence of the authoritarian regime on the 
promotion of women’s rights and gender justice.8 By taking into consideration the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I am referring to the tumultuous rallies and protests that arose following the June 2009 presidential 
election, which saw the highly disputed ‘re-election’ of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
8 The notion of ‘women’s rights’ gains different meaning in different contexts and to different people 
(Walter, 2001). For the purposes of this thesis, when I refer to ‘women’s rights’ I intend these to 
include different types of rights – civil, political, economic and social – as understood in international 
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intersections between the experiences of ‘women in politics’, the role of the state and 
the influence of the international community, I ask how and to what extent women’s 
and gender interests9 are embodied in this relationship. Most importantly, what is the 
role of the authoritarian state in gendering democratisation in a regional context in 
which the credibility of regimes is being questioned? How does international gender 
equality rhetoric come into play?10 Finally, how do ‘women in politics’ and women’s 
rights’ activists experience political participation? 
As I will discuss in greater detail in chapter one, I understand democratisation as a 
process of ‘making democratic regimes, practices and discourses of public power’ 
(Rai, 2008: 59), with a focus on the actors and including women’s experiences and 
their perspectives. Since feminist social scientists often argue that a polity is not fully 
democratic if there is no adequate representation of women (Moghadam, 2003, among 
others), I wish to clarify that my understanding of participation does not refer 
exclusively to inclusion and access to ‘politics’. Instead, I link participation to the 
representation of specific interests (Molyneux, 1985; Beckwith, 2007a-b; Krook and 
Childs, 2010).  
I am fascinated by the ways in which the promotion of women’s political 
participation involves a diverse range of interests, and my initial academic curiosity 
grew out of the existing literature on gender mainstreaming11 (Rai, 2008; Verloo, 
2001; Zaoudé and Sandler, 2001; Charlesworth, 2005; Nusair, 2009). Many scholars 
have written on this topic from a theoretical and abstract point of view (among others, 
Verloo, 2001; True, 2003; Walby, 2005; Eveline and Bacchi, 2005; Hawkesworth, 
2006) and with reference to the Middle East (Nusair, 2009; Kandiyoti, 1988, 1996 
and 2007; Moghadam, 2005), in particular to conflict situations such as Iraq and 
Palestine (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a-b; Nusair, 2009; Jad, 2004). However, when it 
comes to Jordan there is a paucity of literature on the topic.  
While my initial country of interest was Iran, I decided to switch to Jordan for a 
number of reasons. First, compared to other countries in the Middle East, relatively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
development practices (Marshall, 1964). While analysing the specific context of Jordan I will be 
careful to show the intersections deriving from different lived experiences and contexts. 
9 See chapter one for an analysis and discussion of women’s and gender interests. 
10 I intend gender equality in substantive terms, trying to go beyond the legalistic rights-based 
approach, as I will explain throughout the thesis. Equality is distinct from gender equity, which has a 
narrower application with strong economic and material connotations. 
11 Although the definition and theoretical underpinnings of the notion of gender mainstreaming will be 
discussed in chapter one in great detail, here I refer to gender mainstreaming as the process that pushes 
for the infusion of gender perspectives into decision-making practices (Hawkesworth, 2006). 
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little research has been done on ‘women and gender’ in Jordan. Although scholars 
have written on health, labour force participation (Shukri, 1996), legal rights (Lynch, 
1999; Warrick, 2009; Husseini, 2010), the experiences of young middle-class women 
as agents of social change (analysed through ethnographic and anthropological lenses 
by Droeber, 2005), honour crimes (Husseini, 2002; Nanes, 2003) political 
participation (Naqshabandi, 1995; Shatwi and Daghestani, 1996; David and Nanes, 
2011; Dababneh, 2012) and education (Adely, 2012a), the production of academic 
research has been less consistent than in the cases of Egypt, Palestine, Morocco, 
Algeria or Tunisia.12 Second, as I will explain throughout this thesis, while there is 
considerable support for women’s empowerment promoted by international and local 
women’s organisations, women’s political participation is relatively low in Jordan.13 
This backdrop, together with the role of the regime, has proved to be an excellent case 
study for the analysis of intersections between the interconnected international, 
regional and local contexts in the processes of ‘gendering’ democratisation. Third, 
one of the positive aspects of being in Jordan at the time of the uprisings was the 
relative ease of participation in civil society activities (mainly regional and 
international conferences) that had previously been organised in other countries 
(Egypt, for instance) and had moved to Jordan for security reasons. 
Through my research I aim to make various contributions to the academic field. 
First, I hope to broaden theoretical debates around gender mainstreaming and 
women’s empowerment at an international level, by focusing on a new empirical case 
study of an often-neglected country. Second, I particularly aim to bring the 
experiences of female candidates in the 2010 parliamentary elections into the 
analysis. Top-down approaches have often been used to analyse issues of 
democratisation, gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment and participation 
(Larson, 2008; Eveline and Bacchi, 2005; Nusair, 2009, among others). By including 
the narratives of female candidates and women’s rights activists, I hope to introduce a 
feminist and more anthropological analysis to these processes. Third, by situating my 
own findings within the context of the uprisings, I hope to contribute to debates about 
the relevance of applying a gendered lens in the socio-political and historical analysis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The literature that explores ‘gender in the Middle East’ is very broad, and includes, among others, 
Lazreg (1988), Abu-Lughod (1998) Alloula (1986), Kandiyoti (1988, 1991a and 1996), Ahmed 
(1992a), Moghadam (1999, 2002 and 2003), Singerman (1997 and 2006), Mir-Hosseini (1999), Joseph 
(2000a), Al-Ali (2000 and 2007) and Al-Ali and Pratt (2009a-b). 
13 According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Jordan ranks 103th out of 190 countries, with 
women comprising 12.2% of the Lower House and 11.7% of the Upper House (IPU data, 2013a). 
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of these events. Finally, I hope that this study will have academic and political 
significance both for the women it is about and for the organisations that claim to 
work for the advancement of ‘women in politics’. 
 
Some theoretical clarifications 
 
Before discussing the methodology and methods used in the research, I will introduce 
some debates that I hope will provide a context for and clarify the theoretical 
framework I employ throughout the thesis. In discussions of women’s presence in the 
public domain, controversy can arise around the slogan ‘the personal is political’,14 
which placed the gendered organisation of public and private spaces at the centre of 
the feminist debates in the 1960s and 1970s (Landes, 1998).15 In the 1990s Nancy 
Fraser (1990), criticising Habermas’s model of the bourgeois public sphere,16 
observed that because of his failure to examine examples of non-liberal, non-
bourgeois or competing public spheres, he ended up ‘idealising the liberal public 
sphere’ (61).17 In particular, she argues that although Habermas acknowledges that 
there are alternative public spheres, he assumes that it is possible to understand the 
character of the bourgeois public by looking at it in isolation from its relations with 
other, competing publics (Fraser, 1990: 61, footnote 9).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In the 1970s American feminists started to use this slogan, which has been coined by feminist 
activist Carol Hanisch in the anthology Notes From the Second Year: Women's Liberation (1970), 
although the exact origin of the phrase is still debated (Ling Lee, 2007: 163).  
15 In her book Sexual Politics (1970), Millet argued that (political) power relations are regularly 
enacted across a much wider spectrum of human activities and relationships than is usually perceived: 
political relationships occur on a daily basis in traditionally feminine spheres of activity, particularly in 
the domestic sphere and within nuclear families. From a different perspective, the opposition between 
public and private has been a feature of both liberal and conservative political arguments, which have 
offered different assessments of these terms (see Landes, 1998). Feminists have not felt comfortable 
with either of these traditions, challenging the effects of keeping the body and sexual matters hidden 
from view, and denying that inherited views of freedom have been applied equally to all people or 
aspects of persons (Landes, 1998: 2). 
16 In his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, Habermas (1987) describes the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ as to ‘be conceived above 
all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere 
regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the 
general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labour’ (27).  
17 Other scholars have challenged the abstract, universal model of the official public sphere, which rests 
on and is constituted by a number of significant exclusions. Landes (1988) argues that the ‘key axis of 
exclusion’ (cited in Fraser, 1990: 59) is gender. For other critiques see Eley (1991) and Ryan (1990). 
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Scholars have not been unanimous in their evaluation of the public-private split, or 
in their approach to its study.18 In the specific context of democratisation, some 
scholars (Luckam and White, 1996: 222; Rai, 2008: 61), while acknowledging that 
the two domains are separate, argue that there is a need for the simultaneous and 
parallel democratisation of both the public and private spheres. Luckam and White 
(1996) and Rai (2008) agree that only by making the ‘private public’ or the ‘personal 
political’ can feminists move forward on the issue of democratisation. The bringing 
together of the public and private takes place in practice through the social 
mobilisation of women within the public sphere.  
The debate on the private-public divide has highlighted the importance of the 
private for the public, in the sense of both the humanisation and the democratisation 
of the public sphere. Most importantly, the feminist discussion has helped the 
construction of a broader theoretical argument around democratisation, providing a 
measure for assessing the processes of democratisation. By contesting the normative, 
hegemonic model described by Habermas, feminists have shown that the line between 
public and private needs to be constantly renegotiated and questioned with specific 
reference to the historical, political and social contexts of analysis (Fraser, 1990; 
Landes, 1998; Ryan, 1990; Eley, 1991; Skalli, 2006).  
This focusing on the public sphere requires me to introduce my understanding of 
‘politics’ as encompassing both informal politics and the formal processes and 
institutions of governments and elections (Krook and Childs, 2010: 3). As some other 
scholars have argued (Baldez, 2002; Beckwith, 2007b), street demonstrations and 
grassroots and social movements are forms of political participation, no less than 
engagement within the state. Moreover, the notion of politics includes what Butler 
(1990) and Foucault (1995) define as ‘any instance or manifestation of power 
relations’, thus addressing not only ‘the politics of state and the politics of social 
movements, but also the politics of language, the politics of exchange, and the politics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Criticising the concepts of liberal theory, Carole Pateman (1983) argues that ‘the separation of the 
private and public is presented as if it applied to all individuals in the same way’ (283). She goes on to 
criticise the liberal conception of politics, which, in locating itself within the public sphere, 
systematically excludes women; she argues that equality and liberty were not the only fundamental 
values at the basis of the social contract in the creation of the political sphere, but that fraternity was so 
too, and she thereby highlights the empowerment of men rather than women (Pateman, 1989). Other 
scholars advocate the ‘humanisation’ of the public arena through the values of the maternal private 
domain, since the former is so dominated by male practices (Elshtain, 1981). See also Phillips (1991), 
Dietz (1992), Mouffe (1992) and Young (1990) for further contributions to the debate.  
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of representation’ (cited in Krook and Childs, 2010: 4). This broad understanding of 
‘politics’ is reflected in my case study. Primarily focusing on the participation of 
female candidates in the 2010 parliamentary elections in Jordan, I will also address 
the experiences, opinions and work of MPs, women’s rights’ activists, practitioners in 
women’s organisations, selected international institutions and state-level bodies.  
Although, as discussed above, the private-public debate is integral to discussions 
of democratisation and participation, in this thesis I prefer to view my research 
questions through the lens of intersectionality: my understanding of the public sphere 
will be shaped by the intersections of local, national and international dynamics, as I 
will explain in the next section. 
 
Methodology 
 
[Feminists] need a home in which everyone has a room of her own, 
but one in which the walls are thin enough to permit a conversation 
(Tong, 1989: 7). 
 
It has become obvious that feminism does not represent a unified project.19 I consider 
it to be a social and political project rooted in ‘the belief that gender relations can and 
should be transformed’ (Hemmings, 2010). By recognising systematic and structural 
inequalities based on gender, feminism finds ways of acting to challenge them. In the 
context of democratisation, gender mainstreaming, women’s empowerment and 
participation, I see feminism as linked to gender justice and social transformation 
(Kabeer, 2005). In particular, I take the approach not of simply ‘adding women and 
stirring’, but of working towards a transformative agenda (Pateman, 1989), as I will 
discuss in greater detail throughout the thesis. But feminism involves ‘both theory and 
practice’ (Letherby, 2003: 4). If on the one hand I am concerned to challenge the 
silences in mainstream research, as Letherby (2003) suggests, ‘both in relation to the 
issues studied and the ways in which study is undertaken’ (4), on the other hand my 
hope is to contribute, in however limited a way, to social change, addressing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Although I am aware of the different ways in which feminism(s) is/are theorised and practised, it is 
not an aim of my research to enter these debates. For clarifications of and debates on feminism(s), see 
Moore (1988), Kandiyoti (1996) and Moghadam (2003), among others.   
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challenging inequalities. To this end, ‘feminist research practice’ (Kelly, 1988) is 
central to understanding the tensions between theory, practice, politics and research.  
My methodology draws on transnational feminism. As a mode of theorising, 
transnational feminism attempts to trace the connections between imperialism and 
globalisation, as well as between the local and the global (Mohanty, 2002; Grewal and 
Kaplan, 2000; Brenner, 2003; Ferree and Tripp, 2006; Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a; 
Mama, 2011). Rooted in post-colonial theory, transnational feminism shifts the focus 
from north-south exploitation towards the search for commonalities in the micro- and 
macro-politics of that exploitation (Mohanty, 2002: 503) while still recognising 
differences.20 Transnational feminism is then both ‘locally grounded’ and ‘globally 
informed’ (Mama, 2011: 7),21 seeking to bridge the gaps between material and 
discursive focuses in a rebuttal of postmodernist relativism (Mohanty, 2002: 501). On 
the basis of the contention that neoliberal and globalising economics link all forms of 
oppression, Mohanty (2002) sees anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation efforts as the 
best site for a new transnational feminism (509). In particular, this entails going 
beyond the false universalism of some Western feminisms to consider the particular 
experiences of women at the margins of the global political economy, ‘allow[ing] for 
a more concrete and expansive vision of universal justice’ (Mohanty, 2002: 510).  
At the core of transnational feminism is the concept of intersectionality (Al-Ali and 
Pratt, 2009b: 18), which recognises that women’s oppressions and struggles are 
constituted by a variety of structural inequalities linked to gender, class, race, 
ethnicity, religion, education and sexuality (among others, Collins, 1989; Brah and 
Phoenix, 2004; hooks, 2001; Maynard, 2001; Yuval-Davis, 2007; Phoenix, 2001). As 
argued by Yuval-Davis (2007), a constitutive intersectional approach sees different 
categorical discourses not as mechanically added together in a ‘multiplicity’, but as 
mutually constituting each other. Although there are separate ontological bases to 
different social divisions and identity categories such as ‘woman’, ‘black’ or ‘gay’, 
there is no concrete meaning to them that is not affected by their mutual constitution. 
There is no meaning to the notion of women that is not ethnicised, racialised, classed, 
aged, sexualised, etc. (Yuval-Davis, 2007: 5). But categories such as ‘gender’, ‘class’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The recognition of difference does not imply cultural relativism, which reduces gender inequality to 
cultural differences in such a way that ‘questions of power, agency, justice, and common criteria for 
critique and evaluation are silenced’ (Mohanty, 2002: 520).  
21 According to Mohanty (2002), these terms do not just refer to physical location, but ‘exist 
simultaneously and constitute each other’ (521). 
	   22 
‘ethnicity’, etc., are ‘always constructed, reproduced and resisted through 
intersections with one another and (…) transnationally’ (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a: 6). 
Thus an analysis of how gender-based struggles are linked to globalisation, 
neoliberalism and neocolonial policies is necessary for the study of relations within 
and between international, national and local institutions, as I will illustrate in my 
thesis. 
I have employed an intersectional approach to both ethnographic research and the 
analysis of the transnational political sphere of activism. For this reason, when I refer 
to ‘women’ I do not intend them to be understood as a ‘group’: women, like men, do 
not constitute a homogeneous category. In particular, women in Jordan differ in terms 
of their nationality (‘full’ Jordanian, or of Palestinian or Iraqi origin) and religion 
(Muslim or Christian). Differences also derive from social class, educational and 
professional background, political orientation and place of residence (Al-Ali and 
Pratt, 2009a). Whenever I use the terms ‘women’ and ‘female candidates’ in this 
thesis I am aware that each woman has her own political, professional and educational 
experiences, as well as differences linked to tribal relations, ethnic origins, religion 
and so on. While I am careful to understand the intersections that shape the identity of 
each woman, I am also aware that in the context of the transnational sphere of 
activism, women are often depicted as a coherent group or category. As Huston 
(1979) has shown in her study of family units and their individual members in 
countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Tunisia, there is the risk of assuming 
that all ‘third-world’ women have the same problems and needs, and that they should 
therefore have the same interests and goals. The assumption that all women somehow 
constitute a homogeneous group reinforces Mohanty’s notion of the ‘sameness of 
their oppression’ (1988: 65), as well as the well-known trope of ‘white men saving 
brown women from brown men’ (Spivak, 1994: 93).  
The treatment of women as a homogeneous group is a reflection of the neocolonial 
and neoliberal tendencies of transnational discussions. These discussions, like those 
that take place at national level, are often characterised by inequalities of gender, class 
and ethnicity, as well as by hierarchies based on linguistic and cultural competence, 
access to more or less privileged languages, and access to technologies (Mackie, 
2001). The transnational public sphere is a gendered, raced, classed and ethnicised 
space, no less so than the local and national spheres. Indeed, while appealing to the 
protection of women’s rights, some transnational organisations, networks and 
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campaigns may reproduce inequalities related to colonial domination, racial hierarchy 
and capitalist exploitation. These are institutions that are transnational in method only, 
not in their beliefs; they seek to expand in terms of their own membership, 
networking and lobbying, but they are not necessarily rooted in post-colonial, anti-
imperialist or global justice approaches (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a: 260). Politics that 
are transnational in both content and practice recognise the diversity of women’s 
experiences and subjectivities, and take into consideration the intersections of all 
types of differences in the face of economic exploitation and imperialism. 
During my work on my PhD, my academic positionality has been informed by 
transnational feminist politics and intersectionality. However, it was particularly 
during my fieldwork experience that my academic methodology intersected with my 
personal positionality. 
 
Experiencing fieldwork 
 
When we enter a field we make footprints on the land and are likely 
to disturb the environment. When we leave we may have mud on 
our shoes, pollen on our clothes. If we leave the gate open this may 
have serious implications for farmers and their animals (Letherby, 
2003: 6). 
 
As Letherby brilliantly notes, this image of entering a field can be applied to the 
experiences of a researcher conducting fieldwork. As ethnographic researchers we 
constantly need to be sensitive to respondents, and to the impact of our presence on 
their lives and in the research process (Letherby, 2003: 6). The aim of ethnographic 
research is to offer a holistic and rich overview of the subject under examination, 
considering the interviewee ‘not an object, but a subject with agency, history, and his 
or her own idiosyncratic command of a story’ (Madison, 2005: 25). Thus the power 
relations between researcher and informant, as well as the issue of representation, are 
central to ethnographic research (Harding, 1987; Mohanty, 1988; Visweswaran, 1994; 
Davies, 1999).  
Doing ethnographic research certainly involves ‘intersubjectivity’, i.e. the way the 
researcher and the researched community relate to each other, the relevance of the 
politico-cultural worlds to which each belong, and the ultimate purpose of the 
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research project (Sayigh, 1996: 2). Intersubjectivity intersects with subjectivity,22 
particularly when a feminist approach is employed. The researcher’s subjectivity is 
conceptualised as a constant interplay of and contestation between ontological, social, 
psychical, corporeal and discursive forces (Wickramasinghe, 2010: 34). I consider my 
research to be feminist ethnography: a self-reflexive approach to and interpretation of 
data, constantly shaped my positionality. Along with Wickramasinghe (2010: 38), I 
understand reflexivity as an epistemological-theoretical standpoint and method-
practice of research that outlines and includes individuals’ experiences, opinions, 
insecurities and emotional perspectives, in opposition to approaches that strive to be 
abstract, generalised, objective or definitive. In this section I will present the methods 
I employed during my fieldwork, together with some tensions, challenges and ethical 
reflections that contributed to my positionality.  
 
The use of interviews and participant observation 
 
Interviewing is a hallmark experience of fieldwork research (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
As Madison (2005) notes: 
 
The beauty of this method of interviewing is in the complex realms 
of individual subjectivity, memory, yearnings, polemics, and hope 
that are unveiled and inseparable from shared and inherited 
expressions of communal strivings, social history, and political 
possibility. The interview is a window to individual subjectivity and 
collective belonging: I am because we are and we are because I am 
(26). 
 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were my main research method, together with 
participant observation and participation in conferences, events and demonstrations. 
During my nine months of fieldwork I conducted around 65 interviews with a diverse 
range of respondents; and I was not just conducting interviews, but learning about 
women’s lives, or aspects of their lives, from their own perspectives and within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Subjectivity refers to the consciousness of the internal self (in terms of thought, emotions, 
experiences, beliefs, assumptions, intentions, imagination and consciousness of oneself and others), as 
well as to the external identities imposed by society (Wickramasinghe, 2010). 
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context of their lived experience, participating in their lives whenever possible 
(O’Reilly, 2005). My months in Jordan were an intense and sometimes very 
emotional time, which gave rise to conflicting feelings.  
I interviewed 26 female candidates from Amman and outside, including women 
from Jerash, Salt, Zarqa, Irbid, Karak, Madaba, Ajloun and Tafilah.23 The women I 
interviewed came from different educational backgrounds,24 and their ages ranged 
from 32 to 67, with the majority of them being in their 40s and 50s. The majority 
were Muslim – only five were Christian – and the majority were involved in 
community work and volunteering.25 Only seven had already run during municipal or 
parliamentary elections before 2010.26 Seven had been affiliated with a party27 during 
the 2010 election campaign; the others had all run as independents.  
With female candidates and women’s rights activists I engaged in informal in-
depth interviews, using open-ended questions that allowed for a range of responses. 
Depending on my relationship with the interviewee, these interviews could become 
vibrant discussions between the two of us (Letherby, 2003; Madison, 2005). I usually 
tried to follow the general outline I had planned at the beginning of the meeting, using 
a semi-structured approach; however, most of the time I ended up conducting 
unstructured interviews, which gave women not only the space to explore ideas and 
be reflexive, but also the time to delve into their thoughts so as to be able to express 
their opinions, doubts, fears and hopes (O’Reilly, 2005: 117). Allowing them to 
wander away from the point at times helped me get to their personal views. However, 
if a woman digressed too far from the general topic of the interview, I would gently 
try to bring her back to it. Along with the sit-down interviews, I took every 
opportunity to ask questions and glean information in many circumstances, such as 
while sitting in a car with a woman I had already interviewed, or while eating a lunch 
she had cooked for me in her home, these being less formal and friendlier contexts – 
although I tried not to be too demanding.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jordan is divided into 12 governorates and three areas in the north, centre and south called Central, 
Northern and Southern Badia. I was able to interview women from nine governorates. 
24 Four of them had secondary-school qualifications, 15 had Bachelors degrees, three had Masters 
degrees, and four had PhDs.  
25 22 of them were involved in some form of volunteering with women’s and children’s programmes in 
their communities. 
26 One of them had run for municipal elections in both 2003 and 2007; two had run in 2007 for the 
municipal elections; two had run in 2003 for the parliamentary elections; two had run in 2007 for the 
parliamentary elections. 
27 Six women are members of the al-Wasat Islamic Party; one woman is member of the National Party. 
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I learnt a lot during these interviews, about Jordan, about being a woman in 
politics, and about being a feminist, mother, sister, daughter and wife. The majority of 
the interviews consisted in one-off visits, but with two women in particular I managed 
to have several conversations. I went to their houses or offices, or to cafés, or they 
came to my place – whatever was more convenient and comfortable for them. I 
established interesting relationships with some of them, and with a few I also became 
friends. As Al-Ali (2000) points out in relation to her fieldwork with the Egyptian’s 
women movement, ‘becoming a friend was both the most pleasurable as well as 
problematic aspect’ of her research (13). In my experience, the closer I got to the 
women, the more difficult it became to define the border between being a researcher 
and being a friend (Letherby, 2003). On a positive note, and similarly to Al-Ali’s 
experience (2000), interviewing a friend sometimes allowed me to discuss particular 
problems that the interviewee would not have addressed with other colleagues or 
friends.  
Female candidates were not the only people I interviewed. I also contacted local 
and international organisations (IOs) that claimed to work towards ‘women’s 
empowerment’. In particular, I focused on organisations that trained and provided 
activities for female candidates before the 2010 parliamentary elections. I contacted 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI)28 and the International Republican Institute 
(IRI),29 since they were the major international bodies providing political leadership 
and capacity-building training specifically for women. I managed to conduct three 
separate interviews at the IRI with three different practitioners, and I spoke with one 
practitioner at the NDI on multiple occasions. Moreover, at the NDI I participated in a 
workshop organised with female candidates. While in-depth and semi-structured 
interviews helped me to forge one-to-one relationships with my interviewees, 
participant observation during workshops and conferences allowed me to observe 
how women and practitioners related to each other in the context of a group.  
Participant observation is a problematic term. As Middleton (1970) notes, the main 
problem with this method is trying to ‘live as a human being among other human 
beings yet also having to act as an objective observer’ (9). Finding the right balance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 According to its website, the NDI is a ‘nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and 
strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability 
in government’, (http://www.ndi.org/ [accessed 9 April 2013]).  
29 According to its website, the IRI is a ‘nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that advances freedom and 
democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, democratic 
governance and the rule of law’, (http://www.iri.org/ [accessed 9 April 2013]). 
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between participating and observing was difficult. My aim was to use participant 
observation not only as a tool for collecting data, but also as a means by which to 
sensitise myself to the world of others through experiences and the construction of 
that world (O’Reilly, 2005: 106). Although I conducted more interviews than 
participant observation, it was interesting to note the differences between how women 
discussed things with their colleagues and/or trainers and how they would discuss 
them in one-to-one talks with me, as I will particularly outline in chapter four. I also 
conducted interviews with practitioners working at United Nations Entity for Gender 
Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN–WOMEN),30 the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)31 and Vital Voices Global Partnership (VVGP),32 
through which I participated in a week-long workshop on women’s empowerment in 
Amman in February 2011.  
During my time in Jordan I managed to contact the country’s main women’s 
organisations and to engage in discussions with their presidents or directors and with 
the women’s rights activists working there. As I will describe in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters, my experience with each of these organisations was extremely 
different, and in certain cases was unique. I managed quite often to visit the Jordanian 
Women Union (JWU)33 and the Arab Women Organization (AWO).34 I also 
conducted in-depth interviews at the Jordanian National Commission for Women 
(JNCW),35 the Jordanian National Forum for Women (JNFW)36 and the General 
Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW).37 I did not contact women-specific 
organisations only, but also groups and research institutes that worked on election 
monitoring (such as the al-Hayat Centre in Amman38), gender mainstreaming (such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 http://www.unwomen.org/ [accessed 9 April 2013]. 
31 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html [accessed 9 April 2013]. 
32 The VVGP is a ‘non-governmental organization that identifies, trains and empowers emerging 
women leaders and social entrepreneurs around the globe’, (http://www.vitalvoices.org/ [accessed 9 
April 2013]). 
33 The JWU is an independent organisation, (http://www.jwu.itgo.com/bg.htm [accessed 9 April 
2013]). 
34 The AWO is an independent organisation, (http://www.awo.org.jo/ [accessed 9 April 2013]). 
35 The JNCW is a semi-governmental organisation, (http://www.women.jo/en/home.php [accessed 9 
April 2013]). 
36 The JNFW is a semi-governmental organisation established and headed by Princess Basma, 
(http://www.princessbasma.jo/index.php?page_type=pages&page_id=486 [accessed 9 April 2013]). 
37 The GFJW is a governmental organisation, 
(http://www.princessbasma.jo/index.php?page_type=pages&page_id=487 [accessed 9 April 2013]). 
38 The Centre is an independent, non-profit organisation, (http://www.hayatcenter.org/ [accessed 9 
April 2013]). 
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the Gender and Social Fund39) and social science research (such as the al-Quds Centre 
for Political Studies40). I also interviewed five independent women’s rights activists 
and gender consultants working in Jordan, three male members of political parties and 
a former male member of parliament. 
Given my interest in understanding the role and implications of state policies in 
gendering democratisation processes, I also attempted to interview people who were 
more involved with the formal institutions of the state. I had short interviews with 
four female MPs (lasting around 30 minutes), and I also conducted a long and 
insightful interview with former MP Toujan Faisal, and a stimulating interview with 
Senator Leila Sharaf. Finally, I managed to talk to two women working at the gender 
units of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and the 
Ministry of Social and Political Development (MoSPD), and to the head of the Quota 
Commission at the Ministry of the Interior.  
Gaining access to my informants was less complicated than I had expected. At first 
I tried to establish contact with the aforementioned organisations in order to gain 
access both to their staff and to the women who participated in their programmes. 
Starting from those connections, my network enlarged through the so-called 
‘snowball’ effect.41 Although gaining access to female candidates through 
organisations was a useful way to enlarge my network, I preferred to contact them 
through women I had already interviewed – particularly if the latter were friends with 
the former. In this way I felt that it was easier to establish a trusting relationship with 
my interviewees.  
 
Challenges and ethical reflections 
 
Establishing ‘rapport’ with my informants was one of my first priorities, and 
consisted in finding a ‘balance between pragmatism and sensitivity in the respondent 
relationship’ (Wickramasinghe, 2010: 165). In order to start to establish a relationship 
of trust, I first had to gain full, informed and meaningful consent from all research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The GSF is a ‘Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) initiative that supports Jordan’s 
efforts to achieve equality between men and women’, (http://www.gsf-jo.org/index.asp [accessed 9 
April 2013]). 
40 The Centre is an independent research institute in Amman, (http://www.alqudscenter.org/english/ 
[accessed 9 April 2013]). 
41 According to Boeije (2010) an ‘initial number of participants are asked for the name of others, who 
are subsequently approached’ (40).  
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participants (O’Reilly, 2005: 62). To do so, I tried to be clear about the aim of my 
research and my background. As Madison (2005) suggests, the ‘lay summary is more 
for the benefit of the subjects you will be meeting. It serves to assist them in 
understanding who you are, what you are doing, and what their role will be in the 
process’ (23). In line with Madison’s suggestions (2005), I wanted first to explain 
‘who I am’: a middle-class, married, white Italian woman, doing a PhD in gender 
studies in the UK. Second, I wanted to be clear about what I was going to research.  
Reflecting on my identity, at the beginning of my fieldwork I did not realise the 
extent to which being Italian and married might impact upon the creation of rapport 
with my interviewees. When I said that I was studying at a UK university, most of my 
(Jordanian) informants turned up their noses; but as soon as I specified my 
nationality, a big smile would light up their faces. More than once I heard statements 
like: ‘Oh we are similar, you can understand us, because you are the Arab country of 
Europe.’42 I was astonished. I had never thought of Italy in those terms, and I was not 
fully able to understand why they would say this. After a few months of interviews, 
discussions and participation in Jordanian life, I understood. The association was 
related neither to superficial clichés about similar cultural factors, such as the 
importance of the family, the community and religion in our everyday lives, nor to the 
relative geographical proximity of our two countries in the Mediterranean region. It 
was about the manner of politics. The political structures and scenes of Jordan and 
Italy have different historical backgrounds, and my research does not seek to engage 
in this kind of discussion. However, according to most of the people I talked to, the 
facts that in my country corruption and favouritism are continuously spreading, and 
that we were governed by the same man for almost 20 years (albeit with short and 
useless pauses), coupled with Italian citizens’ apparent inability to shake off this 
stagnation, all led my interviewees to think that we shared similar experiences. Most 
importantly, they thought I could understand their situation. Those first links, together 
with the fact that I am married – since the majority of my informants had families and 
children – increased my credibility and helped to build trust. I also think that my 
being a woman allowed my female respondents to feel more comfortable with me, to 
the point that I often faced personal and intimate questions about why I do not yet 
have children. Since I am used to hearing these remarks from relatives and friends in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Field notes, December 2010. 
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Italy – where, at least in the small village I come from in the north of the country, one 
of the main requirements after marriage seems to be to have children – I was not 
particularly troubled by these questions. Indeed, I thought that opening up about my 
personal life might be a good way to engage with my informants. But being a woman 
revealed to be a bit challenging while talking to some male interviewees, as I will 
further illustrate in the conclusion of the thesis. 
Although on a personal level I had very positive experiences with my respondents, 
explaining my research sometimes proved to be problematic. I found it particularly 
difficult to explain and engage in discussions about ‘gender studies’ and ‘gender 
issues’. One of the most astonishing of these pre-interview explanations took place 
with a female candidate from Zarqa. She did not speak very good English, and for this 
reason her husband, a former MP, eagerly offered to act as interpreter. Given that I 
knew neither the interpreter nor the informant, I felt I had to build rapport with both 
of them. I started to explain my background, but when he heard the word ‘gender’, he 
immediately stopped me and said: ‘I don’t understand why you talk about gender…  I 
can physically see a woman… I can see a man… but I can’t see a gender’ (Zarqa, 2 
February 2011). I was left open-mouthed: in his mind he needed to be able to 
empirically see ‘gender’ as a ‘body’. This is an extreme anecdote, but it reveals how 
difficult and challenging it was to be clear about my research in certain 
circumstances.  
This anecdote brings up one of the biggest limitations I encountered during my 
fieldwork: language. I have a basic knowledge of Arabic, but it was not enough to 
conduct a full interview in Arabic by myself. I needed an interpreter. Luckily, two 
women I met in Jordan – Vanda, a young activist who was very enthusiastic about 
helping with my research, and Ahlam, one of the female candidates I interviewed – 
offered to help me with interpreting. Since their English was very good, and given the 
close relationships we had established, I felt extremely comfortable about having 
them as my interpreters. Most of the people I interviewed spoke English; in those 
cases I conducted the interview myself.43 When I needed an interpreter, the rapport 
between my interpreter and me, and that between my informant and me, came into 
play, together with the relationship between informant and interpreter. Each interview 
was a different story, and the diverse dynamics depended on the person we were with, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 I needed an interpreter while interviewing eight female candidates. 
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the place we were in, our ability to concentrate and establish an intimate atmosphere, 
and the presence of other people such as friends, husbands, colleagues, daughters and 
sons. Although I did not encounter many tensions with Vanda or Ahlam, when my 
informants wanted to choose the interpreter, it was another story. Similarly to my trip 
to Zarqa, during an interview in January 2011 in Balqa, with Eman, a female 
candidate, I found myself in a tricky situation. Eman insisted on having her own 
interpreter, and although I would have preferred to have mine, I agreed. Before each 
interview I would ask whether I could record the discussion on an audio device. When 
allowed, I did so. If not, I took notes. That day, although Eman did not have a 
problem with being recorded, her interpreter did. That interview confirmed the 
importance of building a relationship not only with my interviewees, but also with the 
interpreters, especially when they did not already know me. During this interview, as 
in all interviews when I was not allowed to make a recording, I tried to take extensive 
notes straight afterwards. This took time. For this reason, whenever possible, I 
preferred not to schedule more than two interviews per day; this allowed me to take 
proper field notes and to think about the discussion I had just had. 
The establishment of rapport is closely correlated with confidentiality and 
anonymity. Confidentiality means ensuring that what we hear goes no further than us, 
or is at least not attributable to anyone who can be identified (O’Reilly, 2005; 
Letherby, 2003; Wickramasinghe, 2010). Respecting participants’ confidentiality and 
right to privacy can mean maintaining their anonymity. However, sometimes the 
researcher has to juggle between participants who wish to remain anonymous and 
those who desire recognition. Indeed, some participants are very unhappy when their 
names are not mentioned in ethnographies (Grinyer, 2002 cited in O’Reilly, 2005: 
65). In this thesis I use my informants’ first names in cases where they gave me their 
consent to do so. In the minority of cases in which the informants did not allow me to 
use their name, I have not done so. I have always tried to act according to my 
informants’ wishes. However, since I have to try to cause as little pain or harm as 
possible and to be aware of my effects on the participants and on my data (O’Reilly, 
2005), in some sensitive situations I have decided not use interviewees’ names out of 
consideration for their personal safety, even though they may have given me 
permission to do so.  
Consent and confidentiality are fundamental ethical issues in the conduct of 
research, but they are not the only ones, especially when it comes to feminist research 
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projects. Feminist research ethics has traditionally been concerned with the goals, 
processes and outcomes of research (Wickramasinghe, 2010). My research process 
developed over four years, during which time I was involved in different types of 
research. This research not only involved ethnographic fieldwork, but also consisted 
in library research and writing up, and in the dissemination of my findings. My 
responsibility to share my knowledge with my respondents, as well as my 
responsibility towards international and local academic communities, made me reflect 
on the extent to which my research will produce social change. While in Jordan, I 
managed to present part of my findings to some of my respondents during a seminar 
organised at the British Institute in Amman on 4 April 2011. I was glad that some of 
the women I interviewed came: they were very happy to see that their names appeared 
in my PowerPoint presentation and to be part of my research. During that seminar I 
felt I was ‘repaying’ my interviewees for what they had given me during the months 
of fieldwork, because I let them understand that without them my research could not 
have been done. But was that enough? Recalling Berreman’s (1969) frustration at the 
‘lack of any human purpose in a discipline that engages in the study of humankind’ 
(cited in Davies, 1999: 12), what has been the effect of my research on my 
respondents? Most importantly, has my research been a form of feminist activism 
(Wickramasinghe, 2010: 23)? 44 I hope to answer these questions throughout the 
thesis, and to reflect on them in the conclusion. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into five main chapters and a conclusion. While recalling the 
general aim and research questions described above, each chapter will analyse 
specific debates. 
Chapter one involves a theoretical discussion of the gender dimension of 
democratisation processes, introducing the theoretical debates and concepts upon 
which the thesis is based. Throughout the chapter I will shed light on feminist 
critiques of democratisation, including debates on gender mainstreaming, the 
representation of women’s gender interests, and women’s participation. Although it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Wickramasinghe (2010) points to the idea that research can be conceptualised as 
intersections/overlaps between savoir and connaissances (23). 
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mainly addresses theoretical debates, it will also refer to the empirical context of the 
Middle East.  
In chapter two I will specifically focus on Jordan. I will shed light on the historical 
phases of liberalisation and democratisation that have occurred in the country, 
particularly including the role of women’s organisations and the influence of the 
regime on the promotion of women’s rights. My analysis of Jordan’s socio-political 
context will help me to introduce more specific debates in the subsequent chapters. 
In chapter three I will particularly address women’s political participation in 
Jordan. By analysing the introduction of a gender quota system in parliament,45 I 
interrogate the reasons and interests behind the adoption of measures such as quotas. 
Shedding light on the actors involved in the introduction of quotas, I aim to 
understand the extent to which gender quotas were introduced to meet women’s 
gender interests. Drawing on the experiences and opinions of female candidates and 
‘women in politics’, my discussion will not be limited to the analysis of the positive 
and negative aspects of the introduction of quotas, but will go on to understand the 
social, political and historical factors we need to take into consideration when 
analysing the impact of such measures on gender social justice. Finally, I ask whether 
equal representation will be enough to ensure that women’s rights are included and 
incorporated into decision-making processes. 
In chapter four I will continue the discussion of women’s political participation 
from a different angle. By analysing the aims and agendas of selected international 
and local women’s organisations in the training and activities they organised for 
female candidates before the 2010 parliamentary elections, I aim to understand how 
gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment translate into practice. Is the 
relationship between gender mainstreaming/women’s empowerment and the agendas 
of these organisations transformative? Drawing on interviews with practitioners in the 
field and women’s rights activists, and on my own reflections on my participation in 
events and conferences, I aim to understand the relationship between women’s 
political participation and the promotion of leadership. Moreover, on the basis of 
interviews with female candidates who participated in the activities offered by these 
organisations, I ask to what extent women’s gender interests are embodied in the 
agendas of local women’s organisations and selected international institutions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 A reserved-seats quota system was introduced in parliament in 2003, assigning six seats to women. 
In 2010 the number of reserved seats was doubled, and in 2013 it increased to 15.  
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The focus on women’s gender interests is central to the fifth chapter of the thesis 
as well. In this last chapter I will pay attention to the representation of gender interests 
by taking into consideration how the different actors that claim to advocate women’s 
rights intersect with and relate to each other. Starting from the campaigns of female 
candidates and MPs, I will shed light on the sometimes contradictory relationships 
between female candidates, MPs and women’s organisations, in order to understand 
the extent to which women’s gender interests are met. In this chapter I will also 
address more specifically the intersections between women’s organisations and the 
regime, and how this relationship may impact upon the promotion of women’s rights 
and gender justice in Jordan: how are women’s rights perceived, understood and 
included in state policies?   
In the conclusion I will bring together the main arguments of the thesis, linking 
debates about gender quotas, women’s political empowerment, gender mainstreaming 
and the representation of women’s gender interests to the context of the Arab 
uprisings. What is the relevance of ‘gendering democratisation’ in this particular 
historical moment? Most importantly, I aim to shed light on what the specific socio-
political context of Jordan might tell us (or not) about the intersections between the 
interconnected national, regional and international levels in the ‘gendering’ of 
democratisation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE GENDER DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATISATION 
 
In April 2011 I attended a one-day conference in Amman organised by the 
Foundation for the Future,1 with women activists from Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and 
Jordan. All participants were involved in the ongoing uprisings and talked about their 
own and their close friends’ experiences in the demonstrations. The audience, which 
consisted of both women and men of different ages and from diverse countries in the 
region, became very moved during the debates, especially when the women from 
Yemen and Egypt talked about their past activism and their more recent 
demonstrations in the streets in an extremely touching and passionate way. At one 
point, Abla, a middle-aged Egyptian activist, explained how she had encouraged 
women from small villages in the south of Egypt to go out and speak up for their 
rights. During her talk, she posed a key question: ‘Women’s rights are a fundamental 
part of democracy, but is democracy the solution?’ I heard that question spoken out 
loud at that event, but it was on my mind all the time while I was reading, researching 
and conducting interviews. As Moghadam (2011) has recently said, if democracy is to 
be inclusive, representative and enduring, it needs women. But how exactly is gender 
related to and significant for democracy and democratisation? The relationship 
between gender and democracy has been widely debated in the past (by, among 
others, Young, 1997; Joseph, 2000a; Moghadam, 2003; Kandiyoti, 2007; Al-Ali and 
Pratt, 2009a-b), and also more recently with reference to the Arab uprisings (Lust, 
2011; Al-Ali, 2012; Winegar, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 2012; Ali-Agrama, 2012; Hafez, 
2012). However, the tensions emerging from the broader discourse on gender and 
democracy may take many different shapes in relation to the role of the family, the 
state, civil society and the international community.  
Mindful of the vast literature on the topic, in this chapter I aim to problematise the 
discourse on democratisation with reference to the Middle East. After introducing a 
theoretical framework on the gender dimension of democratisation, I will then focus 
on the identification of women’s and gender interests. In my analysis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This was a conference at which the role of women in the 2011 uprisings was particularly discussed, 
14 April 2011. 
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democratisation, I will first discuss the extent to which gender mainstreaming and 
women’s empowerment may become transformative in their operationalisation. I will 
then present the role of international donors and the international community, together 
with the role of women’s activism in democratisation processes in the region. The 
chapter will conclude with an assessment of the relevance of women’s participation in 
light of the recent uprisings in the region (2011, 2012). 
 
Gendering democratisation: a theoretical framework 
 
Before anyone starts talking about democracy, we really need to 
understand what gender means in our society. Women’s rights are 
not automatically recognised and promoted when a country 
becomes a democracy. As long as the whole society does not 
change its attitude towards women’s rights, women will continue to 
be exploited by the state, the international community, and society 
as well (Lucine, Amman, 6 June 2011). 
 
I was sitting in the living room of Lucine, a middle-aged anthropologist whom I met 
during my time in Jordan, and we had ended up discussing the relevance of gender in 
democratisation processes, focusing particularly on the Jordanian context and the role 
of women’s organisations. Lucine raised a fundamental critique of discussions of 
democracy and democratisation: to what extent does gender matter in this process? 
According to Moghadam (2011), democracy is a multifaceted and ongoing process 
that takes place not only at the level of the national polity, but also at ‘different levels 
of social existence: in the family, in the community, at the workplace, in the 
economy, in civil society, and in the polity’. 
The mainstream literature on democratisation, especially the body of literature that 
developed in the 1980s on the processes of transition to democracy (Diamond et al., 
1988; O’Donnell et al., 1986), makes no mention of the gender dimension. Waylen 
(1994) argues that this silence on gender may be linked to the use of a narrow and 
restricted institutional definition of democracy, understood as ‘a political system, 
separate and apart from the economic and social system which is joined’ (Diamond et 
al., 1988 cited in Waylen, 1994: 332). Democracy perceived in this way risks 
becoming a ‘political method’ that serves as an institutional arrangement to generate 
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and legitimate leadership (Held, 1987: 164); its gender dimension is evidently 
sidestepped. Since gender relations are present in all types of institutions (Connell, 
1987: 120), gender regimes are fundamental in democracy and democratisation as 
well. Here gender is understood as ‘a constitutive element of social relationships 
based on perceived differences between the sexes’, being ‘a primary way of 
signifying relationships of power’ (Scott, 1988: 42). Moreover, gender orders the 
processes of everyday life, and is built into the major social organisations of society, 
such as the economy, ideology, the family and politics (Lorber, 1994) – recalling 
Moghadam’s definition of democracy as a multifaceted process. 
With reference to the Middle East, mainstream scholars consider democratisation a 
process rather than an event – usually quite a lengthy one (Ottaway and Choucair-
Visoso, 2008: 5), in which each country has to accommodate its own historical, 
political, cultural and economic transitional context (Saikal and Schnabel, 2003: 2). 
Some scholars have stressed the importance of structural factors in the process of 
democratic consolidation; these factors may include institutional reform and 
economic development (Tessler, 2002: 231), as well as the historical precedent in a 
number of polities for establishing informal and formal structures2 of power (Haynes, 
2001: 33). Luckham and White (1996: 221) argue that the discourse on 
democratisation was linked to the concepts of ‘marketisation’ and representative 
democracy by the political rhetoric of the 1990s.3 These approaches led to the view 
that democracy is favourable to the emergence of a political system that is 
(completely or almost completely) responsive to its citizens, allowing them to express 
their preferences (Dahl, 1972 cited in Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, 2008: 11; 
Haynes, 2001; Tessler, 2002; Hinnebush, 2006; Lockard, 2005).  
This debate is connected to the notion of political representation, which I will 
further analyse throughout the thesis. I understand political representation not only as 
an activity – as Pitkin suggests in The Concept of Representation (1967) – but also, 
more specifically, as a performance (Stoffel, 2008: 141). The promotion of reforms, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Haynes (2001) considers that politically relevant structures are both formal and informal. Permanent 
edifices of public life – such as laws, organisations, public offices and elections – fall within the former 
category. The dynamics of interests and identities, domination and resistance, and compromises and 
accommodations fall within the latter category. The author hypothesises that only the interaction of 
such aspects will determine the outcome of democratic consolidation in a polity (Haynes, 2001: 29). 
3 The authors refer to two different traditions in democratic theory: one emphasises a participatory 
model, in which citizens are more involved in the life of the public sphere, and the other stresses the 
representational democratic framework, i.e. liberal theory (Luckham and White, 1996). 
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the institution of elections and the ratification of laws, for example, can all be 
understood as performative acts. But to what extent do these acts represent social 
interests? Interests can be defined as ‘shared understanding and articulations of an 
individual or groups’ concern’ (Rai, 2008: 76), as I will examine in depth with 
reference to women’s and gender interests in the next section. Debates on the 
representation of interests, and on the transformative potential of performative acts 
such as reforms, raise questions as to whether, in relation to institutional arrangements 
(such as the regular holding of elections), changes and reforms are just formal steps 
towards democracy. A focus on responsiveness (i.e. on understanding whether 
elections have led to the formation of a responsive government) would make it easier 
to identify those reforms that might potentially affect the distribution of power in a 
country, leading to paradigm change (Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, 2008: 11). But if 
this may be the case with parliamentary democracies, it might be difficult to focus 
solely on responsiveness in a context in which patronage and clientelism occur, as I 
will explore in greater detail in relation to Jordan in chapter two. 
This approach elaborates the ways in which democratisation might lead to social 
change, but it leaves its gender dimension unexplored. Democratisation processes do 
not affect men and women in the same way, and gender relations have changed as a 
result of such processes (Waylen, 1994; Moghadam, 2003). For this reason, using 
gender as an analytical tool may be a way to outline the extent to which gender 
relations and orders have been shaped, constructed and challenged in democratisation 
processes in Jordan. In particular, by analysing the tensions among the state, the 
international community and women (including parliamentary candidates and 
women’s rights activists) in the promotion of women’s rights, I will pay attention to 
the spaces in which these actors build and shape gender relations. For the purposes of 
this research I will use Rai’s conceptualisation of democratisation as a working 
definition (2008). She understands democratisation as the process of ‘making 
democratic regimes, practices and discourses of public power’ (2008: 59), with a 
focus on the spaces where actors, states and individuals act in the public political 
sphere, including women’s experiences and perspectives.  
However, questions of women’s participation and of the representation of 
women’s and gender interests stem from the discussion of the role of women in 
democratisation processes. In this regard, feminist social scientists argue that a polity 
is not fully democratic if there is no adequate representation of women (Moghadam, 
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2003; Dahlerup, 2006; Abou-Zeid, 2006; Bozena, 2010; Krook et al., 2010). But is 
equal representation enough for women’s rights and gender issues4 to be included and 
incorporated in decision-making processes? More importantly, how can women’s and 
gender issues be perceived, understood and included in state policies without 
becoming instrumentalised? Before addressing these questions, it is important to 
understand what I mean when I refer to women’s and gender interests, since these 
terms are much used and much debated among academics (Jonasdottir, 1988). 
 
Women’s and gender interests 
 
There are debates among scholars (among others, Bourdieu, 1972; Molyneux, 1985; 
Jonasdottir, 1988; Moser, 1993; Rai, 2008) about the differentiation between 
women’s interests and gender interests: the former focus on women’s lives, and the 
latter address the structure of relations between men and women. The concept of 
women’s interests (as well as men’s interests) tends to refer to women’s biological 
similarities, and does not necessarily relate to their gender identity. As discussed in 
the introduction to the thesis, in the analysis of the positions of women (and men) in 
society, intersectionality comes into play. Women’s and men’s positions within 
gender hierarchies are shaped by a variety of different factors such as class, ethnicity, 
race and gender, and women’s and men’s interests may be determined as much by 
their class or ethnicity as by their gender (Moser, 1993: 38; Wordsworth, 2007: 3). 
Therefore, according to Molyneux (1985), ‘gender interests are those that women (or 
men for that matter) may develop by virtue of their social positioning through gender 
attributes’ (232). Both women and men have gender interests, which develop as a 
result of a given society’s construction of gender roles and relations.  
Molyneux (1985: 232–233) further conceptualises gender interests, dividing them 
into practical and strategic interests. Practical gender interests relate to immediate 
practical concerns, and are perceived as urgent necessities (e.g. clean water supplies, 
shelter and food). Practical gender interests seek a change in women’s conditions 
without insisting on a change in the larger system of gender dichotomies; they do not 
challenge accepted norms of gender subordination. On the other hand, as Molyneux 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In the context of this research the broad categories of women’s and gender issues are linked to gender 
equality and justice, and to the ways in which gender becomes institutionalised, as I will explain 
throughout this and the following chapters. 
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(1998) argues, strategic interests imply an ‘explicit questioning of the existing gender 
order and of the compliance of some women with it’ (235), and reflect the ‘need to 
shift the paradigm of power’ (Rai, 2008: 77). Strategic interests are formulated from 
the analysis of women’s subordination to men. According to Molyneux (1985), these 
include the ‘removal of institutionalised forms of discrimination’ such as rights to 
own land or property, or access to credit, ‘the attainment of political equality, (…) and 
the adoption of adequate measures against male violence and control over women’ 
(233), and so forth. Strategic gender interests are often identified as ‘feminist’5 and 
transformative, as is the level of consciousness required to struggle for them 
effectively (Moser, 1993: 39); they also vary depending on the particular cultural and 
socio-political context within which they are formulated. In order to achieve strategic 
gender interests, top-down and bottom-up interventions need to be integrated; but the 
failure to fulfil them continues to be a widespread preoccupation for many (Moser, 
1993), as I will discuss with specific reference to Jordanian politics in subsequent 
chapters. 
However, practical and strategic gender interests are very much linked and 
connected with each other. As Wordsworth (2007: 3) argues in relation to women’s 
participation in parliament in Afghanistan, addressing practical gender interests might 
lead to an improved strategic position for women more generally. Similarly, a change 
in strategic legislation may have a direct impact on women’s practical gender 
interests. Although they are often interlinked, Wordsworth (2007: 39) found that 
while women’s political influence per se may have increased since their entry into 
parliament, women’s strategic gender interests were not strongly represented in 
parliament; the focus was more on practical needs. This is an argument and position 
that I will further problematise with reference to Jordan.  
Throughout this thesis I will pay attention to the representation of women’s gender 
interests in parliament, during the candidacy, within local and international 
organisations, and in state institutions, with an emphasis on women’s potential to 
articulate their gender interests and challenging the useful but overly dichotomous 
framework introduced by Molyneux (1985). In the following sections, I will explore 
in greater detail the various ways in which gender has been employed in international 
development practices, and the extent to which this process has affected the Middle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As stated in the introduction to the thesis, for the purposes of this research I define ‘feminist’ as 
linked to gender justice and transformation (Kabeer, 2005). 
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East.  
 
Democratisation and international development 
 
Democratisation is frequently linked to international development practices, and 
gender justice and women’s rights have been central to the recently prevailing 
international discourses on democratisation. However, if gender inequalities have 
been relevant to the work of development scholars (among others, Rai, 2008; 
Kandiyoti, 2007; Kabeer, 2004; Moghadam, 2003), for the most part this has not been 
the case for mainstream international relations researchers. 
Women’s and gender issues started to become central to development discourse in 
the early 1970s, when the term ‘women in development’ (WID) was coined and 
articulated by American liberal feminists (Visvanathan, 1997). Grounded in the 
modernisation theory6 of the 1950s–1970s, this concept assumed that women were 
not integrated into the process of development (Razavi and Miller, 1995). WID did 
not question the sources of women’s subordination and oppression, and accepted 
existing social structures; women were also treated as an undifferentiated category, 
overlooking the influence of class, race and culture. A critique of WID led to the 
‘women and development’ approach (WAD), which considered that women were 
always part of the development processes, treating them as important economic actors 
in their societies, and stressing attention to the private-public domain7 (Pateman, 
1983). However, WAD failed to analyse differing modes of production of women’s 
subordination and oppression. It also discouraged any ‘strict analytical focus on the 
problems of women independent of those of men since both sexes are seen to be 
disadvantaged with oppressive global structure based on class and capital’ (Kumar 
Bala, 2010: 2; Visvanathan, 1997).  
It was then that, under the influence of socialist feminist thinking, the concept of 
gender was introduced into development studies. Starting from Simone de Beauvoir’s 
(1949) dictum that ‘one is not born a woman, one becomes one,’ ‘gender’ refers to the 
social and cultural constructions of masculinities and femininities, not to the fact of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Modernisation theory stresses ‘Western values’ and targets individuals as the catalyst for social 
change, depicting traditional societies as authoritarian and male-dominated and modern ones as 
democratic and egalitarian (Visvanathan, 1997: 17). Liberal feminists tend to endorse this theory, while 
critiques of modernisation theory find its characterisation of ‘third-world’ women as distorted and 
detrimental (Mohanty et al., 1991).  
7 See the introduction to the thesis for an explanation and critical analysis of the private-public debate.  
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being male or female in its entirety. The concept of gender refers to relationships 
characterised by power differences, and points to processes in which ‘hierarchies are 
established, reproduced and challenged’ (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a: 8). Lorber (1994) 
defines gender as ‘a process of social construction, a system of social stratification, 
and an institution that structures every aspect of our lives because of its 
embeddedness in the family, the workplace, and the state, as well as in sexuality, 
language and culture’ (5). Moreover, gender not only focuses on power relations and 
differences, but by addressing social relations, it also highlights the intersections of 
race, ethnicity and class (Collins, 1999). The fact that gender constitutes a ‘pervasive 
ordering principle’ (Peterson, 1998: 42), which is seen to ‘shape the dynamics of 
every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena’ 
(Cockburn, 1999: 3 in Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a: 8) led to a rethink of the concept of 
WAD. The ‘gender and development’ approach (GAD) questions the assignment of 
gender roles to different sexes. Rejecting the private-public dichotomy, it sees women 
as agents of change rather than as passive recipients of development assistance 
(Young, 1997). Gender also became part of the language of international development 
when the institutionalisation of women’s and gender interests in every sector and area 
of public policy started to be called ‘gender mainstreaming’.8 
Feminist international relations (IR) scholars then started to bring gender analysis 
into mainstream IR scholarship and discourses, analysing women’s gender interests 
and experiences (Rai, 2008; Moghadam, 2003; Young, 1997; Beneria, 1997) and 
considering the interactions of ‘non-state, antistate and trans-state actors’ (Peterson 
and Runyan, 1993: 113, in Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a: 9). For instance, IR scholars 
began to include a gender analysis in their discussions of the process of socialisation, 
through which ideas and norms influence the behaviour of individuals and states, and 
international norms are internalised and implemented domestically (Finnemore, 1996; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz 1995). However, few researchers demonstrated 
the actual gendered impact that international norms might have on domestic politics 
(Enloe, 2000), especially with reference to gender mainstreaming.9 No doubt, as Risse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A theoretical discussion of gender mainstreaming is presented in the next section. 
9 As some authors recognise (Peshkopia and Arben, 2008), the above-mentioned research on the 
process of socialisation is limited to a subset of international human rights norms, particularly those 
norms that are included in the ‘freedom from’ rights (freedom from torture, from detention without 
trial, from disappearance, etc.), leaving unexplained the proliferation within democratising countries of 
norms not included in the ‘freedom from’ group. Furthermore, despite their wide applicability, these 
models focus only on cases in which norm proliferation affects regime change, and do not explain the 
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et al. (1999) point out, international norms and principles ‘do not float freely’ (4), but 
affect domestic institutional change in a differential manner, through the 
establishment and sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational 
actors.10 But how do international norms affect gender power relations in domestic 
institutions with reference to gender mainstreaming policies? This question is central 
to my entire analysis, with reference both to the role of the Jordanian state in 
promoting gender justice at the national level, and to the role of the international 
community in pursuing democratisation efforts. But before this analysis can take 
shape in the subsequent chapters of the thesis, it is important to understand what 
gender mainstreaming means. 
 
Gender mainstreaming 
 
Thanks to women’s movements and women activists worldwide, issues such as the 
incorporation of gender within existing institutions, the creation of new institutions ad 
hoc, and the parallel use of both strategies have become central to political and 
academic contexts. The push to integrate gender and women’s issues into the 
structures of national and international institutions gained real prominence during the 
World Conference on International Women’s Year, held in Mexico City between 19 
June and 2 July 1975. This was the first world conference on the status of women, and 
it highlighted the continuous and pervasive nature of discrimination against women. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
international proliferation of norms that do not bring any such change but simply improve the human 
rights conditions in the country. This critique of the constructivist approach to socialisation claims that 
socialisation requires all the pieces of the relevant social structure – including not only the norms 
themselves, but also a range of international institutions to oversee compliance with them, and 
advocacy networks to monitor norm compliance and norm-breaking – to be in place for the process to 
be effective.  
10 A brand new strand of scholarship (Checkel, 2005), post-functionalism, has made serious efforts to 
show how international organisations socialise states and agents with international norms, bringing 
domestic politics back in, including political opposition by domestic actors. One of the weaknesses of 
post-functionalism is its view that the agents who are the target of socialisation include only individual 
policymakers and institutions, excluding the wider interests of society. Michelutti (2007) argues that 
because of the focus on ‘institutional factors’, rather than on ‘the practices and ideas of local people’ 
which locally legitimise (or do not legitimise) democracy and the practices associated with it, the ways 
in which the values and practices of democracy become embedded in particular cultural and social 
practices and entrenched in the consciousness of ordinary people have not been deeply taken into 
consideration by scholars. This is what she calls ‘the process of vernacularisation of democratic 
politics’ (Michelutti, 2007: 639). The vernacularisation process has been one of the main focuses of 
critique of the socialisation argument, especially in relation to gender studies, understood by Merry 
(2006) as the process that captures the important role played by local agents in making international 
human rights laws and ideas applicable in specific local contexts in order to challenging gender 
violence. 
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The United Nations Decade for Women (1976–1985), which followed this conference 
and included two more World Conferences  (Copenhagen 198011 and Nairobi 198512), 
brought further attention to the issue. From the second half of the 1970s, international 
funders began to promote the integration of women into development. The Fourth 
World Conference on Women (1995) produced the Beijing Platform for Action 
(BPFA),13 a ‘visionary roadmap on the path to gender equality’ (Zaoudé and Sandler, 
2001: 26). In the 1990s, feminists working within the European Commission (EC) 
developed the concept of ‘gender mainstreaming’ in an effort to promote gender 
equality policies among member states; gender mainstreaming was then included in 
the Platform for Action. This consensus document placed gender equality and the 
advancement of women on the global policymaking agenda. 
The main assumption of gender mainstreaming is that gender perspectives are 
essential to policymaking programmes (West, 1999). As a strategy for social change, 
gender mainstreaming requires that all ‘decision-making processes take gender into 
account’ (Hawkesworth, 2006: 96), investigating the gender impacts, outcomes and 
implications of proposed policies and programmes on men and women. The United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) developed a definition in which the 
main goal was to achieve equality between men and women, infusing gender 
considerations into organisational processes. The United Nations defined gender 
mainstreaming as:  
 
(…) the process of assessing the implications for women and men 
of any planned action, including legislation, policies or 
programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy of making 
women’s as well men’s concerns and experiences an integral 
dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic 
and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and 
inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender 
equality (ECOSOC, 1997). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Quality, Development and Peace, 14–
30 July 1980. 
12 World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for 
Women: Quality, Development and Peace, 15–26 July 1985. 
13 Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace, September 
1995. 
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This definition strengthens the integration of women and men’s concerns into the 
outputs, policies and programmes of organisations. Rai (2008) agrees with this 
definition, and further conceptualises gender mainstreaming as a ‘process of gender 
democratisation, including women and their own perception of their political interests 
and political projects into the policy-making processes’ (72). Agreeing with Rai’s 
definition as it connects with democratisation processes, I also adhere to the 
‘transformative’ approach proposed by Squires14 (1999) and developed by others 
(Woodward, 2003; Verloo, 2005). As a strategy, gender mainstreaming is 
transformative because it ‘claims to address and redress the genderedness of systems 
and processes’ (Verloo, 2005: 347). Through the transformative agenda, dialogues 
between diverse social groups are emphasised, and the experiences, knowledge and 
interests of women and men are made central to development and democratisation 
practices (Staudt, 1998; Herbert, 2007; Squires, 2005). Moreover, in order to be fully 
transformative, there is a need to include a strategy for empowerment by creating 
space for non-hegemonic actors to promote gender equality (Verloo 2005).  
The institutionalisation of women and gender interests at the national level has 
been a concern of both women’s movements and international organisations. Gender 
mainstreaming has emerged as a strategy for distributing women’s gender needs and 
interests across state, local and international institutions. The institutional mechanisms 
for enhancing gender mainstreaming agendas are found in the ‘national machineries’. 
National machineries, also known as women’s policy agencies, were defined after the 
First World Conference as instruments for advancing women’s interests. They were 
specifically addressed by the BPFA, which defined them as ‘the central policy 
coordinating unit inside the government. Its main task is to support government-wide 
mainstreaming of a gender equality perspective in all policy areas’ (UN–WOMEN 
Platform for Action, 1995: para. 201). The UN saw national machineries as ‘catalysts’ 
for promoting gender equality and justice (UNHCR, 2000: 10). This definition sounds 
like a precept, acceptable only at a theoretical level. It is important to verify how 
women’s policy machineries deal in practice with women’s interests, and what the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In her analysis of gender and political theory, Squires (1999) distinguishes between three different 
strategies: the strategy of inclusion, based on the principle of equality; the strategy of reversal, based on 
the principle of difference; and the strategy of displacement, based on the principle of diversity. The 
latter two strategies are considered transformative. See Squires (1999) and Verloo (2005) for an in-
depth analysis. 
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impact is on state policies.  
Although many countries established women’s policy offices during the UN 
Decade for Women, most of these offices remained on the margins of decision-
making processes at national and international levels. They ‘lacked resources, 
authority and expertise to achieve their objectives’ (Stienstra, 1994: 95). By 1990, 100 
nations had established national machineries for the advancement of women. By 
2004, at least 165 countries had created some form of national machinery (UNDAW, 
2005: 5); these included ministries of women’s affairs, and women’s units within 
ministries of health, education and employment. Although many nations established 
women’s machineries, the limited number of instruments with which these units were 
actually provided made the fulfilment of their broad mandates incredibly difficult. In 
the MENA region, as well as in other parts of the world, some countries created 
gender sections, units within ministries or national institutions (Derichs, 2010), such 
as the Ministry of Women, Family, Children and Elderly Affairs in Tunisia (McBride 
and Mazur, 2011), the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Afghanistan (Larson, 2008), or 
the Women Unit in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in 
Palestine (Nusair, 2009). 
In such a context, it is important to understand how the gaps are being filled. 
Which women are capable of representing gender interests? Is it enough to be a 
woman in order to represent gender interests? As I will show in relation to Jordan 
throughout this thesis, a detailed analysis of the historical and social context is 
necessary in order to challenge the ways these gaps are filled. 
 
Women’s empowerment and women’s leadership 
 
Women’s empowerment is inherent to the concept of gender mainstreaming. As 
empowerment is a term that is often misused and a concept that is often 
misunderstood, I will sketch a brief background. The concept of empowerment was 
developed during the 1970s; it was predominantly used to understand ‘third-world’ 
development issues (Panda, 2002). ‘Empowerment’ focused particularly on the 
facilitation of struggles for social justice and equality by changing social, economic 
and political structures at all levels, and ensuring the participation of women in 
decision-making processes. Antrobus (1989) defines empowerment as a ‘process to 
enable a powerless woman to develop autonomy, self control and confidence with a 
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group of women and men, a sense of collective influence over oppressive social 
conditions’ (188). Writing on poor urban and rural women in India, Batliwala (1994) 
talks about inner and outer power. Empowerment is about both what is within you and 
what is not, in multiple relationships with others, and it begins when women not only 
recognise social oppression, but also act to change existing power relations 
(Batliwala, 1994). She also argues that while change on the individual level is crucial 
to becoming aware of the sources of oppression, ‘such radical changes are not 
sustainable if limited to a few individual women, because traditional power structures 
will seek to isolate and ostracize them’ (Batliwala, 1994: 132). Kabeer (2004) adds to 
this that empowerment necessitates the development of a collective project built on 
collective solidarity in the public arena, underlining the important role of women’s 
organisations and social movements. Rowlands (1995) goes further, pointing out that 
women need to set out their own agendas; she also agrees that individual 
empowerment is a relevant step, but that it is not enough by itself. The collectiveness 
and the sharing of the same agendas leads to stronger and more powerful movements; 
however, the main goal should remain the ability of the individual woman to take 
control of her life (Sen and Batliwala, 2000: 20).  
According to Kabeer (2004 and 2005), the concept of empowerment is closely 
linked to the notion of disempowerment, which can be defined as a situation in which 
the ability to make choices is denied. Hence empowerment refers to the expansion of 
people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was 
previously denied to them: according to Kabeer’s understanding of the concept, 
empowerment entails change (Kabeer, 2005: 14). Lazo (1995) also considers 
empowerment a process, an instrument to equip women with the capabilities to gain 
control over resources. Stromquist (1995) defines empowerment as a socio-political 
concept that goes beyond formal political participation and consciousness-raising. 
The concept of empowerment encompasses four different dimensions: the cognitive,15 
the political, the economic and the psychological. Monkman (1997 quoted in Panda, 
2002: 3) adds a fifth dimension, the physical,16 to this conceptualisation. Mayoux 
(1998), who focuses on issues of poverty, considers empowerment to be the 
expansion of the individual’s life choices and capacities for self-reliance, and outlines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The cognitive dimension involves the understanding of the causes of subordination. 
16 The physical dimension involves having control over one’s body and the ability to protect oneself 
from sexual violence. 
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its four dimensions as: ‘power within’, which refers to changes in confidence and 
consciousness; ‘power to’, which implies an increase in skills and abilities, including 
the earning of income and access to markets and networks; ‘power over’, which refers 
to changes in power relations within households, in communities and at the level of 
institutions; and ‘power with’, which implies the organisation of the powerless to 
enhance individual abilities and challenge power relations. While all of these 
conceptualisations of power have political implications, ‘power over’ and ‘power 
with’ have the most, because ‘power over’ involves a direct and open contestation of 
the status quo, while ‘power with’, focusing on collective mobilisation in order to 
induce change, also involves a ‘direct challenge to the existing hierarchies of power’ 
(Tadros, 2010: 227).  
As explained above, and as I will analyse in the next sections, international 
institutions and national states play an important role in terms of women’s 
empowerment. In order to ‘gender’ their policies, international institutions and states 
create the conditions and provide the instruments and access to resources so that 
women can exercise their autonomy and self-empowerment as a process. States and 
institutions are instrumental to reconstituting the position of women on an equal basis 
in all spheres of social and state activity (Panda, 2002). The extent to which the 
Jordanian state and institutions empower women is the focus of my research. 
The concept of empowerment, like that of gender mainstreaming, has a 
transformative aspect; therefore, following Kabeer’s argument (2004), the emphasis 
should shift from ‘access to’ and ‘participation in’ to ‘ideas of contestation and 
struggle in which alliances can be formed with different groups, including men in 
specific times and places for purposes of transforming institutions of the state, the 
economy, the community and the family’ (53) in order to achieve gender equality. 
Failure to implement the stated objectives may derail the intended social 
transformation. Throughout the thesis, I will interrogate the aims and agendas of 
empowerment and gender mainstreaming projects in Jordan in order to discover 
whether practitioners have taken into consideration the transformative aspects of both. 
The 1995 BPFA included political empowerment, understood as women’s equal 
power in political decision-making and their consequent access to power. I consider 
politics in an inclusive way, as encompassing power relations that operate at all levels 
of society: from the most personal family relations to the most public – i.e. 
governmental or international – levels, addressing basic needs and issues such as 
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employment, education, healthcare and violence against women. According to the 
BPFA, women’s political empowerment is premised on three fundamental and non-
negotiable principles: equality between men and women, women’s rights to the 
development of their full potential, and women’s rights to self-representation and self-
determination (UN–WOMEN Platform for Action, 1995). Whether countries’ 
constitutions guarantee these principles may need further analysis; whereas 
constitutions provide these principles, there might be a large gap between 
constitutional provision and actual practice. 
The contradiction between perception and practice raises several issues, 
particularly with reference to gender stereotyping in leadership positions. Historically, 
ideas of leadership have rested on notions of masculinity and women leaders are often 
regarded as an afterthought (Kiamba, 2006). Social conventions on gender and 
leadership have often excluded women, and senior leadership is seen as a masculine 
domain. In the political context, a leader is a person who rules, guides or inspires 
others; someone who is endowed with formal or informal authority by others, 
regardless of the values they represent. Abdela (2000) adds that a leader is a person 
who also has the ‘ability to mobilise others’ (16). She believes that, in a democratic 
environment, leaders are expected to respond to the influence of their followers, as 
well as to exert influence over them. Rost (1991) adds the idea of transformation to 
the concept of leadership: ‘real transformation involves active people, engaging in 
influence relationships based on persuasion intending real changes to happen, and 
insisting that those changes reflect their mutual purposes’ (123). Although women’s 
sphere of activity has often been confined to the domestic, private world – where they 
are considered to be secondary earners, and therefore not even leaders within the 
family – women in the Middle East have demonstrated that they can be active agents 
for change, not only within the family, but also within civil society, and to a certain 
extent in national institutions. Before turning to the context of the Middle East, I will 
conclude with some reflections on the relationships between democratisation, 
neoliberalism and gender mainstreaming.  
 
How does neoliberalism come into play?  
 
As previously discussed, the integration of gender issues into both international and 
national institutions is a step towards the promotion and advancement of gender 
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equality, at least in theory. Some feminists have argued that the presence of gender 
equality policies within the international system is necessary in order to achieve 
gender equality and to have a positive impact on the lives of women, an idea that is 
challenged within the UN system itself (Zaoudé and Sandler, 2001). In this regard, 
Zaoudé and Sandler (2001: 30) underline three changes that affect institutions. First, 
they emphasise that gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment are 
complementary strategies for achieving gender equality, pursued by the state and the 
international community. Second, they highlight the use of existing human rights 
machineries to promote equality and change institutions. Third, they underline the 
relevance of the growing cooperation among a critical mass of women, both inside 
and outside development institutions, who share the goal of moving the gender 
equality agenda forward. Zaoudé and Sandler (2001) are merely outlining the first 
step towards turning gender mainstreaming into a transformative agenda. There are 
two major factors that shape and constrain efforts to mainstream gender and empower 
women in global policymaking: the gap between feminist theory and institutional 
practice, and the conflict between feminist concepts and values and the broader 
ideological framework of neoliberal economics.  
Neoliberalism refers to the policies and processes of the ‘political economic 
paradigm of our time’ (McChesney, 1999: 7); a central premise of this discourse is the 
equation of improved human well-being with wealth accumulation (Keddie, 2010: 
139). While in theory neoliberalism might be seen as a utopian project in its aim to 
revitalise the global economy, in practice it has established the conditions for the 
restoration of power to economic elites (Harvey, 2005; O’Connell, 2007). Although 
producing new prosperity and growth for a variety of sectors and regions, its 
predominant impact has been the generation of growing inequalities, both within and 
between countries, and the intensification of the inequitable distribution of resources 
and power along racialised, gendered and classed lines (Eisenstein, 1998; Mohanty, 
2003, Keddie, 2010: 140). Neoliberalism does not operate uniquely in relation to 
economic forces; by supressing non-market forces, it also acts as a political and 
cultural system (McChesney, 1999: 9). Moreover, neoliberalism does not stop at the 
implementation of economic policies, but also has a deep impact on people’s 
subjectivities and ‘modes of thought’. Although subjectivities are central to my 
research, I am also interested in analysing the extent to which ‘agents’ of 
neoliberalism, namely states, institutions and organisations, shape and construct 
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gender hierarchies and relations in line with neoliberal policies. The ways in which 
neoliberalism has deepened the impoverishment and marginalisation of women – 
especially women who are already oppressed by circumstances of poverty and race – 
are well documented (Eisenstein, 1998; Blackmore, 2000; Jaggar, 2002; Mohanty, 
2003). By analysing the interactions and intersections among and between the 
different actors in the process of ‘gendering’ democratisation, I hope to further 
contribute to this debate, particularly with reference to gender mainstreaming and 
women’s empowerment. 
In line with neoliberal agendas, Western multilateral institutions often do not 
question whether simply adding women’s projects to their gender mainstreaming 
and/or women’s empowerment dossiers may contribute to sustain unequal gendered 
power relations (Kandiyoti, 2007; Cheng; 2011). But how is gender understood 
among international and local practitioners? More importantly, how is women’s 
empowerment translated into practice? In chapter four I will try to answer these 
questions with reference to women’s political empowerment programmes in Jordan. 
Eschle (2000) argues, and I agree, that there is a current shift away from focusing 
on women’s issues, as well as an elimination of programmes specifically targeting 
women, in the sense that mainstreaming has become ‘part of a broader instrumental-
capitalist restructuring agenda that has created an elite system of gender experts 
without opening the political space or changing the material conditions for women at 
the grassroots’ (Eschle, 2000: 215–6). But in a context where neoliberal and 
economic policies become the priority, will feminist intentions and objectives risk 
being marginalised and instrumentalised?  
This has been the case in the Middle East. In the second part of this chapter I aim 
to give an empirical twist to this debate, starting from an analysis of democratisation 
practices in the region, including the role of women. Moreover, by presenting the 
involvement of women’s movements in the region during the liberation phases and in 
the more recent uprisings, I aim to provide an adequate analysis of the position of 
women in Middle Eastern societies ‘grounded in a detailed examination of the 
political projects of contemporary states and of their historical transformation’ 
(Kandyioti, 1992: 2) – as I will also do in the context of Jordan in the next chapter.  
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Discussing ‘transformative agendas’ in the context of the Middle East 
 
Gender mainstreaming has been cross-national from the start, as well as dependent on 
gender relations and national political contexts (Eveline and Bacchi, 2005). 
Governments, EU and UN bodies, women’s groups and international organisations 
have been involved in gender mainstreaming initiatives in the MENA region (Nusair, 
2009). However, before addressing the extent to which feminist scholars have 
contributed to the literature on gender mainstreaming, it is necessary to introduce the 
ways in which external pressures have influenced democratisation processes in the 
region. 
Western countries have influenced and instrumentalised the political economies of 
the region not only through military invasions, but also through the huge amounts of 
funding poured into regimes and civil society. The use of non-military strategies to 
shape and control the politics of transitional states in the region, has been defined by 
Horn (2010) as a ‘gentle invasion’ (4). As Horn (2010) argues, through this subtle 
power, democratic development is encouraged, and the hegemonic use of this 
‘indirect power influences the rules of civil society and its development’ (6). The link 
between national states and civil society is extremely relevant, mainly because states 
act as gatekeepers, shaping and framing the trajectory of norms and interests within 
civil society. Moreover, according to Horn (2010), the interaction between domestic 
social action and transnational networks is fundamental in framing issues for the 
public agenda: indeed, through the influence of transnational actors, many states have 
redefined their ‘national interests’ and foreign policy initiatives in relation to human 
rights and democratisation (Horn, 2010: 7). However, the ‘democracy promotion’ 
programmes pursued by the US and some EU countries have been instrumental in 
maintaining security in an era of political transition – especially between 11 
September 2001 and the recent uprisings (2011, 2012) – rather than focusing on 
understanding the interests of the civil societies involved. 
The interest in democratisation policies started right after 1989, when the US 
promoted democratisation through ‘small democracy’ grants offered by its embassies, 
at first especially in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The most 
significant actor in the area of assistance in terms of budget at that time was the US 
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Agency for International Development (USAID).17 USAID had previously been 
dedicated to economic growth, social development and infrastructure; it then started 
to be involved in projects with political relevance, and to operate in areas where it had 
never previously worked, such as Russia.  
The demise of military rule in South America, and of Communism in Europe, 
obscured the essentially reactive nature of American interests, as well as the exclusion 
of the Arab world from a perceived global trend. However, the attention to democracy 
was there: it especially focused on electoral democracy, constitutional reform and the 
development of civil society (Brown and el-Din Shahin, 2010: 16). The US was not 
alone in the field; other donor states, especially European states, demonstrated a new 
enthusiasm for the promotion of democracy. Some countries were pioneering, in ways 
the US learned to emulate: I am referring to the German model of party foundations,18 
which were introduced in the US through the creation of the NDI and the IRI to 
contribute to the democratisation policies promoted initially by the first Bush 
administration (1988–1992). Finally, the two most relevant international financial 
institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, showed 
increasing interest in ‘governance’ too. ‘Good governance’ became particularly 
important in underpinning US interventions in the region, ‘building up into the 
aggressive wave to “democratize” the region, which gained momentum after 
September 11th’ (Jad, 2004: 4).  
The attention paid to the Arab world prior to 11 September 2001 was more focused 
on maintaining the stability of regimes than on promoting democracy. The issue of 
democratisation was not completely ignored, but by comparison with other global 
regions, it was less recurrent. Indeed, throughout the 1990s and in the first eight 
months of the George W. Bush administration, the US saw the ‘undemocratic status 
quo as far preferable to the instability and anti-Western sentiment that many feared 
would sweep the region were authoritarian rulers to fall from power’ (Brown and el-
Din Shahin, 2010: 18). According to US diplomats who worked on US-Middle East 
relations prior to 11 September 2001, democracy and human rights issues were never 
included on the agendas of meetings with Arab leaders. The US government regarded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 www.usaid.gov [accessed 9 April 2013]. 
18 Party foundations are closely linked with a particular political party, although they have a distinct 
legal status. The most important examples of party foundations are the German Stiftungen 
(foundations), such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (linked with the Social Democrats), the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation (linked with the Christian Democrats) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
(the Free Democrats). 
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authoritarian regimes as preferable to the Islamist opposition movements that were 
gaining ground in the early 1990s. This hesitant approach to democracy was often 
criticised as ‘hypocritical because it coupled platitudes about the importance of 
democracy with cosy relationship with authoritarian regimes’ (Brown and el-Din 
Shahin, 2010: 20) – a relationship that has also been criticised more recently with 
reference to the 2011 uprisings in the region. Indeed, during the uprisings, civil 
society actors were very suspicious of possible interference by foreign countries, not 
least because several Western nations have had economic relationships with dictators 
and profiteers for many years, mainly with reference to oil interests (Ross, 2011).  
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, some Bush administration officials 
accepted the essence of this critique. Aid for the region increased accordingly, 
especially after the war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq: tens of millions of 
dollars were poured into the effort to ‘democratise’ post-Saddam Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and ‘democracy promotion’ initiatives – such as the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI),19 which was launched by the US State Department in 
late 2002 – were created for the rest of the region. This was also when attention to 
women’s projects and gender mainstreaming increased. The administration expanded 
the funding and scope of the Middle East programmes run by USAID, the State 
Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED).20 However, although democracy assistance was 
supported with several hundred million dollars, the new rhetoric did not result in 
anything like the dramatic shift that was implied; ‘nor it was accompanied by the 
development of viable tools to realise the ambitious vision of transforming the region 
on liberal and democratic lines’ (Brown and el-Din Shahin, 2010: 27).  
This was particularly true of women’s projects, and this was when feminist 
scholars in the region started to place more attention on the analysis of gender 
mainstreaming practices in conflict, post-conflict and peace-building situations, such 
as (but not exclusively21) in Iraq (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009b) and Palestine (Nusair, 
2009; Richter-Devroe, 2009). Although, during various speeches after the invasion of 
Iraq, President Bush pointed out that the advancement of women’s rights in the region 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The MEPI ‘offers assistance, training, and support to groups and individuals striving to create 
positive change in the society’, working in 18 countries and territories, (http://mepi.state.gov/ [accessed 
24 January 2013]). 
20 The NED is a ‘private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic 
institutions around the world’, (http://www.ned.org/ [accessed 24 January 2013]). 
21 See also the case of Afghanistan (Kandiyoti, 2007; Larson, 2008). 
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was fundamental, and that the advancement of freedom was giving women new hope 
and new rights (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2003 and 2004), Al-Ali 
and Pratt (2009b) have demonstrated that the military invasion and consequent 
reconstruction activities marginalised women without considering or addressing their 
real basic needs, leaving them in a worse humanitarian situation than before. 
Institutions have easily instrumentalised women’s rights in the region, but women 
have also been very active in making their voices heard. The authors argue that 
gender mainstreaming, as interpreted and practised by transnational and international 
actors, may contribute to ‘hardening perceptions of national and religious divisions in 
conflict situations, as gender is reproduced as a marker of difference’, without 
‘transforming gender relations in ways that empower women as a means of building 
peaceful societies’ (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a: 257–258). 
As with Iraq, the relationship between local organisations and international donors 
has been discussed and criticised in relation to Palestine (Jad, 2004; Nusair, 2009, 
Richter-Devroe, 2009). The Palestinian women’s movement has been criticised for 
operating within donor-driven global frameworks, with the result that its agenda has 
become both less indigenous and less explicitly political (Jad, 2004; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, 2008). Especially since the declaration of the Oslo Accords22, Palestinian 
women have been demanding the reform of civil, criminal and shari‘a legislation 
(Islamic law) from a gender equality perspective. However, some scholars argue that 
these groups’ focus has shifted, from participation in the liberation movement with 
attention to equality, to ‘survival–level interventions to alleviate the suffering of the 
beleaguered women they help’ (Kvinna till Kvinna/UNDP, 2010: 4).  
Other studies on gender mainstreaming in the region focus on the role played by 
women’s activism and movements in the promotion of human rights, through the 
utilisation of UN processes and global governance at both the local and the national 
level (Walby, 2005; Nusair, 2009; Moghadam and Sadiqi, 2006). Women’s activism 
in the MENA region has benefited from the experience acquired by various women’s 
groups in national liberation movements, in political groups and trade unions, and 
through participation in UN international conferences on women’s rights (Nusair, 
2009: 136). Such conferences have highlighted the concerns of women’s rights 
activists and organisations, and have facilitated the local, regional and transnational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Signed in September 1993 and known as the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles. 
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advocacy of women’s rights.  
Although women’s activism has opened up to the international community, the risk 
of the instrumentalisation of women’s issues for other ends – political, economic and 
security – has always been there. The ‘gentle invasion’ of local civil society, carried 
out mainly by the US but recently also by the EU, is a problem that local 
organisations are facing and trying to deal with. But how did women’s organisations 
get to this point? What was women’s role in democratisation processes in the region?  
 
Women as actors in democratisation processes 
 
Civil society and local agents are some of the actors who can influence 
democratisation processes, as we have seen with the 2011 uprisings in the region, 
particularly in Egypt and Tunisia. As Pratt shows (2007), ‘democratisation depends 
upon the ideological debates between civil society actors and, in particular, the ability 
or desire of civil society actors to put forward a vision that challenges 
authoritarianism’ (127). Women are active agents alongside men in this – ‘builders of 
movements and societies’ (Moghadam, 2003: 28) in their ‘war of position’ (Gramsci, 
1971: 229) against authoritarianism. The role of the state is central to this discussion, 
and will be analysed in greater detail in chapter two with reference to Jordan. Much of 
the existing literature on gender and the state refers mainly to European, North 
American and Australian experiences (Pringle and Watson, 1992; Kantola, 2010; 
Orloff, 2010), shedding light on the diversity of feminist approaches. Among scholars 
who discuss the historical transformations of states and the contestations of state 
power in relation to women’s positions and gender issues in the Middle East (Hatem, 
1993; Kandiyoti, 1988; Badran, 1993), the discussion has focused more on the 
conceptualisation of heterogeneous institutional arenas with different power relations 
(Al-Ali, 2000). Mindful of the different conceptualisations of the state,23 in this study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The significance of the state is related to the historical transformations of the specific context of 
analysis. Liberal theory considers the state a neutral arbiter which in practice can be captured by 
interest groups, in this case men. A Foucauldian approach views the state as an apparatus of regulation 
and soft domination, recognising the diverse and sometimes contradictory apparatuses at work, but 
without taking account of the constitution of interests in sexual politics (Foucault, 1980). Another 
approach takes sexuality into consideration, defining the state as a class state producing effects on sex 
and gender in pursuit of class interests (Connell, 1987: 127); Marxist feminism has seen the state’s 
motivation in class terms, understanding its effect as the maintenance of men’s subordination of 
women. In this approach it is not clear why gender effects are essential for the reproduction of 
capitalism or the maintenance of profit. Another group of theorists argue that the state is a patriarchal 
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I will draw on the notion developed by Connell (1987), who focuses on the 
institutionalisation of gender (126). The fact that the state embodies and also creates 
‘gender regimes’ might serve as a useful analytical tool for understanding the 
relationship among and between women’s organisations, international organisations 
and the Jordanian government. Analysing the role of the state will highlight the 
reproduction of gender inequalities through various dimensions of state policy, the 
gendered construction of citizenship, and the dynamics of incorporation of national 
and ethnic collectiveness into modern states (Kandiyoti, 1991a: 1). 
Women’s movements in the Middle East have been potential agents for 
democratisation, and they emerged ‘amid two major political projects, independence 
and modernisation, stemming from secular nationalism and Islamic modernism 
respectively’ (Jad, 2004: 2). Historically, women’s movements in the Middle East, 
although presenting differences arising from their diverse contexts, have shared some 
common political factors, such as their links to processes of modernisation and 
development, the tensions between secular and religious tendencies, and links to 
nationalist movements (Al-Ali, 2003: 217). Women in the Middle East participated 
effectively in liberation movements during the age of colonialism, such as in Egypt 
(Ahmed, 1992b; Abu-Lughod, 1998), Algeria (Cheref, 2006; Lazreg, 1994) and 
Palestine (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2008; Jad, 2004). Secular nationalists in particular 
saw women as an integral part of the ‘new nation’ in the aftermath of colonial 
occupation (Badran, 1995; Lazreg, 1994), and many women saw the recognition of 
their social rights as a consequence of independence. In Egypt, women’s participation 
in the nationwide marches and protests against British colonial power in 1919 
represented a continuation of the activities of women during previous decades 
(Ahmed, 1992a; Badran, 1995). During the war of liberation in Algeria (1954–1962), 
the participation of more than 10,000 women fighting for independence had a positive 
impact on the vision of the National Liberation Front, which started to consider 
women’s empowerment as central (Cheref, 2006: 64). As with Algeria, the impact of 
the occupation on women’s rights has similarly affected the Palestinian women’s 
movement in the context of the wider liberation struggle against Israeli oppression. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institution from the outset (MacKinnon, 1982; Pateman, 1983), created as the institutionalisation of 
masculine violence, as the male point of view in sexual politics, or as a form of patriarchy in the 
development of civil society. The patriarchal state can be seen as the centre of a reverberating set of 
power relations and political processes in which patriarchy is both constructed and contested (Connell, 
1987: 130). 
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According to Jad (2004), the ‘heroic role played by Algerian and Palestinian women 
in the battles to liberate their countries was one outcome of this phase in the growth of 
women’s organizations’ (2). Revolutionary processes opened up spaces for women’s 
rights to be recognised, but to what extent was gender justice promoted by the new 
regimes? 
The new state leaders quickly discarded the idea of democratising their political 
systems, and instead installed a variety of authoritarian regimes. There is much 
disagreement as to why authoritarian rule in the Arab world has been so persistent. 
Some researchers have emphasised the importance of structural factors such as 
institutional reform and economic development and of political culture in the 
transition to and consolidation of democracy (Haynes, 2001). Many scholars have 
outlined Arab leaders’ resistance to power sharing and meaningful reform (Sivan, 
1997; Brumberg, 1995). Others stress the ‘importance of citizens’ attitudes and 
values, and democratic values need not precede, but can rather follow, elite-led 
transitions involving the reform of political institutions and procedures’ (Rose et al., 
1998: 98).  
In regard to women’s emancipation, many newly independent nations, such as 
Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, ‘installed ‘state feminism’, introducing 
economic and social policies aimed at integrating women into the labour market and 
the new nation’ (Jad, 2004: 3). But measures for the emancipation of women did not 
coincide with a drive for democratisation or the creation of a civil society in which 
gender interests could be represented. Indeed, these measures were ‘mostly part of the 
general thrust of “dirigiste” and frequently authoritarian and repressive regimes’ 
(Kandiyoti, 1991a: 13). Those governments that did grant women new rights 
proceeded simultaneously to abolish independent women’s organisations, creating 
government-related and controlled organisations for women. Under Nasser in Egypt, 
after women gained the suffrage in 1956, the regime moved to outlaw all feminist 
organisations. In Algeria in 1962, the government, as part of its programme to 
mobilise various sectors of society in support of ‘Algerian socialism’, created the 
National Union of Algerian Women (Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes), but 
this organisation never captured feminists’ interests, and was considered a co-opted 
organisation from its inception (Cheref, 2006: 68). Not only in Egypt and Algeria, but 
also in Jordan and Tunisia, among other countries, such official women’s 
organisations became discredited because ‘their function and activities were largely 
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determined by the priorities set by the existing regimes’ (Hatem, 1993: 30).  
Women’s dependence on the state to promote gender equality and social justice 
raises problematic issues. This is not only because women’s rights are easily 
compromised and instrumentalised to favour conservative groups, as has happened in 
Iraq (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009b) or with gender quotas in Jordan,24 but also because 
women have often been excluded from political decision-making processes after 
independence, as they have been ‘forgotten immediately at the end of the war’ 
(Cheref, 2006: 65). In the case of Algeria, for instance, women have studied and 
worked in greater numbers, but they have been largely excluded from the political 
arena since independence, and little has been done to change the categorisation of 
women according to their marital status (as men’s mothers, daughters and wives) 
rather than as women in their own right. The disappointment with state policies that 
have done little or nothing to change women’s status as ‘dependants’ on male citizens 
– known as the ‘Algerian syndrome’ (Jad, 2004: 3) – has especially affected the 
women’s movement in the Gulf area. As Skalli (2006) argues, the significance of the 
increasing numbers of women in schools and in the private and public sectors ‘is 
threatened by the vigilant eye of the political regime and Islamist groups and often 
negated by conservative family laws institutionalising discrimination’ (39). Women’s 
activists are therefore ‘forced to be more strategic in their interventions and creative 
in their actions and alliances if they want to transform their realities in a meaningful 
way’ (Skalli, 2006: 39). Since women’s issues are so symbolic, at both the national 
and the international level, women’s groups need to be very careful in their 
engagements with the state in order to avoid a backlash against women’s rights, as 
happened in Egypt and Iraq.  
In the 1980s and 1990s a continuum of dependent and independent women’s 
movements started to emerge throughout the region. As Al-Ali points out (2003: 4), in 
Iraq no independent women’s movement was feasible in the context of greater 
political repression; in Tunisia, state co-option was a matter of concern for 
independent women’s organisations, as were the state’s limitations on political space 
for women’s organisations in Egypt and Jordan, where some women’s organisations 
were banned (Al-Atiyat, 2003). During those years, when economic and social crises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See chapter three for a discussion of the introduction of gender quotas in Jordan.  
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pervaded many Arab states, most leaders25 only made minimal responses to demands 
for economic and political change. The end of the ‘communist bloc’ further 
contributed to the ‘retreat of progressive nationalism’ (Jad, 2004: 4), while the Israeli 
threat and unresolved issue of Palestine persisted, and the Iranian revolution brought 
Islamist religious leadership to power. 
After the September 2001 attacks, the war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq 
negatively affected those two countries, the entire region and the attention to women’s 
rights, as I will depict throughout the thesis. Women’s role in democratisation 
processes in the Middle East must be studied through the differing political projects of 
nation-states, with their distinct histories, relationships to colonialism and the West, 
class politics, ideological uses of Islamic idioms, and struggles over the role of 
Islamic law in state legal apparatuses (Abu-Lughod, 1998: 5). It is through this 
framework26 that I will analyse the participation of women in democratisation 
processes in Jordan, raising question about the representation of women’s gender 
interests and women’s participation. But first it is necessary to discuss the extent to 
which women have been involved in the recent uprisings (2011–2012) in the region, 
together with the significance of their participation in relation to debates on 
‘gendering’ democratisation. 
 
Is women’s participation enough? The case of the recent uprisings 
 
History shows that women and gender have always been key to both revolutionary 
and counterrevolutionary processes (Al-Ali, 2012). On the one hand, revolutions have 
opened up some space for women’s organising, as in the case of the Egyptian anti-
colonial and independence movement and the Palestinian struggle against Israeli 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In the mid- to late 1960s, the Arab Socialist Ba‘ath Party led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-
Bitar took power in both Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein succeeded Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in 
1979. In Syria, first a military committee led by Salah Jadid ruled the country, and later Hafez al-Assad 
ruled until 2000, when he was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad. In 1979, Egypt under Nasser’s 
successor, Anwar Sadat, concluded a peace treaty with Israel, and in 1981 Mubarak came to power. 
26 When I started to work on this thesis, I decided not to directly focus on Islam, since I did not want 
my research to fall within the category of literature on ‘women and Islam’. Although I think that Islam, 
or the deconstruction of Islam, is central to the study of every phenomenon with reference to Muslim 
countries, I decided to consider Islam as a factor that is constitutive of personal identity. As I will 
discuss in chapters three and five, the issue of religion came up only when I was analysing the personal 
experiences of female candidates. The attention I gave to it reflected the extent to which it came up 
during my interviews. Future research might address the role of Islam more specifically in relation to 
the promotion of women’s rights among ‘women in politics’ in Jordan, especially with reference to the 
recent events in the region; this was not the specific focus of my research. 
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occupation. On the other hand, history has revealed that women have been left out of 
decision-making positions after the revolution, as the case of Algeria’s war of 
liberation clearly demonstrates. The question of women’s participation in decision-
making processes is very pertinent in relation to the recent uprisings in the region, 
particularly in Egypt (Sholkamy, 2012a-b; Moll, 2012; Elyachar and Winegar, 2012). 
Women have been at the forefront of the recent demonstrations, especially in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Yemen. Although the Middle East consists of heterogonous countries and 
diverse contexts, a common feeling of frustration pervaded the region during 2011. 
People were pressured and oppressed by their regimes, and they were angered by 
rising prices, falling standards of living and high levels of joblessness, especially 
among the youth (Sharpe, 2011: 118). A lack of real reform and the spread of 
corruption were also triggering factors. All these ‘resentments and objections 
accumulated and built up over years and decades’ (Sharpe, 2011: 118): people did not 
decide overnight to take to the streets, but did so on the basis of a long period of 
frustration, as well as of previous demonstrations and a desire for change. During an 
event organised by Vital Voices in February 2011 in Amman, Esraa, a young woman 
activist from Egypt, told me during a private conversation:  
 
I have been demonstrating for the last five years, for different 
political reasons each time. But every time I went to the square I 
was hoping that the change would come. During those years I 
always saw that political celebrations were possible, but they did 
not bring change. We needed these last demonstrations to begin the 
change (Amman, 23 February 2011).  
 
The regional political order, which had taken shape with the rise of post-colonial 
regimes in the late 1940s, broke down within just few months; the self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, and the death of Khaled Saeed in Egypt, were the 
turning points for the demonstrations in which Esraa participated. At the beginning of 
the uprisings, democratic outcomes seemed possible to those who took to the streets 
in many countries in the region (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011: 648). However, the 
Arab regimes in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain intensified their repression of the mass 
uprisings, and the smaller protests in Morocco, Algeria and Jordan did not have much 
relevance.  
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The participation of women during these events has been the subject of discussion, 
not only among scholars (Winegar, 2012; Al-Ali, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 2012; Hafez, 
2012; Sholkamy, 2012a-b; Elyachar, 2012), but also in the Western media. Several 
European and American newspapers portrayed women not as subservient, oppressed 
and restricted to the home, but as a fundamental source of strength during the protests. 
Women were described by the Guardian as instrumental and as key players, especially 
in the ‘nitty-gritty organisation that turned Tahrir Square from a moment into a 
movement’ (Rice et al., 2011). The question ‘where are the women in the uprisings?’ 
was put to many scholars working on women in the Middle East (Winegar, 2012; Al-
Ali, 2012: 27), but in my view it was an easy and provocative question to ask. Women 
were participating on the streets just as they had done in the past, without a doubt. As 
Winegar (2012) describes on the basis of her experience of the Egyptian 
demonstrations, many women – more or less known activists – rallied people to 
Tahrir Square, and many others also supported the uprising indirectly, by providing 
food and medical supplies, helping friends and family to demonstrate (Winegar, 2012: 
68). Women supported the revolution, both in the streets and in their homes, 
according to their capabilities and their political visions. This was not just individual 
women; ‘women participated side by side with men in the protests across the region’ 
(Al-Ali, 2012: 27).  
Abla, the passionate Egyptian activist I was listening to at the Foundation for the 
Future event, very clearly pointed out that women have always been there to 
demonstrate: ‘Women were there, as well as men were there. The demonstrations did 
not start from nothing, and women were there even before them’ (Amman, 14 April, 
2011). Although the presence of women in the streets gained more prominence in the 
media during the 2011 uprisings, women have tried to make their voices heard in the 
past as well.  
Two years on from the beginning of the uprisings, many scholars and activists are 
now wondering whether and to what extent women will have a space in the new 
political decision-making processes (Al-Ali, 2012; Hafez, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 2012; 
Sholkamy, 2012b; Pratt, 2013). This is not only a question of numbers or of the 
presence of women in specific political and transitional bodies; it is also about 
whether gender issues are in danger of becoming sidelined in decision-making 
processes, or women’s rights in danger of being violated (Al-Ali, 2012). In August 
2011, around 1,000 women in Tunisia held a rally to remind people in their country of 
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the 1956 Personal Status Code, which provides equality between men and women 
(Anderson, 2011). In Egypt, many women feel that the ‘equality spirit’ of Tahrir 
Square has disappeared: no women were present in the constitutional commission, 
and power seems to be still in the hands of male elders, who are not looking for 
change (Zecchinelli, 2011); moreover, sexual harassment and violence against women 
is becoming a widespread problem, as recent events demonstrate27 (Kandiyoti, 2013). 
As Hafez suggests (2012) in her critical re-examination of the ‘patriarchal bargain’ 
between the state and the people of Egypt, women’s activism needs to fall into a 
‘solid women’s front’ (41) in order for women to shape the future of their nation. 
During her presentation at the conference, Abla at one point said:  
 
Why were women’s issues not put on the agenda of the Higher 
Commission? Because the regime has not been dismantled 
completely; the old mentality is still not eradicated, and women’s 
issues are not part of it. For instance, I have read all the agendas of 
all parties, from left to right. They are all addressing economic 
issues, but when it comes to women’s issues, they all become shy.  
 
In the case of Egypt, only ten of the 508 members of the Egyptian parliament are 
women. Women who ran on party lists were placed far down those lists, meaning that 
they had virtually no chance of getting into office, whether their parties were Islamist 
or liberal (Garcia-Navarro, 2012). At the beginning of the 2011 uprisings, everything 
that was connected to Mubarak’s regime was rejected, including ‘legal reforms that 
have benefited women in the past decade, and have guaranteed their free mobility, 
right to unilateral divorce, and political representation through a quota system’, 
because they were known as Suzanne Mubarak’s laws (Sholkamy, 2012a). This 
resulted from the rejection of the whole discourse of gender equality by youth, 
radicals and the left as ‘a figment of a Western imagination’ and as connected to the 
old regime (Sholkamy, 2012a). According to Sholkamy (2012a), young activists and 
socialist parties were not sympathetic to gender, either as a political category or as 
basis for rights and entitlements. Gender as a concept is still not regarded as a lens 
through which to analyse power relations within society. Many are the challenges 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I am referring to episodes of violence against women and sexual harassment in the streets after the 
uprisings started in Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey, as described by Kandiyoti, 2013. 
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faced by women activists, in Egypt and in the region, such as the increase of 
militarisation and the abuse of women’s sexuality (Al-Ali, 2012), and unless women 
continue their campaigns on gender issues, their rights are likely to continue to be 
instrumentalised and misused. The significance of the state in ‘reproducing, 
maintaining and challenging prevailing gender regimes, ideologies, discourses and 
relations’ (Al-Ali, 2012: 31) still continues in the aftermath of the uprisings.  
 
Conclusions 
 
If democratisation is considered a process of ‘making democratic’ gender regimes 
(Rai, 2008: 59), then ‘is democracy the solution?’, as Abla asked during her speech. 
According to Rouda, a Tunisian activist who replied to Abla, democracy is the way 
forward: ‘What is worrying women at this time is what is worrying all the people of 
Tunisia: we want to dismantle the autocratic system, and then we will work towards a 
democratic one.’ But democracy, I believe, cannot transform power relations between 
women and men as long as gender issues and social justice are not included or 
problematised in its discourse, practices or policies. Thus, gender justice is at the core 
of democracy. As Moghadam (2011) has said, women may need democracy in order 
to flourish, but democracy needs women in order to be enduring and inclusive, since 
gender orders will challenge the power relations of neo-patriarchal and neoliberal 
systems. 
Throughout this chapter I have raised questions about women’s participation, the 
representation of gender interests, and gender mainstreaming programmes, with 
reference to the region. But to what extent do these debates influence the gender 
dimension of democratisation? How are gender issues and women’s rights discussed 
and elaborated at the local, national and transnational levels? 
The position of women must be addressed in order to carry out the social change 
that will enable much of the MENA region to deal with international agreements and 
conventions, and with local structures. Changing the position of women in society and 
addressing grievances that contribute to the spread of extremism are prerequisites for 
building a society that respects human rights, basic freedoms and democracy. The 
question of women’s liberation is related to the questions of representation and 
democracy. Democracy is not possible without challenging male-dominated state 
structures, questioning the boundaries between politics and ordinary life, and 
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addressing the neoliberal agendas of international development projects. I think that 
one characteristic of democracy in contemporary societies is the guarantee of basic 
civil and political rights – such as freedom of expression, organisation and assembly – 
in order to allow citizens to hold their representatives accountable for the public good. 
However, although the ultimate goal is to act for gender interests, we must ask: how 
can women who have moved into the state bureaucracy or conventional political 
parties make an impact on mainstream politics without being absorbed by it? And 
how can women who rely on international gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment practices win recognition for their interests? Even though states have 
incorporated (or better, co-opted) participants in women’s movements, it is still 
extremely difficult for those on the ‘inside’ to translate the goals of those movements 
into concrete policies capable of having a positive impact on the lives of female 
citizens. Although it is extremely difficult for women activists to strike a balance 
between demanding their rights and dealing with pressure from their regimes, the 
belief that the state has the ability to promote women’s rights ‘might seriously 
diminish women activists’ credibility and might limit their strategies and possible 
achievements in the long run’ (Al-Ali, 2012: 30). This is why we also need to ask 
what type of women’s participation we want: what types of women are leading, and 
whom do they represent? More importantly, how do women at the grassroots perceive 
this relationship between women activists and the state in relation to the 
representation of their interests?  
The question of women’s participation cannot be reduced to numbers, because 
simply being a woman is not enough to represent women’s rights, as I will further 
discuss in the following chapters with reference to Jordan. If the gender dimension of 
democratisation is to be discussed, then our analysis needs to involve an exploration 
of how women’s participation in decision-making programmes relates to the 
country’s historical context, and to the authoritarian state, its society, its domestic 
relations and the international community. Do gender issues and women’s rights risk 
becoming instrumentalised? The answer is yes, and not only does the 
instrumentalisation occur at the level of the state, but it is also very problematic in 
light of the relationship between the interconnected international, national and local 
contexts. On one hand, ‘democracy’ promotion programmes need to be challenged 
over the ways in which they promote women’s empowerment in the light of their 
neoliberal framework. On the other hand, the analysis of the ways in which state 
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policies in the region are implicated in the promotion of gender justice has revealed 
the extent to which the state can challenge existing power relations – for instance, by 
granting women more political or personal rights – or can reinforce oppressive gender 
relations by abolishing reforms or controlling women’s activism; all measures that 
will harm neither the regime itself nor the status quo. In what follows, I will discuss 
these tensions more specifically with reference to Jordan’s socio-political context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
JORDANIAN POLITICS: STATE, SOCIETY AND WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS 
 
Female candidates’ stories 
 
Hind 
When I first met Hind at a workshop for female candidates organised by the NDI in 
Amman before the 2010 parliamentary elections, I thought she was an extremely 
strong and passionate woman who loved being involved in and cared about politics. I 
was right. Her outspokenness is what impressed me the most; her attitude emerged 
not only during public events, but also during the one-to-one interviews I did with 
her. Hind is a middle-aged woman from Central Badia;1 she considers herself a 
Bedouin, a ‘true and pure’ Jordanian. She is married and the mother of three children. 
Hind lives in one of the upper-class neighbourhoods in West Amman, Abdoun, and 
she is the owner of a private company that works in media and TV production. Her 
interest in politics dates back to her father’s involvement in political action, as she 
told me during a discussion at her office in Amman: ‘Let me tell you more about my 
background. My father was a political prisoner for 22 years in Syria.2 At that time I 
was only a child, but that was when that I started to be interrogated by the 
mukhabarat so as to be able to go and visit him’ (Amman, 2 March 2011). It was then 
that she started to wonder why her father had been imprisoned, why she had to be 
questioned before she was allowed to talk to him, and who was the responsible for all 
of this. She did not want to tell me more about that period of her life, but the 
expression in her eyes showed that this intrusion of the state and its institutions was at 
the core of her interest in politics, as were her Bedouin roots. Although she now lives 
in one of the richest areas of Amman, during her campaign she knocked on all the 
doors in the village she comes from, trying not to lose her connection with her 
birthplace. Hind was a candidate for parliament in both in 2007 and 2010, and, as she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jordan is divided into 12 governorates, and three areas in the north, centre and south called Central, 
Northern and Southern Badia, which include different governorates. 
2 From 13 July 1971 until 13 July 1993. 
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told me over coffee, ‘I will run until the day I die’ (Amman, 1 February 2011).3 Her 
campaign and activism are mostly focused on the renewal of the political system, 
starting with a fight against corruption. Her strong position against the government 
did not make her campaign easy at all: when she was a candidate in 2007, she claims 
she was poisoned. That event did not undermine her strength and passion to run for 
parliament or campaign for justice, as she did before and after the 2010 elections, 
continuing to focus on the fight against corruption and being aware of the 
mukhabarat’s constant control over her life. 
 
Terez  
I was excited about the type of discussion I was going to have before meeting Terez, 
since she works for and is an activist of the JWU, which is the largest independent 
women’s organisation in the country. Every time I went to the JWU I felt very well 
welcome: people wanted to help me, and they were interested in my research. This is 
why, before meeting Terez, I felt I was going to have an interesting discussion. I met 
Terez only that day, and our interview lasted a couple of hours. As I had expected, she 
was very welcoming and willing to share her life experience with me. Terez lives in 
Madaba, a Christian-majority governorate in the south of Amman. She does not speak 
English, but thanks to the support of one of her colleagues, we managed to have an 
enlightening conversation. Terez is a Christian woman in her 50s, married with no 
children. She has been a women’s rights activist since 1977, and has been demanding 
the development of women’s rights for all these years. She decided to participate in 
the 2010 elections because of the increase in the number of seats assigned to women 
in the new quota system.4 While smoking her cigarette and drinking tea in her office 
(which reminded me of a library), she opened up, telling me that one of her main 
obstacles during the campaign consisted in the lack of support from her tribe, which 
decided to back a male candidate. Terez is one of the first activists who started to 
work for the JWU, and she embodies the JWU’s politicised and critical vision of the 
promotion of women’s rights.5 Indeed, while discussing gender justice advocacy she 
appeared rather frustrated at the lack of awareness of the status of women’s rights in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hind participated in the 2013 elections and she won a seat as member of parliament through the 
quota-system. 
4 In 2010 the reserved-seats quota for women in parliament was doubled from six to 12. The 
introduction of a quota system will be explained and discussed in greater detail in chapter three. 
5 In contrast with other women’s organisations’ approach, the JWU constantly deals with issues 
concerning violence against women, honour crimes, nationality and personal status law.  
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the country among men and women, and the lack of political will from institutions, as 
she persuasively told me: ‘Most of the programmes did not include women’s point of 
view, and it was very difficult to convince the community and the institutions about 
the importance of this’ (Amman, 17 April 2011). During her campaign she 
particularly focused on the promotion of women’s rights and the amendment of 
specific laws that discriminate against women.6 During the interview she pointed to 
the lack of interest in women’s rights among her community, and the difficulties that 
activists had had to deal with in the past and still face today in campaigning for 
gender justice. 
 
Ahlam 
Ahlam wanted to bring me to her favourite place outside Amman, Fuheis.7 I was 
sitting next to her in the car as she was driving like ‘a man’, as she would to tell me 
while going around a bend quite fast. It was a sunny Friday morning in March 2011, 
and Ahlam wanted to take me out for breakfast. Before arriving at the café, she 
stopped the car by the side of a hilly road and then, looking outside with twinkling 
eyes framed by a light brown hijab, she said: ‘Whenever I come here I feel the 
originality of my heritage. This place brings back memories of Nablus, the city in 
which I was born’ (11 March 2011). Ahlam is a middle-aged woman from Palestine. 
After she finished secondary school, she came to Jordan: ‘When I came here, the 
intifada started in Palestine; it was in 1987. At that time it was a big challenge for a 
girl who never did anything by herself, even crossing the street, to start a life on her 
own.’ Ahlam studied finance and accounting at the University of Jordan. Although 
she managed to sustain herself on a scholarship, she felt she had to become more 
independent of her family. That is why she decided to marry when she was 21, to a 
man with ‘significant social and intellectual status’, as she put it. After her only child 
had grown up, she decided to divorce, without the support of her family, since she did 
not like her life as a married woman. Ahlam is now an independent single mother, 
working as a freelance consultant for companies and NGOs, after being involved in 
managerial jobs at the Ministry of Social and Political Development for many years. 
She was a candidate in the 2010 elections only, as she felt that was the right time to 
bring about change. In her campaign she particularly focused on programmes for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See the last section of this chapter for an analysis of the status of women’s rights in the country. 
7 Fuheis is a town in the governorate of Balqa, around 20 kilometres north-west of Amman. 
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youth, and she managed to reach out to supporters through the use of social media 
such as Facebook. Ahlam is very respectful of Islam, and every time religion came up 
during our discussions, she wanted to make it clear that Islam does not discriminate 
against women. Religion is a big part of her life, and although she does not like to go 
the mosque on Fridays, she loves to pray throughout the day, wherever she is. 
Together with religion, Palestine was another topic of discussion, especially the ways 
she had managed to integrate her life into Jordan, the host country. Most of the time 
Palestine was referred to as the place of dreams, to which she wanted to return to live 
in the future if ‘the political situation will allow me to do that’, as she put it. She felt 
that Jordan would never become her country, not only because her family still lives in 
Palestine, but also because Jordan has never granted her full citizen status, although 
she has been living here for more than 20 years.  
 
Amilah8 
I came into contact with Amilah through the NDI, since she was one of the 
participants in their programmes. I met her and her sister in a café close to downtown 
Amman on 30 January 2011. I felt that Amilah was very sceptical about meeting with 
me: she seemed to be willing to tell me her story, but without sharing too much. 
However, we managed to establish reciprocal trust during the course of the 
conversation. Amilah wore a black hijab that made her dark brown eyes stand out. 
After finding out that I was married, she first asked me if I had any children, and I 
answered with the much-used ‘lissa’ (not yet). She told me that I should not wait too 
long, since I was going to become too old to be a mother. I then asked her about her 
personal life. She is in her early 30s, and was the youngest female candidate I 
interviewed. She got married when she was 17 and now has six children. She comes 
from the poor area of East Amman. After finishing secondary school she started to 
take care of her husband and her children. Amilah has always been involved in 
volunteer work in her community, which she describes as ‘an area that is more 
traditional and less developed than other neighbourhoods in Amman’. In 2008 she 
decided to get more involved with her community, and she is now a consultant for 
small projects targeting youth development in schools in her area. It was her increased 
attention to her community that made her decide to run for parliament, mainly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Amilah is a pseudonymous. I have used it instead of the real name for security reasons. 
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because she wanted to bring about change in her area. However, her decision to run as 
a candidate was not greatly welcomed by the people in her tribe, whether men or 
women, as she said: ‘In my area women do not support women to participate in the 
elections, mainly because their tribe tells them to back men and also, I have to say, 
often women are jealous of other women’s success.’ Amilah decided to run by 
herself, against her tribe’s wishes. Her house was set on fire five days before the 
elections. Luckily no one was hurt, but Amilah did not find out who did it, although 
she had some suspicions. She was sure of one thing, as she told me: ‘They hated me. 
But I am not scared: I want to fight for it and I will run again.’ Amilah’s story 
demonstrates to an extreme the importance that candidates place (or do not place) on 
their tribe’s support, and reflects the strength of this woman who is willing to 
campaign for change in her own community. 
 
The brief stories of Hind, Terez, Ahlam and Amilah give a small indication of the 
diversity of class, age, background, place of residence, place of origin, tribal relations 
and religion to which each of these women belongs. Hind, Terez, Ahlam and Amilah 
are only four of the 26 female candidates I interviewed, and they are not 
representative of their diversity in terms of class, visions, campaigns, backgrounds, 
and demography. However, the snapshots of these female candidates serve to 
introduce the main debates and themes I will analyse throughout this and subsequent 
chapters, referring to specific Jordanian historical, political, economic and social 
contexts.  
Hind’s Bedouin roots and Ahlam’s Palestinian origins point towards the 
importance of the concept of national unity in Jordan’s political context; moreover, 
Terez and Amilah’s lack of support from their tribes extends the discourse on the 
creation of national identity the role of the state and the status of women’s rights. The 
stories of these female candidates also raise telling points in relation to women’s 
political participation, such as the lack of faith in female candidates, the introduction 
of quotas, violence against women, and the lack of awareness of women’s rights – all 
issues I aim to address throughout the thesis. In this chapter I will present Jordan’s 
historical, political and social contexts in order to better contextualise the 
development of women’s organisations and the status of women’s rights within the 
country’s political system. While analysing democratisation processes in Jordan, from 
both a national and an international perspective, I will also pay attention to the recent 
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uprisings in the country. In the second part of the chapter I aim to introduce the role 
of women’s organisations in the promotion of women’s rights and their relationship 
with the state, a discussion that I will continue to develop in subsequent chapters. 
 
State, tribes, neighbouring countries and democratisation  
 
A general consensus seems to exist among scholars that some of the most salient 
elements of the Jordanian political system are its tribalism, its authoritarianism, the 
Palestinian-Jordanian split, and the consequent importance of the concept of national 
unity (Layne, 1994; Brand, 1994; Lynch, 1999; Massad, 2001; Adely, 2012a; Alon, 
2009; Shryock, 1997). Fida Adely (2012a), in her engaging book Gendered 
Paradoxes on women, education and development in Jordan, considers the process of 
the making of Jordan a story of ‘British-imposed state and Hashemite efforts to create 
a nation and a national narrative that had the Hashemites at their centre’ (31).  
Jordan is formally a constitutional monarchy; an independent state was created in 
1946. However, according to Shryock (1997) and Adely (2012a), full independence 
from the British was achieved only after 1956, when their control over the military 
came to an end. ‘It was after 1956 that the project of creating a national identity began 
in earnest,’ and the state acted as a ‘supratribe’ (Adely, 2012a: 31), aiming to provide 
security and services through the extension of state institutions, and creating a 
national history and tradition through the ideological work of these institutions. To 
this end the regime has worked to construct a uniquely Jordanian identity through the 
creation of ‘tradition’, shared history, culture and values – Arab, tribal and Islamic – 
and by linking that history closely to the Hashemites (Shryock, 1997; Layne, 1994).  
One of the most significant characteristics of Jordanian political life is ‘its 
domination by the state’9 (Warrick, 2009: 11), as Hind and Terez’s stories also 
revealed. Since independence, the powers of the monarchy have predominated over 
other constitutional actors in the political sphere. This domination is manifest in the 
powers of the King, which include the selection of the prime minister and the 
members of the Upper House of parliament: the royal-appointed prime minister 
introduces new legislation, which must be approved by the royal-appointed Upper 
House, and which is subject to ultimate approval (or rejection) by the King. Royal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As described in chapter one use, I use Connell’s (1987) conceptualisation of the state, pointing the 
attention to the institutionalisation of gender.  
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domination is also evident in the legal restrictions on the formation of political parties 
and charitable and social service organisations; in the creation of top-down 
institutions, as in the case of women’s organisations;10 and in the strategically 
designed election law.11 Alongside the importance of the monarch, according to 
Brown (1997), the use of a dual legal system comprising civil law and Islamic law12 
allows the state to legitimise itself politically. On one hand, the Islamic sphere helps 
to legitimate the state among the ‘traditional’13 sector of society, controlling dissent 
and maintaining ‘traditional’ social forms of civil society. On the other hand, the 
modern sphere serves as a source of legitimation among domestic democrats and 
external powers by demonstrating the ‘state’s secular character, its ability to manage 
modern forms of government and its good faith in democratisation’ (Warrick, 2009: 
52).  
During the long reign of King Hussein14 from 1953 to 1999, the state’s 
authoritarian control, including the imposition of decades of martial law,15 was met 
with two main challenges in the process of nation-building: the persistence of strong 
tribal allegiances, and demographic changes that undermined the construction of a 
national identity. In Jordan, tribes became partners in the foundation of the state 
(Alon, 2009: 7). Even before the British colonised Transjordan in the 1920s, the 
country’s entire population was organised along tribal lines and adhered to tribal 
values and customs, and when the independent state was created, tribal support played 
an active part in the process of state formation. According to Wilson (1987), ‘virtually 
everyone in Transjordan was identified by family, clan and tribal affiliation. This 
social organisation reflected the territory’s low level of urbanisation and marginal 
relationship to the centre of power… Hence, tribalism in Transjordan was not limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The role of the state in the development of women’s organisations is explained later on in this 
chapter. 
11 The structure and functions of the election law will be explained in chapter three with reference to 
the introduction of quotas for women. 
12 The civil and criminal codes are heavily influenced by European codes, particularly the French code. 
Shari‘a (Islamic law) is codified in the Personal Status Code for Muslims, which regulates issues such 
as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody. 
13 In this context, ‘traditional’ refers to the values linked to the most conservative allegiances and 
regime loyalists, i.e. the East Bank tribes, as I will shortly explain.  
14 King Hussein bin Talal was King of Jordan from the abdication of his father, King Talal, in 1952, 
until his death in 1999. He had been the King of Jordan for more than 46 years, during which time he 
was a prominent actor in various conflicts (the Cold War of 1947–1991, and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
from 1948 onwards). He won international respect and admiration, but most importantly, he won the 
respect of people living in Jordan, who are still very attached to his figure, as I experienced while I was 
in the country. 
15 Martial law banned large public meetings and allowed the authorities to restrict freedom of speech. 
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to nomads’ (57) and Bedouins. The term ‘tribe’ can function to create distinctions 
between Jordanian citizens built on dichotomies such as tribal/Palestinian, 
Bedouin/peasant and Jordanian Jordanian/Palestinian Jordanian, which can simplify 
the nature of social and political relations in the country16 (Conte and Walentowitz, 
2009; Adely, 2012a); I therefore prefer to follow Alon’s definition of the term. In his 
historical analysis of the role of tribes in the formation of the Jordanian state, Yoav 
Alon (2009) defines the tribe as ‘a group of people distinguished from other groups 
by notions of shared descent, whether real or imagined’ (8). Within this definition, the 
meaning of tribal loyalties depends on the specific contexts, events and persons 
involved. Tribes have been and still are ‘constituencies’ (Alon, 2009: 9) within the 
state’s structure and development. However, tribes need to be considered not only in 
terms of their interaction with the state, but also from the perspectives of the people 
who consider themselves part of them, as the accounts of my interviewees will show. 
In fact, tribes not only play a major political role, but are also considered to embody 
particular ‘values’, as the stories of Terez and Amilah have demonstrated and as I will 
discuss in greater detail in the next chapter.  
Demographic changes undermined the creation of a national identity as well, 
connecting Jordan with the development and problems of modern Palestine. The 
foundation of the State of Israel (1948) led to the forced emigration of hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanian 
population grew by 42%. The Six-Day War of 1967 led to another wave of 
Palestinians refugees entering the country, and resulted not only in the loss of the 
Jordanian West Bank to Israeli Occupation Forces (Salibi, 1993: 222), but also to a 
considerable increase in the proportion of Palestinians within the Jordanian 
population. The practical considerations and decisions that the Jordanian regime made 
in regard to the Palestinian issue have sometimes resulted in tensions with other Arab 
countries (Salibi, 1993). Initially, when some Palestinian guerrilla organisations set up 
operational bases on the East Bank to launch attacks against Israel, Jordan backed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 According to Adely (2012b), the ‘reversion to a set of categories and binaries significantly simplifies 
the realities of Jordanian socio-political life’. The most significant binary is between so-called East 
Jordanian Jordanians, who are typically defined as ‘the tribes’, and Palestinian Jordanians, who are 
‘non-tribal’. Liberal usage of ‘tribes’ and ‘tribalism’ to characterise Jordan ‘evades the real work of 
understanding how kin-relations function in people’s lives and how this has changed and continues to 
change’. 
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these organisations militarily, providing training sites and assistance. The 
confrontations escalated and led to 10-day civil war known as Black September 
(1970). After a ceasefire, guerrilla groups were eliminated from the country, but 
Black September left King Hussein and Jordan isolated from the rest of the Arab 
world. In fact, as ‘no Arab state at that time felt it could afford to make an enemy of 
the Palestinian revolution by taking Jordan’s side on the fedayeen issue’ (Salibi, 1993: 
248), many Arab countries broke off their relations with Jordan: after the Arab 
summit in Rabat in October 1974, the PLO17 was recognised as the sole and exclusive 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
The consequences of these confrontations were political as well as demographic: 
indeed, the most salient social division within the Jordanian population is not a 
religious one, but that between residents of Palestinian and Jordanian origin. This 
social division comes up particularly during political discussions. On a Saturday 
morning in early February 2011, I was in Jerash to interview two female candidates 
with my friend and translator, Vanda. Seham, one of the two female candidates, is a 
lawyer, and she hosted us in her office in the centre of Jerash. While we were 
discussing the political stasis of the Jordanian government and the lack of 
representation of political parties in Jordanian politics, Seham’s husband came into 
the room. At that point Seham stopped talking, looked at him, turned to Vanda and 
then turned to him again and said: ‘You can say whatever you want… She [referring 
to Vanda] is Jordanian’ (Jerash, 5 February 2011). Seham’s comment reflected the 
vulnerability and discomfort provoked by engaging in certain political discussions 
with people who do not belong to the same background and do not have the same 
origins. On another level, Ahlam’s account above reveals the personal, social and 
political frustration of having to live in a country that it is not her own.  
The proportion of Palestinians in the Jordanian population may be as high as 65%; 
some of them arrived as refugees after 1948 and 1967, and many of them were born 
and raised in Jordan. The government does not release official estimates on this issue 
because of political sensitivities, but does acknowledge that 1.4 million Palestinians 
are registered as refugees with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNWRA); this does not account for all of the Palestinians in the country, as many 
neither live in refugee camps nor receive UNWRA services (Braizat, 2007). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Palestine Liberation Organisation, a political and paramilitary organisation, was founded in 
1964. 
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The Palestinian-Jordanian question is closely related to discussions of what it 
means to be Jordanian and the importance of the concept of national identity. The 
literature on the issue of citizenship, especially in the Middle East, is vast (e.g. 
Charrad, 2000; Kandiyoti, 1991a-b; Layne, 1994; Joseph, 2000a-b; Moghadam, 2003; 
Al-Ali, 2007; Botman, 1999; Hatem, 2000): however, it is not the aim of this research 
to engage in an in-depth discussion of this issue. In Layne’s (1994) study of Jordanian 
identity, she argues that it is difficult to define the two groups precisely, whether by 
place, family origin or social characteristics, and that the distinction has enormous 
social meaning (Layne, 1994: 20). In terms of the impact on Jordanian political 
culture, the power of the state is widely seen as connected to the maintenance of the 
East Bank tribes: the army and the civil service are largely drawn from the East Bank 
Jordanian segment of society, and the monarchy is considered to have a symbiotic 
relationship with them in which a certain degree of political power and privilege is 
provided to the ‘tribal sector’ in exchange for their support (Warrick, 2009: 24). 
Loyalty to the state and the royal family is often expressed through loyalty to one’s 
tribe and family. As I will discuss in greater detail in chapter three with reference to 
the impact of tribalism on parliamentary elections, and especially on female 
candidates, tribes still play a fundamental political role in Jordan, and tribal 
organisation has adjusted and evolved to become a pillar of society in its dealings 
with the state. Palestinians are largely excluded from this special relationship with the 
state. Furthermore, the Jordanian parliament is considered to be a pro-tribal, or non-
Palestinian Jordanian, body (Lynch, 1999).18  
Another event that had an impact on Jordanian demography was a direct 
consequence of the First Gulf War (1990–1991): the influx into Jordan of thousands 
of Iraqi refugees. Jordan was the only legal country of exit for Iraqis, and although 
they intended to use it as a country of transit into third countries, they often ended up 
staying there, as they were unable to attain visas for other countries. After the Iraqi 
authorities opened up the border with Jordan in May 1991, an estimated 200,000 
Iraqis took refuge in Jordan (Chatelard, 2009: 12). By the end of the 1990s, Jordan 
had learned to live with the consequences of the Gulf War and the ensuing sanctions 
against Iraq for its politics and economy. But the question of what constitutes a ‘true’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 On the other hand, it needs to be highlighted that Jordan was the only Arab country to grant certain 
citizenship’s rights to Palestinian refugees after the creation of Israel (Jamjoum, 2013). This split in 
society is potentially destabilising for Jordan, and the government has partially controlled its effects by 
forbidding the fomentation of intergroup conflict, creating the crime of ‘harming national unity’.  
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Jordanian, and how this incorporates tribes, Palestinians and Iraqi refugees, is a matter 
of ongoing discussion among the public (as Hind’s account shows with her feelings 
about being a ‘true’ Bedouin), in the academic sphere (Shryock, 1997; Alon, 2009; 
Adely, 2012a), and in the nuances of Jordanian politics. This has also been the case 
with the impact of the more recent revolutions in Syria and the increasing number of 
refugees seeking refuge in Jordan.19 
In relation to the discussion on national identity, also the new King20 had to face 
some challenges that his father had not (Warrick, 2009: 14): he had to work to be 
perceived as a ‘real’ Jordanian, since his British mother and his foreign education 
moderated the legacy of his father. However, his image as a practical professional 
through his prominent role in the Jordanian military – which ensured the support of 
East Bankers – and the fact that his wife, Queen Rania, comes from a notable 
Palestinian family from the West Bank safeguarded his reputation, not only among 
Jordanians but also among those of Palestinian origin. Faced with continuing turmoil 
in Israel and Palestine, Abdullah has played only a minor role in the pursuit of 
regional peace. Moreover, another important factor was the second intifada,21 which 
was supported by the Jordanian people, aided by vocal bodies such as Jordan’s Anti-
Normalisation Committee, an informal grouping that agitated against any contact – 
political, social or cultural – with Israel or Israelis. When a coalition of US-led forces 
invaded Iraq in March 2003, launching the Second Gulf War, Jordan limited its 
involvement, refusing to open its airspace to coalition aircraft and staying out of the 
ground war.  
International recognition is the sphere in which Abdullah has made the most 
impact: Jordan has joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO),22 has hosted several 
meetings of the World Economic Forum and in May 2011 has joined the Gulf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In relation to the Syrian civil war, it is important to highlight the wave of refugees is coming into 
Jordan across the border in the north. Although it is difficult to get accurate numbers, according to 
Dawn Chatty (2013) following her visit to the Za’tari camp in the north of the country, 100,000 
refugees were estimated to be present in that camp in March 2013, growing at a rate of nearly 5,000 a 
day. According to UNHCR data (2013), in August 2013, up to 455,000 Syrian refugees were registered 
in Jordan. This situation is having a drastic impact on Jordan’s internal political and social economy. It 
will also have an impact on the discussion of national identity with reference to the new wave of 
refugees. 
20 On 7 February 1999 King Hussein died, leaving the throne to his son Abdullah, who was crowned in 
July 1999. 
21 Also known as the al-Aqsa intifada (2000–2005). 
22 On 11 April 2000 Jordan became the 136th member of the WTO. 
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Cooperation Council (GCC).23 The regime is often prompt to organise ‘self-
congratulatory celebrations’ of issues such as Jordan’s ranking in the Heritage 
Foundation’s 2010 Economic Freedom Report (Abu-Rish, 2012a: 246). Indices such 
as ‘Business Freedom’ and ‘Trade Freedom’ measure the ability of capital to move in 
and out of Jordan to circulate among its economic elites. However, as Abu-Rish 
(2012a: 246) points out in his recent analysis of the Jordanian uprisings, celebrations 
of Jordan’s ranking as the 38th freest economy in the world and the fourth freest in the 
Middle East risk rendering invisible the daily experiences and difficulties of the 
average Jordanian. In fact, Jordan ranks globally in the bottom 30% in terms of both 
poverty and unemployment (Abu-Rish, 2012a: 246). As the recent uprisings reveal, 
demands for political reform and the ending of poverty are central – now more than 
ever. However, before analysing the impact of the uprisings it is necessary first to 
discuss Jordan’s relationships with international funders, which were suddenly, but 
not surprisingly, reinforced after 11 September 2001.  
 
Donor assistance in Jordan 
 
Jordan’s relative stability, its lack of natural resources and its important strategic 
position in the region have helped to make it one of the major recipients of foreign aid 
in the region: its main donors are the US and the EU (Echagüe and Michou, 2011: 3). 
On September 22, 2008, the US and the Jordanian government ‘reached an agreement 
whereby the United States will provide a total of US$660 million in annual foreign 
assistance to Jordan over a five-year period’ (2010–2014) (Sharp, 2013: 9). According 
to this agreement, the US provides US$360 million per year in Economic Support 
Funds (ESF) and US$300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
(Sharp, 2013: 10). In fact, with reference to the fiscal year 2011, the total assistance to 
Jordan amounted to US$682.7 million (Echagüe and Michou, 2011: 4), of which less 
than half was channelled into military and security assistance, while the remainder 
went into civilian economic assistance, including direct budget support. Within 
civilian aid, the amount requested for the democracy and governance programme – 
‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ – represents roughly 2% of total aid (Echagüe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Also known as the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, it is a political and economic 
coalition of states bordering the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. 
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and Michou, 2011: 4).24  
US aid is distributed through the USAID, which then shares resources between its 
partners locally and internationally. USAID partners are usually US ‘development’ 
organisations such as the NDI, the IRI and Freedom House,25 which then work with 
local implementers and focus their activities mainly on ‘good governance, political 
participation and elections’, according to their websites. Alongside USAID, foreign 
aid is also implemented through the work of the MEPI and the NED. The MEPI has a 
budget of US$40 million for a total of 50 projects in Jordan, providing direct funding 
through a grant programme for civil society organisations and focusing primarily on 
women’s empowerment, youth, new media and entrepreneurship.26 The NED was 
created by US Congress to strengthen democratic institutions around the world, 
focusing on civic participation, media networks and public-private policy dialogue.  
Most of the international organisations operating in Jordan are US-based; however, 
the EC and the embassies of European states have also increased their interventions in 
the country through grants to local organisations. European funds allocated to support 
democratic governance usually represent a small percentage, no more than 3% or 4%, 
of overall overseas development assistance, and direct budgetary support is far greater 
than support for civil society. The tendency is towards an effort to maintain stability 
through negotiated and consensual reform between state institutions and governments. 
In terms of numbers, overall EU assistance stands at roughly €75 million per year, 
with €15 million a year dedicated to human rights and good governance projects (EC-
Jordan, 2012). The EC channels the money through the bilateral EU-Jordan 
cooperation programme, which provides direct civil society funding. In addition, the 
EC allocates around €900,000 each year to support for local organisations through the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) programme.27 The 
EU prefers to work with Jordan-based partners rather than international organisations. 
However, Echagüe and Michou’s (2011) analysis of the impact of donors in the 
‘democratisation’ process in Jordan has shown that the complexity of the application 
process, especially for EIDHR grants, has ‘contributed to a bias in favour of larger, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In March 2013, President Obama pledged to work with Congress to deliver an additional $200 
million in direct budget support to the country to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees (Sharp, 2013: 
10), in line with the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF) established after the 
uprisings started in the region.  
25 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ [accessed 9 April 2013]. 
26 MEPI Jordan, (http://mepi.state.gov/med-region/jordan/ [accessed 9 April 2013]). 
27 http://www.eidhr.eu/ [accessed 1 May 2013]. 
	   80 
mostly Amman-based, organisations, focusing the international support on few 
influential NGOs’ (6), rather than supporting smaller and more grassroots 
organisations. In addition to the EU’s bilateral relationship with the Jordanian 
government, individual states usually work directly with civil society organisations, 
focusing on media, women’s empowerment and NGO capacity-building, as in the 
case of German, Dutch and Danish support. Finally, financial aid also comes from 
multilateral donors, such as the UNDP, which mainly works with ministries and other 
state institutions such as the Lower House of parliament.  
As shown, the major financial aid comes from the US: this support started to 
increase after 1994, when the peace treaty with Israel was ratified. In 1996 Jordan was 
declared a major non-NATO strategic ally by the US, a designation that makes Jordan 
‘eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for 
cooperative research and development’28 (Sharp, 2013: 12). All this attention in terms 
of the distribution of aid is mostly thanks to Jordan’s strategic position in the region, 
its relative stability, and its status as a key partner in the war on terrorism. In fact, the 
impact of the attacks of 11 September 2001 is clearly evident in relation to Jordan. 
Like Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 1998 Jordan did not rank among the top 10 
recipients of US foreign aid, but in less than a decade the country became the sixth 
largest recipient of US economic and military assistance29 (Epstein et al., 2012: 19). 
The US government’s political and development agenda often lies behind 
democratisation projects, although not all organisations accept funding from the US, 
as I will outline and discuss in chapter four. The strong relationship that Jordan has 
with the US in particular has helped to maintain its stability. However, although 
processes of ‘democratisation’ and ‘internationalisation’ seem to have progressed, 
according to the royal family, at the moment real economic reforms are urgently 
needed in the country. This frustration has emerged particularly during the recent 
uprisings in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Did the ‘Arab uprisings’30 happen in Jordan? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Since 2009, Jordan has received excess U.S. defence equipment valued at approximately $81.69 
million (Sharp, 2013: 12). 
29 For fiscal year 2012, Afghanistan is the second largest recipient of US aid ($2,327million), after 
Israel ($3,075million) and followed by Pakistan ($2,102) (Epstein et al., 2012: 19). 
30 I prefer to use the term ‘uprisings’ rather than ‘revolutions’ when referring to recent events in the 
region (i.e. those beginning in December 2010 and January 2011). For a clarification of my use of the 
term, see the introduction to the thesis. 
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On the afternoon of Thursday 1 February 2011, I went to meet Hind and Ahlam in a 
café in the south of Amman. When I arrived they were already there, discussing and 
chatting in a lively fashion. At the beginning I felt awkward about interrupting them, 
but when we started talking I felt more comfortable and ‘accepted’. They were 
excited to meet each other, because they wanted to create their own party: according 
to them, ‘in order to succeed in parliament we should have the support of a party.’ I 
stayed in the café with them for a couple of hours, discussing and listening to their 
stories. It was at the end of our talk, when Ahlam offered to take me home, that they 
both received a phone call; Hind in particular started getting extremely excited about 
something. She was talking too fast in Arabic, and it was difficult for me to 
understand what was going on, but I perceived it was good news because she shook 
me and congratulated Ahlam as well. When they both finished their phone calls, they 
turned to me and told me, with huge smiles on their faces: ‘The Prime Minister 
resigned and the King appointed a new one! I like him, oh I am so happy, and now 
things will change. He is not corrupt like the previous ones!’ They spread their 
enthusiasm and energy into the whole place, including to the waiters: their joy was 
unrestrained. 
That day, 1 February 2011, Jordanian Prime Minister Samir Rifa’i resigned 
following weeks of protests by ‘people in Jordan’31 calling on the government to step 
down, and King Abdullah II tasked Marouf Bakhit to form a new government. That 
was a gesture by the King to people in Jordan, who had started demonstrating in the 
streets after the protests in Tunisia and Egypt spread outwards in early 2011.  
Although, like Jordan, the countries in which the uprisings evolved, such as Egypt, 
Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, were and are governed by authoritarian systems 
that undermine accountability and civil liberties and promote neoliberal economic 
policies that are unsuitable to citizens’ basic needs, scholars have considered the 
protests in Jordan to be different (Abu-Rish, 2012a; Adely, 2012a; Moore, 2012). 
First, the number of people that took to the streets in Jordan was smaller compared to 
mass numbers in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia.32 Second, and more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 When I refer to ‘people in Jordan’ throughout the thesis, I am aware of the nuances in the definition 
of ‘Jordanian identity’. Here I intend people living and working in Jordan, which includes those of 
Palestinian or Iraqi origin, Bedouins, peasants, East Bank Jordanians, and other people who have 
immigrated to Jordan. 
32 Although it is very difficult, yet impossible, to have exact numbers, people in the streets in Jordan 
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importantly, protesters’ demands in other countries focused on regime change.  
In line with these scholars, and from my personal understanding of what was 
happening in the country during the first months of the uprisings, I grasped two main 
related aspects. First, the role and position of King Abdullah was not under 
discussion; as other scholars have suggested (Hudson, 2012; Abu-Rish, 2012a), at the 
beginning the protests questioned the role of the government, not that of the King. 
Second, and consequently, because of this faith in the royal family, people in Jordan 
often told me: ‘We are different from other countries in the region – we are not going 
to end up in a regime change – we are just asking for reforms’ (extracts from 
interviews with women’s rights activists and female candidates for parliament, 
Amman, 2011). As Hudson (2012) points out in his historical outline of the uprisings, 
protesters in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia – and I would add 
Jordan – were saying: ‘We celebrate and support the protesters of Tunis and Egypt; 
they have broken the ‘wall of fear’ and we would like to see something similar (but 
not necessarily identical) happen in our countries’ (25). 
I perceived this faith in the King and the royal family on the afternoon of Saturday 
11 June 2011, when by chance I found myself in the middle of a pro-king 
demonstration in Amman. I was driving back from Petra with some friends, and we 
ended up in a traffic jam outside Amman. Interestingly, several buses full of young 
men only – all in their early 20s – were causing the traffic jam. An Iraqi friend who 
was with me in the car told me that these buses came from the south of Jordan, 
specifically from the governorate of Karak, a stronghold of conservative tribes and 
regime loyalists. The demonstration proceeded smoothly, with many young men 
singing national songs and displaying pictures of the King and his father from the 
buses and on the streets. The demonstration appeared to me as an outsider to have 
been entirely organised by external forces. We stayed there for half an hour, and then 
we managed to leave. That demonstration revealed that the role of the King was still 
considered central, and was being not challenged by the demonstrators, at least at the 
beginning of the uprisings.33 Although that was a clear pro-king event, during other 
demonstrations the ‘fabric and texture of the politics of resistance’ (Tripp, 2013: 8) 
became clearer: the demands were for changes in the regime-appointed government, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
never reached the tens of thousands as it occurred in Egypt and Tunisia, counting up to 3,500 
protesters, at the beginning of the uprisings (Al-Jazeera staff, 2011).  
33 In November 2012 some protesters demanded regime change in Jordan too. See the end of this 
section for an analysis. 
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and for a set of political and economic reforms. But how did the regime address the 
demands of people in the streets, if indeed it did so? And what were people 
specifically asking for? 
According to Adely’s analysis of the uprisings in Jordan (2012b), the combination 
of a deepening economic crisis and the growing anger over corruption was already 
tangible in 2008. However, the protests of 2011 ‘accelerated forces that were already 
at work in Jordan and had been for some time’ (Adely, 2012b). At the beginning of 
the protests, the demands focused not only on the rise in prices, but especially on 
people’s inability to meet their basic needs thanks to Jordan’s neoliberal economic 
configuration. As Abu-Rish (2012a) points out, the heart of the problem in Jordan’s 
economy is to be found in the ‘nexus of poverty, unemployment, and weak 
purchasing power on the part of the majority of citizens’ (245). Neoliberal 
investments in non-productive sectors provided quick and large revenues, but did so 
exclusively for the privileged Jordanians who had access to those investments.  
The Jordanian regime responded to the first protests in different ways, and I think 
only with rather ‘cosmetic’ changes. The regime allowed the demonstrations and 
worked towards their peaceful resolution. When I participated in one of the first 
protests in January 2011, walking in the streets of downtown Amman with very few 
women and lots of young and old men, I was astonished to see police officers, who 
were there to ensure public order, providing us with bottled water. I personally felt 
that the decision to order the police to offer bottles of water to demonstrators was a 
way for the King to let the people know that he was supportive and on their side. 
During the first months after the uprisings, the regime implemented some measures in 
response to protesters’ demands. However, those measures offered only short-term 
relief for the rising cost of living for specific social groups, such as through the 
temporary elimination of fuel taxes, or the increase of 20 Jordanian dinars in monthly 
salary and pension payments for civilian and military public-sector employees and 
retirees (Abu-Rish, 2012a; Ryan, 2011). 
After the first weeks of protests, the demands started to shift from the social to the 
political level. In fact, although demonstrations sometimes varied in terms of 
participants and demands, with protests for greater media and press freedom and 
against state repression in other Arab countries, the larger demonstrations were for the 
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democratic reforms that opposition parties34 and civil society groups had been 
demanding for years (Ryan, 2011). The coalitions were very different, for ethnic, 
political, generational and geographical reasons. However, both old and new groups 
and activists agreed on at least some demands for reform. Demonstrators demanded a 
return to the 1952 Constitution,35 and wanted parliament to be a body that actually 
legislates rather than merely implements Cabinet initiatives or royal decrees. They 
were also demanding reform of the one-person one-vote election system through a re-
evaluation of the divisions of districts, in order to have elected representatives 
independent of their tribes. Most importantly, they were all demanding an end to 
corruption and the establishment of a more independent judiciary to that end, and they 
were calling for fewer restrictions on the media, press and other publications, and an 
end to mukhabarat interference in public life in general. 
During the first demonstrations in January and February 2011, I saw very few 
women in the streets. I was disappointed at first, but then I thought that with time, 
more women would start to actively participate. However, during the time I spent in 
Jordan (until June 2011) I did not see any improvement in this direction. The only 
women who did participate more actively in the demonstrations were a group 
connected with the JWU. More women started to demonstrate later in 2011 and in 
2012, mostly to demand reform of the Nationality Law and laws on violence against 
women;36 in some cases the women demonstrating were related to the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF), Jordan’s biggest opposition party.37 By contrast with women’s 
participation, youth activists played a very important role in such demonstrations: 
often organised as youth or shabab groups through Facebook or other social media, 
these protestors – who pushed for the resignation of the Rifa’i government – came 
together to form what it is now called the March 24 shabab Movement.38 On 24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Jordan has approximately 30 political parties. The role of political parties in Jordanian politics will 
be analysed in the next chapter with reference to the introduction of a quota system for women in 
parliament. 
35 The amendments of the 1952 Constitution have been criticised for sidelining parliament and eroding 
the government’s executive powers, while the monarch has the most of authority. 
36 As I will explain later on in the chapter, issues of nationality and violence against women are very 
sensitive debates within the Jordanian policy-making system. 
37 The IAF is the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country. It was founded in 1992, 
(www.jordanpolitics.org/en/index.php/parties/current-parties/819-the-islamic-action-front-party 
[accessed 27 May 2013]). 
38 From their Facebook page, as translated by Abu-Rish (2012b): ‘We are a mixture of free Jordanian 
young men and women, who are tired of delays and the promise of reform, who see the spread of 
corruption, the deterioration of the economic situation, the regression of political life, the erasure of 
freedoms, and the dissolution of the social fabric… We thus declare: That the people want the reform 
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March 2011 they spent a whole day and night demonstrating for democracy and 
reform at Ministry of the Interior Circle in Amman. The newer opposition coalition or 
‘alternative opposition’39 had organised the protest, but it came to include participants 
from the more traditional opposition as well (Ryan, 2011: 386). The peaceful 
demonstrators represented the diversity of Jordan itself: men and some women, young 
and old, rich and poor, Muslims and Christians, secular and Islamist. They included 
East Jordanians, Palestinians and Circassians. However, as with most of the 2011 
demonstrations, the majority were East Bankers or Transjordanians, who were using 
very nationalist symbols such as Jordanian flags, nationalist songs and pictures of the 
King. Although that demonstration was broken up the next morning by armed and 
angry nationalist youths known as bultajiyya (‘thugs’), leaving hundreds injured and 
one dead, that day is considered to have been an ‘exercise in genuine grassroots 
democracy’ in Jordan (Ryan, 2011: 386). 
The maintenance of the status quo has been a characteristic of the Jordanian 
politics of the Hashemites, in the past as well as the present (Moore, 2012; Abu-Rish, 
2012a). At the beginning of the uprisings, the Jordanian regime seemed to be 
responding to the protestors’ central demand by sacking Prime Minister Samir al-
Rifa’i and providing short-term measures, as described above. Also, in March 2011 
the regime established the National Dialogue Committee,40 a body created to engage 
in the public discussion of reform in Jordan. However, I think that the creation of this 
political committee represents another top-down and regime-sponsored measure that 
contributes to the maintenance of the status quo through the concentration of power in 
the polity and the economy, and that it serves as a ‘lynchpin of the regime’s domestic 
and international campaigns to prove its alleged now-serious approach to reform’ 
(Abu-Rish, 2012a: 242), without offering anything structurally different from the 
social, economic and political fabric that was in place before the protests. The 
maintenance of the status quo is not only in the interests of the Jordanian regime, but, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the regime. And based on this, we demand: 1- a parliament that represents the people; 2- an elected 
national government; 3- real constitutional reforms; 4- prosecuting those who are corrupt; 5- reforming 
the tax system; 6- lifting the security grip; 7- realising national unity’. 
39 In Jordan there are two types of opposition: the official opposition, comprised of the legalised 
opposition parties and professional associations, and the ‘alternative opposition’, which includes the 
Jordanian Social Left Movement, the Jordanian National Initiative, the National Progressive Current, 
the National Committee of Military Veterans and the Jordanian Writers Association, in addition to very 
small groups such as the Democratic Youth Union, the Philosophy Society, the Socialist Thought 
Forum, the Assembly of Circassian Youth and the Association Against Zionism and Racism (Bustani, 
2011). 
40 Of the committee’s 52 members, only four are women.  
	   86 
as Moore (2012) has argued, it is also a goal for the US, since ‘Jordan is a “safe zone” 
in a sea of unrest’.  
After more than two years since the beginning of the demonstrations, a very active 
Jordanian blogger has stated that everything is pretty much still the same, and that 
‘realistically speaking, 2011 in Jordan has been akin to running wildly through a maze 
only to find yourself back at the start again with that eerie sense of having spent the 
past year running in an endless circle’ (Tarawnah, 2012). Since the start of the 
demonstrations, four prime ministers have resigned, but reforms have not been 
forthcoming, and people are still demonstrating in the streets. Young people are 
getting more involved, as Ala, a 22-year-old female activist, told me while discussing 
her support for the March 24 Movement:  
 
I am really happy about what is happening right now, because 
young people are becoming more aware. We are realising that we 
can make a difference, we count, we matter. We have been told 
many times that we are worthless, we are kids, but now we finally 
have a voice. I supported the March 24 Movement, their demands 
and their hopes (Amman, 7 April 2011). 
 
In November 2012, some demonstrators started to demand regime change in 
Jordan too, with slogans like ‘people want the fall of the regime’ (al-sha’b yurid isqat 
al-nizam).41 However, not all of the ‘opposition’ was united in the call for the fall of 
the regime, as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, which promptly distanced itself 
from such slogans. As recently pointed out by Bustani (2012), a drastic regime change 
is unlikely to happen in Jordan, for various reasons. First, the November 2012 protests 
did not include a huge number of people; this might be related to the complexity and 
vulnerability of the concept of Jordanian identity. Second, the opposition forces were 
not united, as the case of the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates. Third, the brutal 
development of the Syrian uprisings led the opposition to adopt a ‘new pro-state, anti-
chaos rhetoric, which extends to Jordan’ (Bustani, 2012). Fourth and last, because of 
the delicate role that Jordan plays in regional and international politics, the stability of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For examples of other slogans see Abu-Rish 2012c: ‘haza al-urdun urdunna wa-al-khayin yab’id 
‘anna (this Jordan is our Jordan, and the traitor should get away from us); hurriyyeh, hurriyyeh, mish 
makarim malakiyyah (freedom, freedom, not royal handouts); ya bitsalih al-hin, ya bi-tilhaq al-
Abidine (either fix it now, or follow Abidine [Ben Ali])’. 
	   87 
the monarchy will also preserve existing political balances of power. The 
maintenance of the status quo seems to be the ‘safest’ way for the regime to retain its 
role as a buffer state in the region, and to maintain stability inside the country. 
Internally, the status quo has been maintained through control over civil society 
organisations and the lack of structural legal reforms, as I will now demonstrate with 
reference to women’s organisations and the promotion of women’s rights’ in the 
country. 
 
Women organising in Jordan: an introduction  
 
As emerged from the analysis of women’s movements in the region in chapter one, 
despite some similarities, there are many differences among movements in different 
countries and contexts (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Ahmed, 1992b; Al-Ali, 2000). State-
society relations, political freedoms and restrictions, legal frameworks for civil 
society associations, economic resources and international links differ greatly from 
one Middle Eastern country to another (Al-Ali, 2003: 218). There are also many 
differences between women’s organisations and groups within the same country, as in 
the case of Jordan. 
According to Beckwith’s argument (2007b) about the ‘unique relationship’ 
between women’s organisations and the state, women’s movements can be defined as 
‘social movements where women are the major actors and leaders, who make 
gendered identity claims as the basis for the movement, and who organise explicitly 
as women’ (314). However, in line with Stetson and Mazur (2002), I prefer a slightly 
less specific definition, as involving ‘a broad spectrum of actors and institutions that 
can potentially represent women’s interests, whether they are overtly feminist or not’ 
(3: in Beckwith, 2007b: 333, footnote 5). Although I believe that there is not just one 
women’s movement in Jordan, but rather a multiplicity of groups and organisations 
that advocate and work for the promotion of women’s rights, when I refer to the 
‘movement’ in Jordan I mean to include the plurality of women’s organisations. 
Scholars have tried to classify different women’s organisations and groups into 
precise categories, albeit with the awareness that such categories have to be regarded 
as fluid and sometimes overlapping (Moghadam, 1997: 32–33). Following, for 
instance DAWN’s (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) 
classification of women’s organisations, scholars have distinguished between 
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organisations that are service-oriented, affiliated to a political party, worker-based, 
tied to external funding, grassroots, research-oriented or academic, and also women’s 
coalitions or feminist networks (Sen and Grown, 1987: 89–96). In my analysis of the 
tensions among selected women’s organisations in Jordan in the chapters that follow, 
I will certainly focus on the type of activities promoted, but I will also shed light on 
the different approaches used, as well as on their diverse conceptualisations of 
empowerment. Chapters three and four will present the range of specific activities that 
women’s organisations in Jordan have promoted in order to enhance women’s 
political participation, highlighting the different approaches employed. The attention 
to women’s gender interests and needs reflects the diverse strategies of each 
organisation and their different conceptualisations and operationalisations of 
empowerment, which are rooted in each organisation’s history, background and 
relationship to the state. In chapter five I will then focus my analysis on the 
relationship between women’s groups, female candidates, female MPs and ‘national 
machineries’. In this chapter I will introduce the historical development of women’s 
organising in Jordan, stressing the tensions and problems within and between 
women’s organisations, which will be developed throughout the thesis. 
 
Historical background: women’s groups  
 
 ‘Women’s organisations have different ways of thinking and approaching the 
woman’s cause: there are the leftist, the royal and the governmental ones’ (Randa, 
Amman, 8 March 2011). Randa, a gender expert and women’s rights activist whom I 
met at various conferences in Amman during my fieldwork, reflected on the status of 
women’s organisations in the country. The development of women’s organisations in 
Jordan has been extremely influenced by the role and presence of the state and the 
royal family.  
Women’s activism in Jordan started with few charitable organisations at the very 
beginning of the 20th century, to address issues such as poverty and illiteracy 
(Husseini, 2010). During the 1940s, dissatisfaction with the status of women 
increased, and a political consciousness arose following the Israeli war.42 Before the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 As described above, the relationship between Israel and Jordan was tense between 1948 and 1994. 
Here I am particularly referring to the Arab-Israeli war fought between the State of Israel and a military 
coalition of Arab states and Palestinian Arab forces in 1948–1951. 
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war, the state did not interfere directly in social work or organisations; it was 
relatively open to interactions with diverse forms of political power, in what Brand 
(1998: 36) refers to as the first liberalisation phase in Jordan. The emergence of 
women’s action in other countries in the region such as Egypt, and of transnational 
movements, also influenced women’s activism in Jordan.  
Women’s activists in Jordan began to play an active role in demonstrations against 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it was then that the ‘movement’ took shape (Al-Atiyat, 
2003: 56). In January 1945 the JWU, in which Terez has been an activist for many 
years, was established, and the ‘movement’ became more active in demanding greater 
political, social, legal and economic rights. One of its main interests was in obtaining 
women’s right to vote, which was granted in 1955 – but only to educated women (Al-
Atiyat, 2003: 57; Husseini, 2010: 193). This caused outrage, not only in relation to 
class discrimination, but also because illiterate men already had their right to vote and 
run for office. Yet this decision reflected the regime’s vision of the inclusion of 
women in the political system. According to Freij’s (2002) analysis of political 
liberalisation in Jordan, all of the women who received political appointments to 
positions of power, such as on consultative councils to parliament, came exclusively 
from prominent families (Freij, 2002: 33). With the exception of the JWU,43 the other 
smaller women’s organisations established in the country between 1951 and 1979 
were run by wealthy women, ‘who, as a way of filling free time, provided assistance 
to elevate poverty or to support orphanages and similar social categories’, without 
doing ‘serious work related to the woman’s question’ (Al-Atiyat, 2003: 56–57). As 
Freij (2002: 33) argues, the elitist and upper-class nature of women’s organisations, 
especially during the 1970s, contributed to the lack of women’s political mobilisation 
in the country, and I would add that this has also been the case in more recent years, 
as I will demonstrate throughout the thesis.  
The JWU has always been independent of the state, and when authoritarianism 
increased, it had to overcome many hurdles in order to keep working for women’s 
rights. From the mid 1950s to the late 1980s the power of the authoritarian state 
became much stronger, negatively affecting the activities of women’s groups and 
other organisations (Warrick, 2009: 144): this led to the closure and banning of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In 1949 Amaly Bisharat, the president of the JWU, presented parliament with a set of political and 
legal changes in relation to women’s status. According to one of my respondents, ‘she was very 
courageous to talk about women’s equal rights in the context of inheritance, for instance’ (London, 12 
December 2012). 
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JWU. The JWU faced two dissolutions ordered by the government, in 1957 and 1981. 
In 1957, in an attempt to control and stabilise the country’s political situation, the 
Jordanian regime banned political party activities, and in 1967 parliament was 
dissolved; subsequently the regime instituted martial law (Brand, 1998). In 1974, just 
before the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), Jordanian women received the right 
to vote and run as candidates in parliamentary elections (Husseini, 2010: 193), 
without any discrimination related to their level of education. However, they had no 
opportunity to exercise this right, because all political activity in the country was still 
suspended. It was not until the restoration of parliamentary life in Jordan in 1989 that 
the JWU was able to reactivate and regain its voice (Warrick, 2009). In the spirit of 
the JWU, in the 1970s a group of women activists who dreamt of a society where 
gender equality and social justice would be the rule for all citizens founded the AWO, 
a grassroots, non-governmental, non-profit organisation dedicated to making a 
difference to the lives of women in Jordan.  
The 1970s and 1980s marked a shift within the ‘movement’, from focusing entirely 
on social welfare to addressing social development concerns; however, political issues 
related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were still central. The resumption of 
parliamentary elections in 1989 and the re-emergence of political parties opened up a 
new era for women’s organisations, and many of the groups that are currently 
operating have emerged since that date (Warrick, 2009: 144; Al-Atiyat, 2003). Those 
years also marked the beginning of the state’s attempted control over women’s 
organisations and activities through the creation of quasi-governmental/governmental 
organisations.  
The GFJW was founded in 1981, and was the first of this kind of governmental 
organisations. Mainly women’s organisations that focused on charitable work were 
registered under the GFJW, which operated as a government-sponsored 
organisation.44 The state’s power over women’s organisations also gave it strict 
control over the activities of independent groups; this has been seen as an obstacle to 
the advancement of women’s rights in Jordan (Al-Atyiat, 2003). For example, when 
in the early 1990s the JWU wanted to add to its mission statement the goal of 
educating women about their political, economic and social rights, the Ministry of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Federation is not based on an individual membership system: women cannot join it unless they 
are part of a charitable organisation that wants to become a member of the Federation. 
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Interior ‘asked they omit political rights from the statement’ (Freij, 2002: 34).45 
Moreover, the regime’s control over women’s groups and activities has been heavily 
influenced by the role of the royal family through the establishment of the so-called 
royal NGOs, or as Brand refers to them, RONGOs (Brand, 1998: 171). In 1992 the 
JNCW, initiated and headed by Princess Basma, was established by cabinet decision. 
This semi-governmental organisation has gained recognition as the authority on 
women’s affairs in Jordan’s public sector, while it also represents the Kingdom at 
regional and international levels in matters pertaining to women (Warrick, 2009: 145). 
At present, it is an umbrella organisation that tries to coordinate and guide all 
women’s organisations in the country. In December 1995, Princess Basma also 
established the JNFW. The JNFW grew out of the mobilisation efforts of the 
voluntary women’s committees that were set up in 1993 to sensitise local 
communities to the National Strategy for Women,46 which was ratified in 1993 and 
aimed to improve women’s status (Warrick, 2009: 148). The direct supervision by 
members of the royal family of the activities and projects of women’s organisations 
goes hand-in-hand with the limitations and legal restrictions imposed by the state. As 
Warrick (2009) argues in her research on gender and politics in Jordan, in terms of the 
development of a free and pluralistic civil society, this type of royal and quasi-
governmental NGO ‘is not ideal, as it cooperates with authoritarian power rather than 
limiting it’ (Warrick, 2009: 151). Although there are as many as 147 other 
organisations spread all over Jordan working on women’s issues (Dajani, 2008), 
political activism on behalf of women’s gender interests is led by the few 
independent, quasi-governmental and royal organisations described above.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Also, according to one of my respondents who was a member of the JWU: ‘the bargain was over 
JWU identity, as it used to be called the Union for Women in Jordan, which reflected the Union’s 
mission to involve women in Jordan regardless of their nationality. The Ministry insisted we changed 
the name to ‘Jordanian Women Union’ in order to reflect the Jordanian identity of the Union… We 
changed the name, but we kept the political right that every woman, regardless of her nationality, as 
long as she lives in Jordan, can be a member’ (personal interview, London, 12 December 2012). The 
JWU has approximately 10,000 members and 10 branches around the country. 
46 The National Strategy was the result of a series of studies, seminars and meetings between a broad 
cross-section of men and women from different sectors of society. The strategy aimed at strengthening 
and implementing women’s rights and gender equality in the fields of legislation, political activity, in 
the economy and with reference to social, educational and health issues (National Strategy, 1993). This 
strategy is envisaged as the ‘focal point towards which all national efforts, whatever their orientations 
and fields of activity, would ultimately lead’ (Al-Atiyat, 2003: 168). It delineates the main areas of 
attention as improving and enhancing women’s economic status; enhancing women’s status at the 
legislative level; increasing female participation in politics; increasing awareness of women’s rights 
and gender issues; and promoting human security and social protection (interview with Asma Khader, 
JNCW, 28 November 2010). 
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Organisations’ activities and my own experience 
 
Throughout this thesis I will focus on the analysis of three organisations, namely the 
JNCW, the JNFW and the JWU; for this reason, I aim to introduce my own 
experiences of visiting each of these organisations. This will be complemented by a 
brief introduction of the activities offered by each organisation. 
It was only on entering their headquarters on my first visits to each organisation 
that I was able to gain a sense of their diversity. The types of activities they promoted, 
and the backgrounds of the women involved in their projects, highlighted the 
differences. When I visited the JNCW I found a professional but not extremely formal 
atmosphere. The organisation is located on the second floor of the Fund for National 
Development building in Amman, which is divided into offices and meeting rooms, 
with pictures of the King, the Queen and Princess Basma everywhere. During my 
time in Jordan I went there three times, and on each occasion I met different people: 
first a young project coordinator, who was extremely nice and helpful about letting 
me get to know the organisation; second the secretary general, Asma Khader, with 
whom I had a quick but useful meeting; and finally their lawyer, who provided me 
with good information on laws on discrimination against women in Jordan. Each time 
I was made very welcome, with tea or coffee, but always in a very distant and 
professional way. As revealed in the interviews I conducted and on the organisation’s 
website, their mission is to find ways to bolster women’s status, proposing ‘new 
policies and legislation to further the cause of women as well as studying existing 
policies and legislation to ensure they are not discriminated against’.47 Their mission 
resonates with the Jordanian Cabinet’s decision of 12 March 1992, which established 
the organisation to serve as a ‘reference body entrusted with drawing up general 
policies and identifying the priorities of women in Jordan’.48 The JNCW was created 
in response to frequent calls from the United Nations for the establishment of national 
committees that are concerned with women’s issues (Al-Atiyat, 2003: 103). The 
JNCW’s main area of activity is amending legislation that obstructs women’s 
participation in development; enacting new legislation and policies that will guarantee 
the completion of a legal framework that emphasises women’s full participation; and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 http://www.women.jo/en/about.php?cat_id=10&type=0 [accessed 14 April 2013]. 
48 Interview with JNCW project director, 21 November 2010. 
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creating public awareness regarding the importance of women's roles and their status 
in the progress of Jordanian society (Al-Atiyat, 2003: 103; interview with JNCW 
project director, 21 November 2010). 
The JNCW oversaw the publication of the Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the Official Gazette (2007), 
and it is currently monitoring Jordan’s compliance with it, together with the Human 
Forum for Women Rights (HFWR). The JNCW is also involved in the 
implementation and updating of the ‘National Strategy for Women’ in Jordan and it 
mainly coordinates research and studies on National Strategy’s topics, presenting the 
results to government institutions and pushing awareness of women’s rights at the 
national level. More recently the JNCW published an evaluative study of the status of 
gender mainstreaming in various public sector institutions (Suliman, 2010), trying to 
increase the awareness of gender issues among institutions as well. If lobbying and 
establishing pressure groups are the main activities that this organisation offers, as I 
will describe in chapter four with reference to political participation, in a minor way 
they are also linked to women at the grassroots, offering training activities or 
addressing issues related to violence against women or the Personal Status Law. In 
this regard, it is important to underline that the work of the JNCW has contributed to 
the amendment of a number of discriminatory laws on labour regulation, social 
security and income tax, as well as of the penal code, the personal status code and the 
civil status code. These amendments provided some gains for women, such as a paid 
maternity leave, better pension provision and better access to divorce, although men 
and women still do not have equal legal status (Warrick, 2009; Husseini, 2010).  
My sense of being in a formal environment was confirmed during my attempts to 
identify the ‘typical members’ of this organisation. The women represented by the 
JNCW are usually professionals, members of organisations, and women connected to 
the state, such as those who work in ministries. 
The atmosphere I perceived when I visited the JNFW, was less ‘bureaucratic’ and 
friendlier than that at the JNCW. Only four people were working in the office in 
Amman and, as usual, they welcomed me with tea and coffee. My interactions with 
my interviewees were less formal than those I had experienced at the JNCW. Pictures 
of the Queen and Princess Basma were present here too, since the latter is the head of 
the JNFW’s higher council. The main idea behind the JNFW is to enhance women’s 
participation in politics and various other decision-making processes at the local level. 
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This is intended to further several objectives, such as spreading awareness among 
women in Jordan about the content of the ‘National Strategy’; raising awareness on 
health, education, culture, the legislature, economy and politics; and forming pressure 
groups to influence decision makers (Al-Atiyat, 2003: 105; interview with project 
director, 18 January 2011). JNFW activities are focused on advocacy, training 
programmes and awareness-raising projects. As I will depict also in chapter four with 
reference to activities for political empowerment, this organisation is very keen on 
raising awareness among people – men and women – concerning women’s status in 
Jordan, with a particular focus on political participation, women’s health, economic 
empowerment and violence against women. Although the JNFW is a semi-
governmental and royal-supported organisation, their work starts from, and their 
activities are targeted at, the grassroots. They have 127,000 members (interview with 
May Abu Alseemen, 18 January 2011) spread all over the country. This high number 
is possible thanks to the branches they have established in each of the 12 
governorates. On a visit to their office in Irbid I found the same atmosphere as I had 
experienced in Amman. The woman who welcomed me was very specific about the 
activities organised in the Irbid governorate, but again, attention to the needs of 
women from the most diverse backgrounds was her priority. 
The JWU, which I visited more than once during my time in Jordan, is also very 
connected with women at the grassroots level. The atmosphere at the JWU is unique. 
It occupies multiple offices on the same street in the Jabal Hussein area in Amman. 
One big sign at the top of the main building indicates where the JWU is. However, 
when I tried to get into the building, I felt as if I were going into somebody’s house. 
Thanks to two women who were sweeping up outside the entrance and who 
understood that I was looking for the JWU, I was able to find the right direction. On 
entering the courtyard I took a look through the ground floor windows and saw many 
women cooking. But the two women at the entrance had told me that I had to go 
upstairs. I stopped at the first floor, where I was welcomed into a small office next to 
a big room where there were many women chatting in a lively way. I was amazed by 
the happiness and joy I could sense in the environment: although I could not hear 
what they were saying, the women were laughing and seemed to me to be enjoying 
themselves. After I had been waiting for a while, one of them showed me around to 
see how they are organised and how they work. In another room on the same floor, 
some children were playing and drawing, and I started to wonder what types of 
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services the organisation offered. Later I discovered that the JWU provides 
‘Children’s Guest House’ to care for the children of separated and divorced couples 
and single mothers: the children I had seen were part of the Guest House programme. 
This also explained the busy activity in the kitchen I had seen through the window. 
Inside the building I had the same impression of being in a family home as I had had 
from the outside. Indeed, every time I visited the JWU, even while I was doing my 
interviews, the women made me feel like a part of their ‘family’, with their kindness, 
their interest in my work and their willingness to give me the information I was 
looking for.  
As previously described, the JWU is an independent organisation, which often 
demands radical changes in the status of women. It provides a variety of activities, as 
the manager of the Guest House, a lawyer, and a psychologist all enthusiastically 
explained to me: 
 
We have some permanent ongoing activities, such as a hotline for 
legal, social and psychological advice for women, the Children’s 
Guest House, and a women’s shelter to provide some support to 
women who may be being abused and who are victims of violence 
(Amman, 8 December 2010). 
 
Indeed, the JWU is one of the most prominent organisations in the field of violence 
against women (Warrick, 2009), together with the Sisterhood is Global Institute 
(SIGI).49 The direct help the JWU offers to women is the first thing that strikes a 
visitor to the organisation, especially if one stays in the main building. On another 
visit I was invited to another building, still on the same street, to meet the director, 
Nadia Shamrouk. Although the atmosphere in this office too was very welcoming and 
friendly, I could sense that the work on this side of the building was more focused on 
administrative and organisational activities; the space was structured more like an 
office, with desks, computers and meeting rooms. The JWU is very involved in 
lobbying activities, implementing national campaigns, addressing issues such as the 
Nationality Law, the passport law, family law, divorce law and election law. Political 
awareness is also central to the JWU’s approach, and this reflects the organisation’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The Sisterhood Is Global Institute/Jordan was established in 1998 in Amman by a group of Jordanian 
women, and is registered as a non-governmental, non-profit Jordanian organisation. 
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desire to promote change coming from women in cities, villages and camps, dealing 
with political participation, economic empowerment and health issues. The JWU is 
very effective in providing services for women at the grassroots level, and also in 
advocating and lobbying for women’s rights and gender justice, as I will continue to 
depict throughout the thesis.  
The JNCW, the JNFW and the JWU work towards women’s rights promotion 
following different agendas. However, they are not the only bodies that attempt to 
advocate gender justice in the country: there are also other top-down institutions 
called national machineries. 
 
National gender machineries 
 
Goetz and Hassim (2003) argue that not only does the nature of the state affect the 
possibilities of policy change for women’s empowerment, but the power of gender 
equality advocates within civil society is also an important factor. In addition, I would 
include the influence of the international community and of international donors, 
agreements and conferences on women’s rights and gender justice as factors that have 
pushed many states to integrate gender and women’s rights into their policies and 
structures. The institutionalisation of women’s gender interests at the national level 
has been the concern of both women’s movements and IOs, both globally and with 
reference to the Middle East. As discussed in chapter one, when gender 
mainstreaming50 emerged as a strategy for the diffusion of gender interests across 
state and local institutions, many countries started to incorporate a gender analysis 
into their policymaking processes. After the Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing in 1995 and the BPFA, the focus on mainstreaming gender through ‘national 
machineries’ for the advancement of women was strengthened. The BPFA outlined 
three strategic objectives in this regard: to create or strengthen national machineries 
and other government bodies; to integrate gender perspectives into legislation, public 
policies, programmes and projects; and to generate and disseminate gender-
disaggregated data and information for planning and evaluation (Wordsworth, 2008: 
10). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Gender mainstreaming, understood as a process of gendered democratisation, is discussed in chapter 
one, together with the implications of its transformative agenda. 
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The benefits and shortcomings of national machineries have been widely debated 
among feminist scholars (Goetz, 1998; Rai, 2008; Eveline and Bacchi, 2010), 
particularly in relation to two main questions. First, are national machineries as state 
institutions the most appropriate instruments for furthering women’s gender interests? 
Second, do these institutions command the necessary resources to be able to promote 
gender interests?  
The representation of gender interests is a very multifaceted, complex and nuanced 
process, which needs to take into considerations the roles of all the actors involved. 
For this reason, the question of engagement with the state and state institutions in the 
process of representing gender interests should not be seen in terms of binary 
oppositions. We need to consider the broader picture of the mobilisation of gender 
interests and their articulation within the space of women’s groups, organisations and 
civil society at large. We also need to understand the reasons, whether political and/or 
connected to international demands, behind the establishment of such ‘national 
machinery’, bearing in mind that all national machineries are embedded in specific 
socio-economic and political contexts. Although, as Rai (2008) suggests, comparisons 
between national machineries in different contexts are not always useful, some 
elements are critical for all. First, whether the machinery is located at a higher or 
lower level within the decision-making hierarchy might have an influence on its 
position of authority and/or access to resources. There is a general consensus that 
machineries at the highest possible level are potentially the most powerful 
(Wordsworth, 2008: 15), and that such positions enhance their economic and political 
advantages (Rai, 2008: 78). Second, the vexed question of the relationship between 
mandate and functional responsibility may lead to the risk that some national 
machineries will focus exclusively on their ‘role as policy advisers and catalysts for 
gender mainstreaming, leaving the actual implementation of policies, programmes 
and projects to other bodies’ (Rai, 2008: 81). This aspect is closely linked to the 
notorious lack of human and financial resources within these institutions – a problem 
that has its roots in government institutions’ lack of political will to support them. A 
more explicit political will, together with a stronger relationship between national 
machineries and civil society, would benefit the advancement of those machineries.  
Although these reflections may work on a theoretical level, it will be important to 
understand how these problems, situations and relationships translate into practice, 
bearing in mind the transformative potential of gender mainstreaming outlined in 
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chapter one. Indeed, the extent to which such ‘machineries’ employ a transformative 
approach will be at the centre of my analysis in chapter five, together with those 
machineries’ internal limitations and obstacles, with specific reference to Jordan. 
The institutionalisation of gender at the national level in Jordan started at the end 
of 1997, when JNCW, as an umbrella organisation, suggested the establishment of 
‘gender focal points’ within ministries and public institutions in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). MoPIC plays a leading 
role among other ministries and government institutions: no ministry, party or 
government department can implement any development project without its 
approval.51 This monitoring is not limited to financial and administrative matters, but 
also extends to gender-related tasks (Suliman, 2010). The main goal of the 
establishment of focal points was to create a ‘gender network’ within public 
institutions to work together towards a national strategy, which was to be included in 
the national agenda for economic and social development for the years 1999–2003, in 
order to guarantee both horizontal and vertical collaboration. MoPIC established a 
Gender Unit in 2005. Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Social and Political 
Development, established a Gender Section at the end of 2010. The Ministry of 
Labour created a ‘women’s department’, and the Ministry of Education, which had 
had a ‘gender group’ since 2006, created a gender unit at the end of 2010. More 
recently, in May 2012, a Ministry for Women’s Affairs was also established.  
The creation and development of women’s organisations and national machineries 
has been part of Jordan’s ‘democratisation’ process to include women’s cause in 
national and regional political discourse. Whether the attention to women’s rights has 
been just a façade strategy of the government and the royal family is a question to be 
analysed with reference to the status of women’s rights and the development of 
women’s empowerment projects in the country.  
 
The promotion of women’s rights, or the status quo?  
 
Whenever I walked down the hill where I lived in the Tla’ Al‘Ali area next to the 
University of Jordan, on my way to the market to buy food, cars would often slow 
down and the men inside would look at me, smile, and shout something I could never 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 According to Ministry Law No. 68 of 1971. 
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understand but could easily imagine. A very ‘easy’ approach was also common in 
taxis when I was by myself, but as soon as the taxi drivers heard I was married, they 
would stop ‘flirting’ and start talking about the traffic or tourist sites to visit in Jordan. 
I used to receive such ‘approaches’ on the university campus too, which I visited quite 
often during my time in Jordan. At first I thought that this attitude was primarily 
because I was a young, Western, blonde woman who often went around by herself. I 
was wrong. When I confessed to some of my female Jordanian friends and 
interviewees that I was bothered by these glances, verbal appraisals and insults, they 
all shared my annoyance, since these things happened to them too. When I heard that 
in the autumn semester of 2011, Professor Quawas at the University of Jordan had 
assisted and advised a group of students in her feminist theory class to make a short 
video about the sexual harassment experienced by female students on campus, and 
that the video had been posted on YouTube, I was extremely pleased about the 
project.52 When in September 2012 I read that Professor Quawas had been dismissed 
from her post by a decision of the university’s board of trustees, I felt disappointed. 
The film was considered harmful to the university’s reputation; but no one expressed 
any concern about the degradation of the learning environment at the university 
caused by widespread sexual harassment. Reflecting on these events, I thought they 
were perfectly in line with the frustrating behaviour of ‘keeping the façade clean’ that 
I had encountered during my research, especially with reference to women’s 
empowerment projects, as I will discuss throughout the thesis. 
The public role that Queen Rania has acquired as the ‘promoter’ of women’s 
rights, especially in relation to Europe and the US, and the image of women’s rights 
in Jordan that the King wants to project by publicising the introduction of specific 
measures that are well received in the West – such as the introduction of gender 
quotas for municipal and parliamentary elections – have helped to create the 
impression that Jordan is interested in women’s rights, both regionally and 
internationally. However, when we dig deeper and analyse the status of women’s 
rights, women in Jordan still face many contradictions and forms of discrimination, as 
Terez pointed out during our discussion: ‘There is a need to amend those laws that 
affect the daily life of women, such as issues like polygamy, heritage and nationality’ 
(Amman, 17 April, 2011).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The video has now been removed from the Internet. 
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Jordan has ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1974 and the CEDAW in 1990 – albeit with some very significant 
reservations53 – as well as the ILO’s Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration in 1966 
and Convention 111 on Discrimination in 1963. Jordan promulgated its own 
Constitution in 1952, but Article 6 is heavily criticised by women’s organisations as it 
currently stands: ‘Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no 
discrimination between them as regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, 
language or religion.’54 Women’s groups are demanding a constitutional amendment 
to incorporate equality on the basis of gender in Article 6 of the Constitution. 
One of the most widely debated forms of discrimination against women in the 
context of women’s rights in Jordan refers to the Nationality Law.55 Some women’s 
activists, and in particular independent women’s organisations such as the JWU, are 
demanding an amendment of this law, which at the moment does not allow Jordanian 
mothers to pass on their citizenship to their children if they are married to a non-
Jordanian man. Of course, the reverse situation – a Jordanian man who marries a 
foreigner – is provided for in the law, and the father can pass on his citizenship to his 
children. The gender restrictions on full citizenship rights are also confirmed by the 
reservations made by the Jordanian government in its ratification of CEDAW (Nasser, 
2010) with reference to Article 9 on the nationality of children.56 Jordan’s 
reservations indicate that a masculinity-based nationalism reflects the ‘underpinnings 
of a paternally based citizenship’ (Amawi, 2000: 163). Although at the time of the 
reservations, the justification given for the denial of citizenship was its possible 
conflict with the provisions of shari‘a law (Amawi, 2000: 163), the Nationality Law 
is a very political issue in Jordan. The government has more than once announced that 
it is examining the possibility of amending articles in the Nationality Law, but this has 
never happened (Nasser, 2010). In 2003, for instance, the then interior minister Samir 
Habashneh announced that the government was not going to amend the Nationality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Article 9, paragraph 2 (nationality of children); Article 15, paragraph 4 (a wife’s residence is with 
her husband); Article 16, paragraph (1) (c), relating to the rights arising upon the dissolution of 
marriage with regard to maintenance and compensation; Article 16, paragraph (1) (d) and (g), 
(CEDAW Reservations, n.d.).  
54 Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Jordanian Constitution. 
55 Nationality Law No. 6 of 1954. 
56 Article 9, paragraph 2, CEDAW: ‘state parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect 
to the nationality of their children.’  
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Law for Jordanian women who married Palestinians until a settlement had been 
reached in the Palestinian conflict, saying: 
 
This issue is no longer possible because it means granting 
citizenship to around half-a-million Palestinians in Jordan. There 
are about 60,000 Jordanian women married to Palestinians and the 
average number of children in each of these families is around 6.5. 
This means giving the Jordanian citizenship to around 500,000 
Palestinians (Husseini, 2007). 
 
The discrimination embodied in the Nationality Law coincides with the desire to 
maintain the status quo of patriarchal structures, both within the family and within the 
state. The maintenance of the status quo is also evident in other official dispositions, 
such as the Personal Status Law.57  
In the Middle East, the personal status code is often at the centre of debates 
concerning the ‘modernisation’ and ‘democratisation’ of countries, and serves as an 
occasion for the most ‘explicit and politicized debates about women’ (Adely, 2012a: 
53). These laws govern such issues as marriage and divorce, the custody of children, 
the rights of husbands and wives, and polygamy. Attempts to change these laws are 
the source of debates about Islam and what is religiously acceptable, about 
authenticity and culture, about human rights, and about the nature of a country’s 
polity (Adely, 2012a). In Jordan, the Personal Status Law continues to designate 
women as dependents. In fact, through the legal provisions of wilaya (guardianship)58 
a woman is placed under the guardianship of a male relative (wali) until she becomes 
30 years old; thus wilaya provisions define women as legal minors and dependent 
subjects. As Jabiri (2013) has recently argued in her analysis of guardianship 
regulations in Jordan, ‘the legal provisions of wilaya over women do not only restrict 
women’s scope of activity but, more importantly, represent a comprehensive, 
dynamic and multi-stranded discourse that reproduces hegemonic notions of 
normative femininity and masculinity’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Personal Status Law No. 61 of 1976. 
58 There are two types of guardianship provisions: one pertains specifically to women’s choice of 
marriage partners, and the other, applies in general terms (Jabiri, 2013). 
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Women’s groups have attempted to challenge the designation of women as 
dependents, not with specific reference to wilaya, but, for instance, in relation to 
divorce provisions. The most common form of divorce, available only to men, is talaq 
(arbitrary divorce), which permits a husband to divorce his wife without providing 
any legal reason. A woman seeking a divorce may file for a judicial divorce at the 
shari‘a court, ‘but only if she can cite one of a limited number of valid reasons, which 
require strong evidence and witness testimony’ (Hussein, 2010: 202). In 2001, 
women’s groups, with the support of Princess Basma, lobbied for the passage of a law 
on another form of ‘divorce, khul’, meeting with parliamentarians and community 
religious leaders’ (Clark, 2006: 549);59 the amendment was passed as a temporary law 
after parliament was dissolved in 2001. However, when parliament was reconvened in 
2003, the temporary law was overturned, thereby reflecting the tribal and conservative 
nature of this institution.  
Together with this temporary law, an amendment to Article 340 of the Penal 
Code,60 which regulates so-called honour crimes, was also rejected by the reconvened 
parliament. Women’s groups have been lobbying for a revision of the legislation on 
‘honour’ crimes, but the masculine-based and conservative ideology of most 
politicians, including female ones, has made the process extremely difficult. Although 
there are many differences between women’s organisations, violence against women 
and ‘honour’ crimes have been and remain at the centre of many women’s groups’ 
concerns.61 Violence against women is not limited to domestic violence, but has been 
used as a method for the rejection of female candidates in very conservative tribes, as 
the case of Amilah demonstrated above. In regard to ‘honour’ crimes, officially it is 
estimated that there are around 20 ‘honour’ killings in Jordan each year (Husseini, 
2010: 197). However, it is very difficult to get official numbers, since usually these 
crimes are not reported. These crimes consist in the killing of a member of the family, 
usually a woman, by another member of the family in the belief that the person has 
dishonoured the family (Husseini, 2010). Adultery, premarital relationships (which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 It is a form of divorce permitted by shari‘a law ‘in which the wife can unilaterally end the marriage 
by returning her dowry and giving up all her rights to future financial maintenance’ (Husseini, 2010: 
202). 
60 Penal Code No.16 of 1960. 
61 In this regard, it is important to mention the excellent job that the JWU and the Sisterhood is Global 
Institute are doing in terms of promoting awareness of domestic violence and abuse, and providing 
legal and physical protection to women who have been victims of violence. 
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may or may not include sexual relations), rape, and falling in love with an 
‘inappropriate’ person can all constitute violations of family honour (Dawany, 2009).  
Although there are many differences within and between women’s organisations’ 
agendas and visions, the women’s ‘movement’ in Jordan campaigns and lobbies to 
end discrimination against women. However, scholars have criticised the activities of 
women’s organisations for taking a moderate approach that achieves small changes 
over time and does not make radical demands or challenges to the political order 
(Warrick, 2009: 143). Women’s activists obtained the introduction of a gender quota-
system for both parliamentary and municipal elections, and legal equality on issues 
such as freedom of movement, healthcare, education and employment. However, 
women still face discrimination in statutes such as family laws, the Nationality Law, 
and laws related to domestic violence, issues that are closely connected to the political 
and social order of the country. The lack of radical demands that might transform 
power relations and address gender hierarchies within society have led the women’s 
‘movement’ to be considered too bourgeois and too state-controlled, not only by 
scholars (Warrick, 2009; Brand, 1998), but also by the women I interviewed, who do 
not identify themselves with the movement, as I will analyse in the final chapter of 
the thesis.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Hind, Terez, Ahlam and Amilah represent four very different stories from among the 
women who wanted to share their experiences and concerns as female candidates with 
me. Each of their stories has been connected to diverse aspects of Jordan’s socio-
political fabric. Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated how the intrusion and 
role of the regime in the daily lives of ‘people in Jordan’ has been extremely evident 
in the past, and it is still very relevant in the present. The politics of superficial and 
quick solutions, as in the case of the aftermath of the recent uprisings, is closely 
connected with the maintenance of the delicate balance of power between different 
forces within the regime. Through the maintenance of this status quo the regime has 
been able to preserve the ‘stability’ that wins international support and trust. But as 
long as the idea of keeping the ‘façade clean’, as in the case of Professor Quawas’ 
dismissal, will continue to be the preferred politics, it will be difficult for social 
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change to happen – and this will be negatively reflected in the status of women’s 
rights.  
 Indeed, this system allows the state to have direct control over political order. On 
the one hand, it manages political participation by organising election laws, selecting 
candidates and controlling civil society and women’s organisations. On the other 
hand, the state also dominates dissent, by restricting free speech, not granting basic 
rights to women, and limiting the work of independent activist groups, thus 
reproducing and maintaining gender regimes. Unless there is a political will to change 
gender power relations in society (Larson, 2008), women will continue to be treated 
as second-class citizens, and gender will continue to be considered an ‘add-on’ to 
social policies rather than a fundamental component of democracy.  
By analysing women’s participation in parliament, the introduction of quotas and 
the role of international and local organisations in ‘empowering’ women in politics in 
the following chapters, I aim to provider a deeper analysis of the relationships 
between different actors in the promotion of women’s rights. In particular I aim to 
assess the consequences of these dynamics for the promotion of women’s rights in the 
context of increasing, yet questioned, reliance both on the regime and on international 
support.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
WOMEN IN POLITICS: DISCUSSING THE INTRODUCTION OF 
GENDER QUOTAS  
 
Introduction 
 
On 23 January 2013 the third parliamentary elections in six years were held in Jordan 
(2007, 2010, 2013). The 2013 elections came after the so-called Arab uprisings had 
spread throughout the region, including in Jordan, as described in chapters one and 
two. Analysts and scholars often argue that the uprisings in Jordan actually started 
before January 2011 (among others Ryan, 2010; Tell, 2013) because of economic and 
social dissatisfaction. One of the King’s political strategies to try to maintain stability 
involved the dissolution of parliament and a consequent call for new elections. This 
occurred not only with the last parliamentary elections, but also earlier: following 
public dissatisfaction with the parliament that was elected in 2007, King Abdullah 
dissolved it in November 2009 and called for early elections then too. Elections were 
held on 9 November 2010: as I explained in my introduction, my case study focuses 
primarily on these 2010 parliamentary elections. The extent to which the calls for new 
elections provided political, economic and social stability will require further study 
and elaboration.  
One of the main debates raised before the 2010 and 2013 elections concerned the 
amendments to the Constitution and the provisions of election law. Promulgated in 
1947, the first Constitution of the newly independent Kingdom of Jordan granted the 
King exceptional powers. Legislative authority is vested in the bicameral National 
Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) and the King. The legislature is made up of an Upper 
House or Senate (Majlis al-A‘yan), whose members1 are appointed by the King, and a 
Lower House (Majlis al-Nuwab), whose members2 are elected. A new Constitution, 
adopted in 1952, strengthened the power of the legislative and judicial authorities and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the current Senate there are 55 members. Members must be former public officials or otherwise 
notable persons, and at least 40 years of age. Members serve for a four-year term (article 64 of the 
Jordanian Constitution). 
2 The current Lower House comprises 150 members. A member must be at least 30 years of age 
(Article 70, Jordanian Constitution). 
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introduced some controls on the executive, while stipulating a large number of basic 
freedoms and rights for individuals (Lucas, 2005: 107), at least on paper.3 In 1957 and 
until 1989, all political parties were banned. The period up to 1993 saw great political 
turmoil due to the conflicts in the region,4 with many amendments to the Constitution, 
the restoration of absolute power to the executive authority, the suspension or delay of 
elections, and repeated amendments to election law.  
Prior to the 1993 parliamentary elections, the government issued a new amended 
version of the election law and introduced the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) 
system, also known as the one-person one-vote system. This replaced earlier 
provisions, which had given voters the right to select a number of candidates equal to 
or less than the number of seats in a given district, with a new system that allowed 
them to vote for only one candidate (Lucas, 2005). The law for the 2010 elections still 
used the SNTV system, and although it was modified in June 2012, it has a number of 
weak points, as I will discuss in this chapter. 
Jordan has approximately 30 political parties, but these tend to be largely 
irrelevant, both in electoral politics and in the mobilisation of public opinion: the 
exception is the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which boycotted the 2010 and 2013 
elections. The weakness of political parties in Jordan can be seen largely as a result of 
their having been banned for about 30 years, but is also partly because, at the time of 
the founding of the Jordanian Kingdom, the tribe5 was the most important political 
and social organisation and played an important role in the formation of the new state 
(Antoun, 2000). In the 1950s, the spread of pan-Arab nationalism reduced the role of 
tribes, especially regarding mass political action, but during the long interval of 
martial law their role resurfaced. In the absence of political parties, the state dealt 
directly with society through its various segments, particularly the tribes. This 
situation meant that parties were not necessarily the channel through which people 
reached the authorities as providers of services or the means to solve problems. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution state: (26) ‘The Executive Power shall be vested in the 
King, who shall exercise his powers through his Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Constitution.’ (27) ‘The Judicial Power shall be exercised by the courts of law in their varying 
types and degrees. All judgments shall be given in accordance with the law and pronounced in the 
name of the King.’ The Constitution provides some rights, such as the guarantee of personal freedom 
(Article 7) or compulsory elementary education (Article 20), which are not as problematic as others. 
For instance, Article 6 establishes that there should be no discrimination among Jordanians as regards 
their rights and duties on the grounds of race, language or religion (Article 6), without including or 
referring to gender.  
4 See chapter two for more details. 
5 For a definition of this term, refer to chapter two. 
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Whereas tribal organisation adjusted and evolved to become a pillar of society in its 
dealings with the state, the parties were not allowed to do this and were left outside of 
the process of political development. Today various segments of society do not see 
parties as a means to achieve their goals (Antoun, 2000: 460). 
This socio-political development within the country has produced various types of 
practice connected with the election process – a type of election ‘culture’ – during 
previous and recent elections (in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2010 and 2013). 
During the 1950s, candidates came mostly from the ranks of political or party 
activists, and parties enjoyed a reasonable degree of freedom. Today a large number 
of candidates for election to parliament operate on a tribal or individual, independent 
basis. This situation may explain the very large number of candidates,6 some of whom 
gain only a few dozen or a few hundred votes, raising questions about whether their 
standing for election is justified. This also explains why the Jordanian parliament 
functions not as a representational system, but as a clientelist one. Indeed, parliament 
acts as a patronage institution, in which a strong opposition is lacking and tribal 
leaders, urban elites and people loyal to the regime constitute the majority of 
members – a situation that Liddell (2009), with reference to the functions of the 
Moroccan parliament, has defined as ‘mechanisms of elite circulation and regime 
support’ (81).  
 Hence within this system, political parties, women and other minorities that are 
not part of royal supporters’ groups are under-represented. In regard to women’s 
representation, a reserved-seats quota system was introduced in 2003, when six seats 
were reserved for women. In 2010 the number of seats increased to 12, out of a total 
of 120 members of parliament; and in 2013 the reserved-seats quota increased to 15, 
out of a total of 150 seats. Nowadays, the representation of women in Jordan’s 
parliament is very low: according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union ranking, Jordan is 
103rd out of 190 countries in terms of the percentage of women in parliament (IPU 
data, 2013a). But to what extent does numerical and formal representation matter 
when parliament functions on a clientelist basis? Considering the Jordanian 
parliament within the framework of a patronage and clientelist system, I believe it is 
necessary to provide a more accurate analysis of the consequences of women’s 
increased political participation at the national level. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The number of candidates registered for the 2010 election was 763. In 2013 the number of seats in the 
Lower House increased from 120 to 150, and there were approximately 1,400 candidates. 
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In this chapter I aim to discuss the adoption of affirmative action measures in the 
context of the Jordanian parliament in relation to broader theoretical debates on 
substantive and descriptive representation. Specifically, I aim to contribute to existing 
academic debates on gender quotas, both globally and regionally, with my empirical 
case study, i.e. the adoption of reserved seats for women in the 2010 Jordanian 
parliament. Why and to what ends (politico-socio-cultural) was the quota system 
introduced in Jordan? With this question in mind, I am going to explain and analyse 
the main actors behind the adoption of gender quotas in Jordan, which were mainly 
the government, women’s groups and the international community. Drawing on the 
experiences of female candidates for the 2010 parliamentary elections, I will ask how 
different material conditions and circumstances intersected with each other and 
influenced the advancement of women’s political participation in Jordan.  
 
Substantive representation and quotas 
 
One of the most important texts on women and quotas is Pitkin’s The Concept of 
Representation (1967), in which she underlines the distinction between representation 
as ‘standing for’ and representation as ‘acting for’. In her view it is more important to 
focus on what representatives do, rather than on who they are. Thus Pitkin (1967) 
considers political representation in a substantive way, defining it as ‘acting in the 
interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’ (209). However, several 
scholars have made criticisms of Pitkin’s thesis. Some stress the need to pay attention 
to the numerical under-representation of women in politics; they argue that justice and 
fairness demand that women should be present in elected political institutions 
(Phillips, 1995), and they therefore propose affirmative action measures such as the 
adoption of quotas. Others underline the relationship between the descriptive and 
substantive components of representation: being female – ‘standing for’ – is an 
enabling condition for the substantive representation of women – ‘acting for’, and 
also includes the involvement of women and women’s concerns in policymaking 
(Waylen, 2008: 518). Indeed, according to Mansbridge (1999), women in politics are 
more likely to act for women than men are, although there is no guarantee that this 
will happen and women should not be conceived as a homogeneous group; the 
potential to have one’s most important substantive interests represented rests with 
those who are also one’s descriptive representatives. In contrast, Young (2010) asserts 
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that representation should be considered in terms of women’s social perspectives. 
These derive from group members’ being ‘similarly positioned’ and ‘attuned to 
particular kinds of social meanings’ (198). 
Discussions around the increase of women in politics are frequently linked to what 
have been defined as affirmative action measures, such as gender quotas.7 Anne 
Phillips (1998) distinguishes three types of argument for increasing women’s 
presence in politics to which quota supporters appeal. The first is the so-called justice 
argument, which argues that since women constitute half the population, ‘their 
relative absence from spheres of power and influence is unfair and ought to be 
rectified for reasons of justice alone’ (Phillips, 1998 cited in Krook, 2006: 14). 
Women’s presence is considered an end in itself: the equal representation of women 
and men in political office is a parameter of social justice. The weakness of this 
argument, I believe, is that the outcomes of the greater presence of women in office 
are not taken into consideration. This argument does not take into consideration any 
analysis of what a woman does once she enters politics, whether in favour of or 
against women’s rights. This is particularly problematic in countries where patronage, 
clientelism and tribal relationships are at the core of the social fabric, as is the case for 
most countries in the Middle East, including Jordan. 
Indeed, the second argument has been defined as the ‘women’s interests 
argument’, which claims that female representatives are more likely to promote issues 
of concern to women, just because they are women. As explained in chapter one, I 
adhere to a definition of interests that refers to ‘gender interests’,8 since interests are 
constituted in relation to historical and political contexts, and are not only based on 
gender dynamics. Since gender as an analytical tool intersects with other categories 
such as class, race, ethnicity, tribal relationships and place of residence, female as 
well as male representatives may focus on their class’s interests, or on their specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Quotas are affirmative action measures that establish a percentage or number for the representation of 
a specific group (in this case women), most often in the form of a minimum requirement (for instance, 
20% 30% 40% or 50%). Gender quotas may also be constructed in terms of a maximum-minimum 
representation for both sexes (for instance, no more than 60% and no less than 40% for each sex) 
(Dahlerup, 2007: 78). The two most common types of electoral quotas are ‘candidate quotas’, in which 
a definite percentage of the candidates on the lists of individual parties in a constituency must be 
women, or ‘reserved-seats quotas’, as in the case of Jordan, in which there is a set number of seats in 
parliament assigned to women, according to district divisions. For a broader look at the different 
systems and subsystems in the world of gender quotas, see Dahlerup (2006, 2007). 
8 As explained in greater detail in chapter one, women’s interests are distinct from women’s gender 
interests (Molyneux, 1985). Women’s gender interests have to be understood not in an essentialist way, 
but as historically and culturally constituted, as well as politically and discursively constructed. 
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communities’, parties’ and tribes’ interests; they will not exclusively focus on their 
gender interests. For these reasons, I think it may be limiting to focus attention only 
on the representation of women’s interests; I believe it will be necessary to address 
the issue of the representation of interests by taking into consideration the 
intersections between different identities, such as tribal relationships, education or 
place of residence.  
Lastly, the ‘revitalised democracy argument’ claims that incorporating members of 
‘historically marginalised groups into politics’ will help to challenge negative 
stereotypes about their ‘unsuitability for political office, promoting more democratic 
outcomes overall’ (Krook, 2006: 14). However, although a higher presence of women 
in official politics might serve to rank that particular country as ‘more democratic’ 
according to international standards, will it be enough simply to ‘add women and stir’ 
in order to have marginalised groups’ interests represented in national institutions 
such as parliament?  
Whether the focus is on the gender dimension or on class or tribal relations, elected 
candidates will represent selected groups’ interests. According to Mansbridge (1999), 
having a better representation of marginalised groups in political institutions will 
increase ‘the polity’s de facto legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination’ (628). 
Since these groups’ members share a legacy of discrimination, it is further assumed 
that this shared perspective will permit greater knowledge about the group’s interests, 
and at the same time will give representatives from the group the will to pursue those 
interests more vigorously (Phillips 1998; Swers 2002). However, according to Yuval-
Davis’s critique of identity politics (2007), the lack of differentiation between 
individual and collective identity helps to ‘mask power relations within identity 
groupings and to promote particular constructions of boundaries’ as well as of the 
meanings of categories such as women or blacks (4). In fact, within any specific 
group there will be many differences based on a ‘whole range of social locations’, 
such as class, gender, sexuality and so forth, and there might be a shift from identity 
politics towards what Yuval-Davis calls ‘transversal politics’9 (Yuval-Davis, 1999: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although Yuval-Davis has now moved away from the notion of transversal politics, the concept 
refers to the recognition of differential power positions among participants in a dialogue, encompassing 
these differences with equal respect and recognition for each participant (Yuval-Davis, 1999: 98). 
According to Yuval-Davis, transversal politics is based partly on standpoint epistemology, which 
recognises that from each positioning the world is seen differently. By recognising the encompassing 
of difference by equality, transversal politics is also based on a conceptual and political differentiation 
between positioning, identity and values (Yuval-Davis, 1999). 
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94).  
Thus the positionings, the markers of the identities and values of each 
representative, are central to her or his ability to speak up for her/his group’s interests. 
However, it is very complicated and difficult to evaluate the impact of the increased 
participation of any group (in this case women). In the context of the effectiveness of 
women’s representation, women often face double standards: female politicians are 
readily accused of lacking knowledge and education, and at the same time they are 
criticised for only representing a small group of educated elite women (Dahlerup, 
2006: 14). Although this may be true for women, I think it is the same for men. 
Moreover, female politicians are often accused of being tokens within their clans, 
families and parties. The concept of tokenism reinforces arguments by the opponents 
of quotas, who argue that quotas primarily benefit elite women and do nothing to 
address the concerns of the average woman. This is particularly true in cases where 
politics are dominated by party elites, and where lines of patronage and clientelism 
are deeply entrenched, as is the case in most Middle Eastern countries: these elites 
might use quotas to tighten their control over the selection of candidates (Baldez, 
2004) while also nominating elite women, especially women who are linked through 
family relationships to male party leaders (Nanivadekar, 2006).  
Also, especially in very conservative contexts, there is the risk that the elite, party 
or tribe’s interests will heavily collide with women’s rights agendas. This has been 
the case in countries such as Jordan and Somalia, where tribal traditions have been 
considered a barrier to women’s empowerment and political participation (Abou-
Zeid, 2006: 179). In 2000, for instance, women’s seats in the Somali Transitional 
National Assembly were allocated so that a total of five women would represent each 
major clan; women were therefore entering politics as clans’ representatives. In this 
case, the presence of women in politics does not equate with the representation of 
gender interests. Moreover, as Al-Ali and Pratt (2009b) have demonstrated in the case 
of Iraq, the women’s movement was very much in favour of the introduction of a 
women’s quota, campaigning for at least a 40% representation; Iraqi women activists 
achieved a compromise on a 25% target for women’s participation in elected 
assemblies under the Transitional Administrative Law and the permanent constitution 
(131). However, Al-Ali and Pratt (2009b) comment that, ‘ironically’, the women’s 
quota helped to push through a conservative agenda on women’s rights, since ‘most 
of the women elected to parliament were linked to Shi‘i political parties and 
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supported the implementation of shari‘a,’ abolishing the ‘relatively progressive 
personal status code’ (135). Referring to the case of gender quotas in Tunisia before 
the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, Goulding (2009) also shows that women who were 
encouraged to become politically active were primarily those who subscribed to the 
‘state-sponsored’ brand of feminism promoted by the Ben Ali regime (77). Women 
who wanted to effect change were not supported by the state structures, and their 
voices were not acknowledged in the political discourse. 
Whereas the ‘revitalised democracy’ arguments are the most appealing, in political 
systems marked by clientelism, corruption and a closed political elite, quotas may be 
the least likely to transform politics or improve women’s substantive representation. 
Along with other scholars, I would argue that in contexts of regime control and 
clientelism, quotas are unlikely to bring into office women who are seeking social 
transformation, and will most probably favour party and tribal loyalists who will 
make little effort to promote gender interests, as I will discuss in relation to Jordan 
(Cowley and Childs, 2003; Dahlerup, 2006; Franceschet and Krook, 2008). 
Finally, another important branch of literature on quotas, stressing the shift from 
‘equality of opportunities’ to ‘equality of results’, distinguishes between ‘incremental 
track’ and ‘fast track discourse’ (Dahlerup, 2006). According to the former, women 
do not have the same political resources as men, and there is a need for a gradual 
improvement in those resources so that prejudice against women will disappear as 
society develops. The fast track discourse, assuming that an increase in resources 
might not automatically lead to equal representation, claims that quotas will 
immediately transform the gender composition of elected bodies, and will thereby 
lead the way into broader sociocultural transformation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 
2010). The responsibility for dealing with the under-representation of women remains 
within the political institutions, and mandatory quotas for female candidates are seen 
as the faster and better solution to the problem. However, I would add that the risk is 
high that ‘elected’ women, who might represent their families, their parties and their 
own interests, will do little to challenge power inequalities within society, especially 
in countries where clientelism, pro-regime tribes and party elites are embedded within 
the political and social system, as happens in the Middle East. 
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Women’s political presence in Jordan 
 
Before analysing how gender quotas have been adopted within the Jordanian system, I 
am going to provide a brief formal overview of women’s political participation in the 
country. In this section, I aim to give some historical and numerical evidence of the 
presence of women in Jordanian parliament and at the municipal level.  
Women in Jordan gained the right to vote and to stand for parliamentary elections 
in 1974; however, since the activity of political parties was banned until 1989, it was 
only in that year that women were able to vote and stand for parliament. The 
percentage of women in the Senate (Upper House) and Lower House10 is 12.2% and 
11.7% respectively (IPU data, 2013a). The King has discretion to make appointments 
to the Upper House; the selection process varies, but a candidate’s political 
experience is always a criterion for consideration.11 Since 1989, women have been 
increasingly appointed to the 40-member House of Senate: in 1989, one woman was 
appointed; in 1993, two women; in 1997, three women; and in 2003, three women. In 
2007, the number of members in the Senate was increased from 40 to 55, and seven 
women were appointed to this expanded chamber. Lastly, in 2010 the number of 
members increased again from 55 to 60, and the King appointed seven women (Al-
Attiyat, 2005: 29–30).  
Women’s participation in the Lower House, as both voters and candidates, has 
seen positive changes over the various elections. In the 1989 elections, 12 female 
candidates stood, but none won; each received between 150 and 4,000 votes. In 
1993,12 only three women stood for election. Toujan Faisal at this time became the 
first female member of the Lower House in Jordan’s history.13 Although Toujan 
Faisal won through a quota reserved for the Circassian minority, her victory set a 
precedent and encouraged more women to stand for the next election. However, while 
17 women were candidates in 1997, none of them managed to win seats; Toujan 
Faisal was also unable to defend her seat.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Lower House may approve, reject or amend legislation proposed by the Cabinet, but its ability 
to initiate legislation is limited. It cannot enact laws without the assent of the 55-seat Upper House. 
11 Another criterion for consideration is that the person must be a known figure on the Jordanian scene. 
Most of the chamber’s members are former ministers or prime ministers, or long-serving politicians. 
12 This election was held under a new election law and the SNTV electoral system, which replaced the 
block vote (in which voters had as many votes as there were seats to be filled in each multi-member 
district) used in the 1989 elections. 
13 Of Circassian origin, Toujan Faisal was an MP from 1993 until 1997. 
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I met Toujan Faisal at her home in June 2011, and I spent an entire afternoon 
listening to her story. I was fascinated by the strength and passion she still puts into 
her political activism. Her account usefully reflects upon the reasons why she did not 
get elected in 1997: 
 
When I was a member of parliament, the King (Hussein bin Talal) 
started to meet with me, secretly. We met around 20 times. He tried 
to make me his man. Although he liked me, I have been told that he 
said: ‘I don’t want to see her in parliament ever again, whatever it 
takes. Don’t underestimate her next time’ [referring to the 1997 
elections]. In the next elections, I got a huge number of votes… but 
the people who were supposed to count the votes, after one hour of 
work, they took a break… and when they came back they said they 
were done. The man in my constituency won and I did not. They 
said I had around 4,000 votes, and the other man got 5,000 votes. 
Immediately after the elections, the King offered me the Senate, 
while he was dying. And there I decided to be the people’s man, not 
the King’s man (Amman, 7 June 2011). 
 
Toujan Faisal’s account raises very important yet problematic points. The control 
over votes that she denounces reflects the regime’s desire to have only selected 
representatives in parliament in order to secure for itself the support of most 
parliamentary members; it therefore excludes members like Toujan, who could have 
been very outspoken. Moreover, the King’s offer of a position in the Senate tells us a 
great deal about the secondary role to which the Upper House is consigned; this 
explains why women’s chances of achieving a seat by appointment are greater than by 
electoral means. Lastly, in considering herself the people’s man, Toujan is 
reproducing the stereotype that politics is a male arena, seeing the primary 
characteristics of politicians in men. Although Toujan Faisal is not representative of 
all female candidates, she raises important and critical points that will be developed 
throughout this chapter. 
In the 2003 election, out of a total of 760 candidates, 54 were women. In that year 
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the government introduced a new election law,14 which on the one hand increased the 
number of seats in the Lower House from 80 to 110, and on the other introduced a 
quota system of six reserved seats for women.15  
The parliament also allocated six seats to women as part of the reserved-seats 
quota system in the 2007 elections; at that time no women were able to win seats by 
election. Moreover, the new female members of parliament (MPs) were not from 
Amman, but instead came from small districts, as a consequence of the election law’s 
unfairness in relation to the counting system, which will be explained later in this 
chapter. Probably encouraged (as many of the female candidates I interviewed 
confirmed) by the introduction of the reserved seats, in the 2007 elections women 
stood in unprecedented numbers: out of a total of 850 candidates, 199 were women. 
However, only one woman was elected to parliament outside of the quota system, 
Falak Jama’ani.16 Why were women not more successful? Women’s being 
‘unqualified’ as representatives cannot be a justification for this, or at least it cannot 
be the only one. The analysis should dig deeper into Jordanian society, the perception 
of women in politics, and the role of international financial incentives, as I will 
explore in the next sections.  
For the 2010 elections, the number of seats allocated to women increased from six 
to 12 through an amended election law,17 allocating a woman to each of the 12 
governorates. However, the law did not take into consideration the Bedouin division 
of the country, which includes Northern, Central and Southern Badia.18 Compared to 
the 2007 elections, in 2010 the number of candidates decreased to 133, and the final 
number of women elected was 13: only one woman, Reem Badran from Amman, was 
elected outside of the quota system. Reem Badran comes from a ‘political family’, 
since her father served as Jordanian prime minister.19 For this reason she has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Election Law No. 34 of 2001, King Abdullah II. 
15 In the region, three different types of gender quota are used: political party quotas, legal candidate 
quotas, and reserved-seats quotas. The number of women in Arab politics is low: according to the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, in 2013 the Arab world ranked as the lowest region for the presence of 
women in national parliaments, with a percentage of 13.8% (IPU data, 2013b). Few countries in the 
region have passed affirmative action measures such as quotas (Morocco, Afghanistan and Iraq for 
example). 
16 Falak Jama’ani first entered parliament in 2003, in the second electoral district in Madaba, through 
the quota system. At that time, she received 1,048 votes (7.95% of the total). She has had a 
distinguished career in dentistry (NDI, 2007: 13). 
17 The Jordanian government endorsed by royal decree a temporary election law on 18 May 2010. 
18 For the 2013 elections the number of seats increased from 12 to 15, to take into consideration the 
Bedouin districts. 
19 Adnan Badran was Prime Minister of Jordan from 7 April 2005 to 27 November 2005. 
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criticised by candidates I interviewed as the daughter of an important political man. 
Family relationships are one of the first objections that people raise against women in 
politics, as Al-Ali and Pratt (2009b) have shown in the case of Iraq, where a women’s 
rights activist complained that ‘most of the women who are in Parliament (…) are the 
wives, daughters, and sisters of conservative Islamist politicians’ (132). Although 
Reem Badran does not come from a conservative Islamist family, there is general 
agreement among the women I interviewed that she won because of her family’s 
support for the government, and because it would be less problematic for the 
government to have someone on its side. During a brief but interesting interview I 
conducted at her office in parliament, Reem Badran, a middle-aged businesswoman, 
confirmed that the importance of her family helped her to win, but said that she did 
not think her father’s name was the only factor that had brought her into office: 
 
My family’s name was good for me. How did I win? It was a 
combination of factors: number one, the family’s history. Of course 
the family’s reputation is important. If I had had a bad family, if my 
father had gone to jail, of course that would not have helped me. 
But it is also a matter of being an active and a good woman, being 
able to serve, being educated, proving that you are a credible 
person. It is a bit of everything. During the campaign I felt this 
pressure [her family’s name]. Actually at the beginning I said that I 
did not want to take advantage of this, but then I thought that this is 
a competition. Why not? And my family’s reputation is something 
that I should be proud of (Amman, 26 May 2011). 
 
There is little doubt that successful election comes from a combination of factors. 
In my view, in order to achieve proper political representation and participation, 
female as well as a male members of parliament need to be considered for what they 
actually do once they get into politics, rather than for where they come from. In the 
final chapter I will address questions of representation by looking carefully into 
female candidates’ programmes before and after their election.  
In the 2013 elections the reserved-seats quota was increased from 12 to 15, 
including the Bedouin districts. The number of women elected was 18; thus three 
women managed to win outside of the quota system. 
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Women gained the right to vote and stand in municipal and village elections in 
1982. Although likely to vote, women were hesitant to stand as candidates at this 
time. Politics was very much seen as a male arena, and the idea that women are not 
competent for politics was much stronger at that time (Abou-Zeid, 2006). By 1995, 
some progress had been made, but only in terms of the number of women running for 
office: 20 women ran, nine won council seats, and one woman – Iman Fatimat – won 
a mayoral race. In the 1999 elections, eight of 43 female candidates won seats; the 
Cabinet appointed a further 25 of the candidates to positions. The 2003 elections saw 
a higher number of women running for office. The government showed ‘support’ for 
women in politics by adopting the reserved-seats quota in parliament, and it appears 
that more women were encouraged to run for office. However, only five women out 
of the 46 who stood for election won seats. In an effort to show at least some support 
for female representation in each municipal council, the Cabinet appointed a further 
94 women (27% of the total number of appointments).20  
In the 2007 elections women turned out in record numbers to vote, and participated 
in unprecedented numbers in the municipal elections: 355 women declared their 
candidacy, and 20 won seats. In 2007, thanks to an amended municipalities law21 that 
allocated 20% of seats to women (increased to 25% in 2011), a further 195 women 
were appointed to positions, vastly increasing the number of women on municipal 
councils by comparison with previous years. UNIFEM was also instrumental in this 
drastic change in women’s political representation. In close collaboration with the 
JNFW, a semi-governmental royal-supported organisation, UNIFEM conducted a 
high-profile campaign to boost women’s participation at decision-making levels for 
the 2007 elections. UNIFEM organised a series of workshops, held across 12 
governorates in Jordan, aimed at strengthening the capacities of female candidates. 
These workshops helped to ‘not only prepare women to increase their role in political 
affairs, but also to prepare their communities and country to accept the need for 
women’s leadership’ (UN–WOMEN, 2007). Although these and similar workshops22 
may have pushed more women to run, I think that the more explicit apparent support 
from the government, through the introduction of reserved seats in parliament and the 
adoption of the 20% quota in municipal elections, encouraged more women to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A woman was also appointed mayor (Al-Attiyat, 2005: 34). 
21 Municipalities Law No. 29, 1955, revised in 2007. 
22 The implications, aims and consequences of workshops like these will be the focus of my analysis in 
the next chapter. 
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participate too. However, the reasons behind the adoption of such measures, and the 
consequences of having more women in politics in terms of women’s rights, need to 
be better explored. 
As discussed in the introduction to the thesis, the political participation of women 
is not limited to parliamentary and municipal elections, but happens throughout all 
levels of society,23 and includes any instance or manifestation of power relations (the 
politics of language, of exchange and of representation). In the next sections I aim to 
show how women’s organisations and international affairs influenced the adoption of 
the above-mentioned affirmative action measures in Jordan.  
 
Perspectives on the adoption of gender quotas 
 
As described in the previous section, Jordan adopted a quota of six reserved seats in 
parliament in 2003 – which was increased to 12 in 2010 and 15 in 2013 – and a 20% 
threshold quota for municipal elections in 2007, increased to 25% in 2011. In this 
section I aim to analyse the debates about the adoption of quotas through the findings 
from the interviews I conducted in Jordan with female candidates, female 
parliamentarians and women’s rights activists, reconnecting them to relevant 
theoretical discussions. Since my research focuses on the adoption of reserved seats in 
parliament, I primarily discussed this type of gender quota during my fieldwork: why 
was it adopted, and what were the perspectives of women on this? 
In her analysis of gender quotas adopted in parliaments globally, Krook (2009) 
suggests that there are four possible explanations of who supports quota policies and 
why they are ultimately adopted. The first is that women advocate quotas in order to 
increase women’s representation. Usually this occurs when women’s groups realise 
that quotas are an effective and maybe the only way to increase women’s political 
representation. This tends to happen in countries where a patriarchal understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The 2004 UNIFEM report on the status of Jordanian women analyses women’s participation in 
voluntary organisations, political parties, labour unions and political associations. The report shows 
that where membership in groups was practically compulsory, as with labour unions and professional 
associations, the presence of women was higher than in other associations: 23% in the former, versus 
18.9% in the latter. Women’s participation in voluntary associations is also quite low, oscillating 
between 19% and 25%, depending on the different roles performed, such as taking part in general 
assemblies, founding committees or administrative boards. When we consider the situation with 
political parties, the percentage is even worse, with an average of 10% female participation (UNIFEM, 
2004).  
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politics is rooted in the belief that politics is a male arena. The second explanation is 
that political elites adopt quotas for strategic reasons. Different case studies suggest, 
for example, that party elites often adopt quotas when one of their rivals adopts them 
(Caul, 2001). The third explanation is that quotas are adopted when they blend with 
existing or emerging notions of equality and representation. Quotas for women are an 
extension of guarantees given to other groups based on linguistic, religious, racial and 
other identities. In this case, quotas tend to appear during periods of democratic 
innovation, when they may be seen as a way to establish the legitimacy of a new 
political system during democratic transition or the creation of new democratic 
institutions (Krook, 2009: 11). This has happened particularly in post-conflict 
situations, such as in Iraq, where quotas were seen as a way for a ‘democratic system’ 
to be introduced into a new political structure (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009b). The last 
explanation is that quotas are supported by international norms and practices. Over 
the last 10 years, a diversity of international organisations and bodies has issued 
declarations recommending that all states aim for 30% female participation in all 
political bodies. The international community has influenced not only relatively stable 
countries such as Jordan, but also post-conflict countries such as Iraq and, 
particularly, Afghanistan, where the gender quota guarantees almost 28% female 
participation in the bicameral National Assembly.24 In Afghanistan, the international 
community has promoted the attention to the ‘politics of presence’ rather than the 
‘politics of ideas’ (Wordsworth, 2007) and the role of the UN in particular has been 
considered crucial in this (Krook et al., 2010). However, although the quota was 
supported by Afghan women’s organisations, I agree with Ballington and Dahlerup 
(2006)’s view: such an inclusion of women in the institutions of government is critical 
to the extent that the gain of a parliamentary seat is not an end in itself, but simply a 
means for participating in authoritative decision-making that influences how society 
functions. 
In the case of Jordan, the role of women’s organisations and civil society, and the 
impact of international norms and agreements on the national government, have been 
fundamental in the achievement of the current situation. Women in Jordan have been 
fighting for more participation in politics since the early 1950s. One of the early 
women’s organisations, the AWO, established in 1954, started a campaign by sending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Article 83 of the Afghan Constitution, adopted in 2004. 
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several petitions to the Prime Minister as well as to Cabinet members, demanding 
more political rights for women at all levels. After the right to vote in and stand for 
elections was obtained, debates and actions concerning the adoption of a quota system 
took place in the Jordanian public sphere, directly after the first national elections in 
1993. These debates, which were mainly triggered by women’s and several other civil 
society organisations, focused on possible mechanisms to enhance women’s political 
participation. In the early 1990s, women activists from different backgrounds and 
from diverse women’s organisations ran a huge campaign concerning the various 
possibilities for implementing the quota system as a mechanism to enhance women’s 
political participation (David and Nanes, 2011). There were many opinions regarding 
the effects of the implementation of a quota system on women’s participation in 
political life. Some thought that such a system would be prejudicial to equality 
between women and men (Al-Atiyat, 2003). This was the case with the independent 
JWU. JWU activists today are still strongly against the use of quotas, as Nadia 
Shamrouk, the director, told me during a long and exciting interview at her office: ‘I 
would like women to reach a position in society because that woman convinces 
people through her voice, and so she gets elected’ (Amman, 17 January 2011). The 
JWU is the only organisation among the major women’s groups that is against the 
adoption of a quota system. The JWU historically has adopted a very politicised 
approach, placing women’s needs and perspectives at the core of its decisions on the 
one hand, and bravely opposing the government’s views and policies on the other, as 
described in chapter two.  
The organisation that acted in favour of the quota historically, and that continues to 
champion it, is the AWO. According to their programme director, Leila Hamarneh, 
the quota-seats system adopted by the government is still not enough: ‘The quota is 
not enough to increase women’s political participation. It is a necessary instrument, 
but it needs to be supported by other measures’ (Amman, 11 January 2011), such as 
awareness campaigns for both candidates and voters. Moreover, the AWO believes 
that it is necessary to increase the threshold quota in parliament to 30%, so that 
‘women will be much more united, and they will have more confidence and 
awareness of working towards and for women’s rights’ (Leila Hamarneh, Amman, 11 
January 2011).  
On International Women’s Day on 8 March 2011, the main women’s organisations 
in Jordan launched a campaign to increase women’s participation in politics and 
	   121 
society, making demands for a female quota of 30% in parliament and at the 
municipal level. Agreeing with Leila Krook (2009) that it is necessary to include 
other supporting activities alongside quotas, Asma Khader, the president of the 
JNCW, a semi-governmental organisation, said to me: ‘After the 2010 election the 
quota system had a great success, but it is not enough to push women into politics. 
Women need to be trained politically, and they have to gain more self-confidence’ 
(Amman, 28 November 2010).  
Following on from Khader’s comment, one might ask to what extent and under 
what circumstances quotas will eventually empower women. The fact of representing 
some citizens may give previously excluded groups the right not only to choose as far 
as their own lives are concerned, but also to participate in society. Samar, the JNFW 
project director, connected the adoption of quotas with the concept of empowerment 
when she told me:  
 
The quota is a tool to attain women’s empowerment. Women 
should be able to run for election and to win by themselves, but, 
because of the patriarchal society, the quota is a tool for women to 
participate in politics and to gain a voice. Hopefully in several years 
women will win elections without the quota (Amman, 13 January 
2011). 
 
As Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2010) point out in their analysis of the ‘fast track’ 
model in the Scandinavian context, quotas are a ‘means to open up systems of closed 
and male-dominated recruitment patterns’ (181), and in quantitative terms quotas 
have been effective in increasing the number of women in the political arena. Even 
Leila Sharaf, the first female Senator in Jordan, told me that in order for women not to 
be considered merely a ‘symbol’ within the family, a higher number is necessary: 
‘There is a need for more women, because only one hand cannot clap. There is a need 
for more women involved in public life; they have to take part in decision-making 
positions. Without a quota we will always be a symbol’ (Amman, 8 March 2011). 
Others consider the quota system to be capable of ensuring greater participation of 
women in political life, particularly in cases where women’s social situation and the 
prevalence of certain traditions and customs hamper their participation, such as in 
rural and remote areas, as May Abu Alseemen, also a Senator, told me:  
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A quota is not the right way to reach the awareness of people in 
order to show that women can do something, but, at the moment, it 
is probably the only way to change the mentality of people living in 
the rural areas. It is a matter of time to raise awareness both of 
voters and of the women elected (Amman, 13 January 2011). 
 
Kawthar, a passionate candidate from Zarqa, also stressed this point: ‘A quota is 
helpful, because this will give women a chance to be decision-makers. The quota is 
especially good for villages and remote areas, where they are more conservative’ 
(Zarqa, 2 February 2011). However, I believe that a qualitative analysis of the role of 
women in politics is necessary in order to understand the impact that such women 
have once they enter politics. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2010) suggest further 
research on this, and I would add that although numbers are important up to a point, 
the analysis also needs to focus on the contexts in which women operate, on external 
factors such as the communities where women live, and most importantly on the 
backgrounds, experience and visions of the female candidates. Indeed, Hala, the 
Director of the GSF, supported my idea when she convincingly argued that the quota 
per se is useless for women’s empowerment, and that it is necessary to work on the 
broader context in which the system is adopted:  
 
The quota is a form of empowerment as long as you are working on 
certain elements within the quota for a certain time. This quota, for 
example, has been played to take advantage of certain tribes. We 
are getting certain women in, but nothing is happening inside. The 
image of women is not changing in society. It gives voice to women 
only theoretically (Amman, 20 December 2012). 
 
In line with Hala’s comment, I argue that as long as quotas are introduced into 
systems where parliament and political institutions function merely as patronage 
machines, they are unlikely to be means of empowerment in and of themselves. As 
Liddell (2009) points out in the context of the introduction of gender quotas in the 
Moroccan parliament, increasing the representation of women in institutions might act 
as a ‘surface reform taking pressure off male elites to genuinely empower women in 
	   123 
decision making-positions’ (79). 
Although many criticise the quota system, most of the female candidates25 I 
interviewed were in favour of it. They also explained to me that the doubling of the 
number of seats in 2010, from six to 12, had influenced and encouraged their decision 
to run. Since there were more reserved seats assigned to women, they thought they 
had a better chance of winning, as Khawla, a very outspoken lawyer from Jerash, 
explained to me when I asked her why she had decided to run: ‘I ran for different 
reasons. First, thanks to the quota I thought I had a better opportunity to win; and 
second, no one was running in my tribe and I also thought I had better chances to win 
because of this’ (Jerash, 5 February 2011). In their recent study of the quota at the 
municipal level in Jordan, David and Nanes (2011) found out that preliminary results 
showed that the introduction of the 20% quota for municipal elections had encouraged 
many women to enter the political arena. The majority of the female candidates I 
interviewed, especially those living outside Amman, explained to me that they had 
tried to calculate how many votes they would be able to get in order to decide whether 
it was worthwhile becoming a candidate. If, as in the case of Khawla, no one else in 
their tribe was running, that gave the hidden quota a stronger significance. 
Although the introduction of the reserved-seats quota for parliament in Jordan may 
have encouraged more women to get out and experience candidacy, other female 
candidates were very much against this measure. Some arguments against the quota 
system emphasise that such affirmative action might be seen as a form of ‘special 
treatment’ or ‘specific advantage’ to compensate for some kind of discrimination 
(Bacchi, 2006). A middle-aged woman candidate from Karak, who had been 
advocating women’s rights in her community for long time, was firmly against the 
introduction of the quota, as she told me at my place in Amman while we were 
enjoying tea together: ‘The quota is unfair to women. Women have fixed percentages 
because they are considered to be a special case. But we are not a special case: we 
have the right to participate in politics like men do’ (Amman, 23 January 2011). 
Characterising affirmative action as ‘special help’ for those considered to be 
‘disadvantaged’ tends to ‘stigmatise affirmative action targets’ (Bacchi, 2006: 34) – 
women in this case – and undermines the potential effectiveness of the reform, since it 
marks ‘the most disadvantaged class as inherently deficient, insatiable, as needing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Eighteen of the 26 candidates I interviewed. 
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more and more’ (Fraser, 1997: 115). Once again, women are considered a 
disadvantaged rather than an enriching part of society, and risk becoming even more 
discriminated against and marginalised. 
  
International influence on the adoption of gender quotas 
 
According to Krook’s (2009) and Abou-Zeid’s (2006) analyses of the factors behind 
the adoption of quotas (globally and in the Arab World respectively), several 
developing countries have been influenced by international agreements in this 
process. The CEDAW and the BPFA continue to push women’s organisations 
towards the goals enshrined in such conventions, especially with reference to the Arab 
world. Moreover, the third UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG),26 which is to 
promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, and which demands that a 
specific proportion of parliamentary seats be held by women by 2015, has been 
influencing the adoption of affirmative action measures such as quotas worldwide. 
Krook et al. (2010) have shown that more than three quarters of all proposals to adopt 
gender quotas were introduced during the last 15 years, which directly follows the rise 
of gender mainstreaming after Beijing 1995 and the popularity of women’s 
empowerment programmes in development practice. Furthermore, the goals of the 
BPFA (1995) and the MDGs (2000) explicitly promoted the idea of women’s 
importance for economic development. This new rhetoric rapidly created an economic 
incentive to ‘institutionally incorporate women into the political systems of countries 
with oftentimes less than stellar reputations for upholding women’s rights’ (Bozena, 
2010: 6), such as Sudan and Afghanistan. Also, as Bozena (2010) shows in her paper 
on the strategic use of quotas in the Arab world, these affirmative action measures 
might be seen as a ‘by-product of Arab governments’ attempts to attain “democracy” 
benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, rather than to 
truly enfranchise women’ (1). Writing in the context of the promotion of women’s 
rights and democracy in the Arab world, Marina Ottaway (2004) claims that 
increasing women’s political participation can be a cheap way for highly authoritarian 
political systems to demonstrate democratic credentials.  
As described in the previous section, women’s organisations in Jordan, although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml [accessed 9 April 2013]. 
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not always unified, have lobbied for the introduction of quota systems at both the 
parliamentary and the municipal level with apparent success, especially after the first 
elections held without quotas saw only one woman elected. While women’s 
organisations were, hopefully, influenced by principles of gender equality, the role of 
the Jordanian government has been fundamental in the adoption of such measures.  
As described in chapter two, Jordan is the sixth largest receiver of US ‘democracy 
promotion’ funds worldwide. In their study of quotas at the municipal level in Jordan, 
David and Nanes (2011) have clearly demonstrated that the adoption of the 20% 
threshold for women on municipal councils was not entirely due to women’s 
organisations’ lobbying activities, but was especially pushed by US financial 
interests. Jordan had a chance to receive financial support from the US through a 
specific programme, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). In February 2006, 
the women’s quota for municipal councils was included in the municipal elections 
bill, and in September of that year Jordan received US$25 million from the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Threshold Programme to fund two 
activities, one of which aimed at ‘increasing the participation of women in electoral 
politics through public fora, training and media outreach’ (David and Nanes, 2011: 
289). Two months later, Jordan was selected as eligible for the Compact Programme, 
which offers more assistance than the MCC Threshold Programme, and which Jordan 
won in October 2010 with a grant of US$275 million. According to David and Nanes 
(2011: 289), women’s organisations played a limited role in the lobbying for the 
municipal quota, and once the bill went before parliament, women activist did not 
lobby for it at all. The explanation that women activists gave was that they had had 
trouble with parliament before on issues such as divorce rights for women, the 
nationality law and honour crime, and that they did not want any more trouble. 
However, the government, which was against reforms to the personal status and 
nationality laws, suddenly gave women a 20% quota on municipal councils (David 
and Nanes, 2011: 289). As discussed in greater detail in chapters two and five, the 
willingness to grant specific rights within the public sphere collides with the regime’s 
more conservative reluctance to amend personal or familial laws, which might have a 
broader socio-political impact within society and the private sphere. 
Although the parliamentary quota was introduced before the 2007 municipal 
elections, Rabiha ad-Dabbas, the head of the women’s quota committee in the 
Ministry of the Interior at the time, made it clear that the parliamentary quota ‘was not 
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a law but a one-time gift from the King designed to empower women in legislative 
authority’ (David and Nanes, 2011: 293). In 2010 the parliamentary quota was 
doubled from six to 12 seats, and after the 2010 election Jordan was ‘promoted’ to the 
Compact Programme, receiving more funding from the US. The head of the Quota 
Commission during the 2010 elections told me during an interview I conducted at his 
office: ‘The Arab World is ranked as the lowest part of the world for what concerns 
women’s political participation, and we need to be comparable to other countries in 
order to progress within the democratisation process’ (Amman, 12 December 2010). 
The emphasis was not on women and their capabilities and potential contributions to 
the political arena, but was more related to the process of democratisation, to the idea 
of being in line with other countries’ policies in relation to women’s empowerment 
promotion. However, when I asked him what the other ‘improvements’ by the 
Jordanian government to promote the status of women were, especially in relation to 
the personal status law, he replied: ‘Because of Arab culture, such progress is very 
slow.’ His comment reflects the regime’s vision of (not) improving the status of 
women’s rights in the country. 
While this has been the approach of governmental officials, how have female 
candidates perceived this instrumentalisation of quotas for other ends? According to 
my interviewees and to previous research (David and Nanes, 2011), candidates 
perceived the adoption of the quota system as coming directly from the King and 
Queen – in other words, as a royal gift. Loyalty towards and trust in the royal family 
often came up during discussions of the reasons behind the adoption of the quota, as 
Zachieh, a candidate from Madaba, told me in front of a picture of herself with the 
King: ‘Quotas are dictated by the King, Queen Rania and Princess Basma. They 
believe that women in Jordan should have an effective role in this field. They 
supported gender quotas and they support a more active participation of women in 
society’ (Madaba, 4 February 2011). However, I also encountered more explicit 
criticisms of the adoption of quotas than those collected by David and Nanes (2011) 
in relation to municipal candidates in Jordan. The quota was perceived as a measure 
adopted not for women or because of women activists’ lobbying, but because of 
international pressure, as Dr Sabah, a candidate from Karak, emotionally told me: 
‘There is still no trust in women, but they increased the quota… they increased the 
quota only for decoration, for the media and for the international community, not for 
us’ (Amman, 18 January 2011). I personally agree with Dr Sabah’s and other 
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women’s opinions that the introduction of quotas has been closely related to the 
government’s instrumentalisation of women’s rights and women’s organisations, as a 
researcher at the al-Quds Centre for Political Studies revealed to me: 
 
The government is interested in empowering women mainly 
because they receive donations from the international community 
and because they need to listen to the women’s movement and to 
keep them quiet. The government in one way or another is 
interested in women’s issues, but their interest is not aimed at the 
empowerment of women; they just aim to present themselves as if 
they are doing something for women. The problem is that if they 
increase the number of quotas in parliament on the one hand, on the 
other many laws against women are on standby, and they are not 
doing a proper job in order to improve them in the direction of 
respect for women’s rights (Amman, 7 December 2010). 
 
Indeed, if the government and parliament were interested in the empowerment of 
women, laws on honour crime, the passing on of one’s nationality to one’s children 
and women’s paid employment would be taken into account. As David and Nanes 
(2011) argue, it is easy to claim to work on behalf of women’s rights in Jordan 
‘without attempting more difficult, politically sensitive reforms that would actually 
have a larger impact on women’s lives, such as amending personal status, divorce, 
and nationality laws’ (285). There is a need for a strategy, and unless women’s rights 
become a priority for the government, women will continue to be instrumentalised for 
security and economic ends (Nusair, 2009). While certain women’s groups are said to 
work for women’s interests, there should be no ‘patriarchal bargain’ to co-opt 
women’s rights. Kandiyoti (1996) argues that social institutions do not merely reflect 
a monolithic patriarchal logic, but rather are the site of power relations and political 
processes through which gender hierarchies are both created and contested. In Jordan, 
as much as in other countries in the Middle East, women’s organisations are closely 
connected to the government and its priorities. There is the risk that in exchange for 
protection, both political and financial, many women will ‘barter their submissiveness 
and propriety in return for becoming part of the system’ (Goulding, 2009: 76), 
maintaining the stability of the system as long as they can be a part of it (Kandiyoti, 
	   128 
1988).  
As Bozena (2010) points out in her analysis of gender quotas and international 
financial benefits in the Arab world, gender quotas have been promoted by 
‘progressively-minded’ (7) Arab monarchs such as King Abdullah of Jordan or King 
Mohammad VI of Morocco. In Tunisia too, before the recent Jasmine Revolution 
(2011), gender quotas were introduced under the dictator Ben Ali. However, such top-
down decisions are mostly made to meet the requirements of international donors and 
investors, rather than out of any real interest in women’s empowerment. The motive is 
to ‘appear to be good’ at the regional and international level, to look ‘modern’ and 
show that democracy is being ‘promoted’ through women’s issues. Thus quotas are 
not adopted from the perspective of the demand for women’s rights, but rather ‘reflect 
more a cynical attempt among elites to mask other struggles under the guise of 
concern for the political status of women’ (Krook, 2009: 10). 
 
Quotas and structural changes 
 
When female Jordanian candidates, women activists and elected women agreed to the 
introduction of the quota system, they considered it to be a temporary tool. Although 
the degree of acceptance was greater than I would have expected, only few of my 
respondents agreed to the introduction of quotas without any reservations.27 They 
justified the adoption of quotas as the only means through which women could attain 
political positions, as had been the case in Iraq. In fact, some Iraqi women 
interviewed by Al-Ali and Pratt (2009b) said that the quota ensured at least some 
female presence in public life, and several Iraqi ‘secular women activists argued how 
conservative parliamentarians may change their opinions with experience’ (133). One 
of the main critiques made by female candidates and women’s rights activists in 
Jordan in relation to quotas was the lack of qualified women and of women 
advocating women’s rights. The head of the Quota Commission underlined the lack of 
experience and qualifications among many women candidates during my interview at 
his office: ‘The majority of female candidates are not qualified enough to work 
properly in politics. The qualified people do not want to run for office because they 
are scared of losing the right support’ (Amman, 12 December 2010). However, I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Only four of the 26 women I interviewed had no criticism of the quotas. 
	   129 
to add that if this may be true for women, the same can also be said for male 
candidates and parliamentarians.  
Although the ‘qualification’ argument might be somewhat problematic in relation 
to the difficulties of measuring ‘qualifications’ as such, and although the question of 
what exactly qualifies a person to enter politics may be an interesting one, during my 
fieldwork I focused my attention on candidates’ campaigns. During my 26 interviews 
with female candidates and four interviews with MPs, I encountered some very 
educated and passionate women who wanted to raise their voices to bring about 
change. However, some women seemed to be more interested in their community’s 
concerns than in promoting policies with national impact. Furthermore, only a few of 
them were campaigning on issues related to the promotion of women’s rights: most of 
the time they were discussing economic issues or problems related to their 
community. This situation makes sense in a context where tribal support is necessary 
if one wishes to attain a public position, and where the independence of female voters 
may be in question, as I will discuss in chapter five.  
Besides the issue of qualifications, candidates discussed two difficulties in 
succeeding in the elections: they referred to the unfairness of the election law, and 
they connected it to tribal divisions within Jordanian society. Hala at the GSF told me: 
‘The quota system is not a fair system in calculation: it would be fair if voting areas 
were similar – with the same number of voters in different constituencies. It became 
worse with the new law and the virtual constituencies’ (Amman, 20 December 2010). 
In order to better understand this, it is essential to examine the structure of the 
election law.  
 
The electoral system 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the election law adopted in 1993 has 
been criticised and contested by analysts, activists, political observers and civic 
groups. Although this law was modified in June 2012, I will refer to the law that was 
in use during the 2010 elections.  
Before the 2010 elections, civil society organisations saw an opportunity to 
strengthen their role in shaping the electoral process in Jordan, and worked to build up 
public demand for electoral reform. A coalition of civil society organisations and 
women’s groups formally submitted recommendations to the government. At the 
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institutional level, electoral law is considered to be ‘one of the most important 
indicators of the existence of a degree of participation in politics, but it does not 
always indicate the existence of democracy in a political regime’ (Al-Attiyat, 2005: 
54). The coalition that advocated reform of the electoral law in 2010 mainly 
demanded the elimination of the SNTV (one-person one-vote) system, which tended 
to favour very strong tribal candidates, and sought greater recognition of parties both 
inside and outside parliament. Women’s organisations advocated a greater 
representation of women in politics, asking for a higher percentage in the quota 
system. However, the main expectations were not met. The new law promulgated in 
May 2010 preserved the SNTV system, and rejected any attempt to shift towards 
proportional representation or party lists.28 As described above, the law doubled the 
number of reserved seats for women from six to 12, but it also increased the total 
number of seats in the Lower House from 110 to 120. Four seats were added for the 
heavily populated Palestinian areas in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa. Moreover, the new 
law introduced a ‘unique system of districting, in which the country’s main electoral 
zones are divided into “virtual” sub-districts equal to the number of seats assigned to 
the zone’ (NDI, 2010). Candidates register to run in a sub-district of their choice, and 
voters can cast one ballot for a candidate in any sub-district in their electoral zone. 
The sub-districts are called ‘virtual’ because they do not correspond to any particular 
geographical area. The voters can vote in each virtual constituency for only one 
candidate from the whole constituency. The candidate needs to choose only one 
virtual constituency. The first-past-the-post winner in the virtual constituency gains a 
place in parliament, alongside the winners from all the other virtual constituencies. 
The distribution of constituencies is not dependent on the size of the population, and 
is not proportional to the number of people. It can happen that a candidate in a virtual 
constituency can win with a lower number of votes than were received by another 
candidate in another virtual constituency within the same overall constituency, and 
this also has a negative effect in relation to the quota. Dr Sabah, the extremely strong 
and passionate candidate from Karak, explained to me that she did not win, even 
though she had the highest number of votes in her virtual constituency:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The law invoked stricter penalties for electoral fraud, including vote-buying; broadened election 
administration beyond the Ministry of the Interior, adding a judge as deputy head for each election 
committee and an independent judge to arbitrate electoral disputes; and introduced a number of 
procedural changes to protect the secrecy of the vote and enhance the transparency of the process.  
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The big problem is that the division of the constituency is not fair: 
the government did this in order to decide whom they want to win. 
With a different voting system, for instance, if there are two votes in 
the election, I could vote for my tribe and for the person I believe 
could do something. Karak is divided into Karak city (three seats, 
one for Christians and two for Muslims), Alqasid city (two seats, 
one for Muslims, one for Christians), Alwahar (one seat) and 
Almasar (two seats for Muslims). There is no need to divide the 
constituency of Almasar into two: in the first constituency a person 
won with 2,000 votes and in the second one won with 6,000 votes, 
but the one after him got 5,000 votes and did not win a seat even 
though he got more than 2,000 votes. It’s the same with the quota: 
the woman who won in Karak got 1,200 votes and there were 7,000 
voters. I got 2,000 votes but there were 14,000 voters. So the 
percentage she got was 17% (1,200 out of 7,000) and I got 14% 
(2,000 out of 14,000). It is unfair. I do not expect they [parliament] 
are going to change it soon, because they won thanks to this system. 
But if they are not going to change it, I will do everything I can in 
order to express my rejection of it, though the Internet, in 
newspapers and through my charity (Amman, 18 January 2011). 
 
As well as Dr Sabah, other female candidates also heavily criticised this election 
law, especially those who felt that they had lost through the unfairness of the 
counting, as outlined above. This was the case with Fayza, the oldest candidate I 
interviewed, with whom I had an insightful conversation at her house in Irbid:  
 
We have an unfair law. We need different percentages and different 
ways of counting. Women in big cities are disadvantaged and they 
can win only if they are part of a big party. Women in big cities 
with a high percentage, like me, do not win; I need more than 2,000 
votes to win, and in remote areas 300 votes are enough in order to 
be a member of parliament. This is not fair (Irbid, 16 May 2011). 
 
Terez, the middle-aged Christian candidate from Madaba and member of the JWU, 
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whom I referred to in chapter two, was against the introduction of the quota and 
demanded that the system will be changed: ‘We should amend the election law and 
add women in parties. The election law should focus on parties’ lists. There should 
also be an amendment to the calculation; it should depend on the number of votes you 
get. Now women from small districts can win with a low number of votes’ (Amman, 
17 April 2011). Terez raises a very crucial point about the formation of constituencies 
in Jordan. Since urban districts such as Amman and Zarqa are believed to be 
populated mostly by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, there is a preference for the 
representation of rural areas, which historically are more loyal to the royal family, and 
whose presence in parliament therefore will not harm the stability of the King or the 
parliament. 
Supporters of the quota system praise it as a form of affirmative action without 
which women in particular would have no seats in the Lower House or on municipal 
councils. It is criticised, however, because it cancels out the chances of female 
candidates from large electoral districts such as Amman. Such a quota system not 
only disadvantages urban women, but also tends to favour conservatives. Filling quota 
seats on the basis of percentages rather than the number of votes favours women who 
run in small districts with few competitors. These tend to be rural districts. Women 
activists have pointed out that the skewed distribution of seats may exclude from 
parliament the most experienced female politicians, who often live and work in the 
capital.  
 
The role of tribes and cultural stereotypes 
 
This election system clearly favours tribal relationships and solidarity at the expense 
of political parties and independent political candidates. The lack of political party 
representation and the consequent significance in Jordanian political life mean that 
tribes still play an important role in Jordanian politics, where family leagues have 
become established and institutionalised. But how does this social structure impact on 
women’s political participation? My respondents’ comments resonate with Abou-
Zeid’s (2006) assessment that tribes and cultural stereotypes are among the strongest 
impediments to women’s political participation in Jordan, especially when – as in the 
majority of cases – tribes decide to support a man. Terez, the candidate from Madaba, 
told me that among all the difficulties she faced as a candidate:  
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The tribal nature of the state itself is an issue. My tribe was 
choosing to support another candidate, a man. There was a general 
agreement to support that man just because he was a man, related to 
the army, but he was not qualified for politics. And it was very 
difficult to get support, just because I am a woman. However, I tried 
to represent myself as independent, away from my tribe: I tried to 
convince people that it is not the tribe that represents you, but it is 
the candidate who represents you (Amman, 17 April 2011). 
 
Tribalism is considered by many to be, in the words of one activist, ‘the greatest 
obstacle towards women’s emancipation’ (Khouri, 2004 quoted in Warrick, 2009: 
132). A woman candidate29 for a municipal council seat exemplified this when, 
explaining why she had not voted for herself, she said: ‘I would not break my 
commitment to the tribe. We are a tribal community and the priority is for electing a 
man’ (Al-Azzam, 2012: 371). Thus not only do tribes play a major political role, but 
their values also shape much of Jordanian ‘culture’ (Alon, 2009: 155). Tribal 
conservatism tends to support the cultural belief that politics is a male arena, and 
sometimes this negatively influences even women’s opinions about the role of female 
candidates: men are thought to be more politically competent, while women are 
considered to be both less trustworthy and less self-confident within the political 
system,30 as Ala, a very passionate young activist, underlined during our discussion: 
 
Having women in politics is still a taboo for our society… and this 
does not come only from men, but also from women. The 
interesting thing we found out during elections is that women do not 
vote for women.31 Both men and women questioned women’s 
knowledge about politics. This is the whole idea in society. They do 
not think women are good enough or are capable of working in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The candidate Fardous Mohammad Al Khaldi ran for a seat in the Sabha and Dafianeh municipal 
council in Mafraq. 
30 A study undertaken by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in 1996 found that 
Jordanian society continues to lack confidence in women’s political and decision-making abilities 
(Shatwi and Daghestani 1996 in Al-Attiyat, 2005: 53). 
31 Ala participated in an awareness campaign promoted by the al-Hayat Centre to encourage more 
young people to vote. 
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politics. They think it is too hard a task that only a man can do 
(Amman, 7 April 2011). 
 
The unconditional support for men from tribes was the main element pointed out 
by my interviewees. The gender factor of being a man was often also related to the 
man’s relationship with the army, as in case of Terez above, and in the following 
story from Zachieh, another candidate from the Madaba area: 
 
I had the full support of my husband. Sometimes I wanted to give 
up, but he was pushing me not to do that. In terms of tribes, my 
husband’s tribe did not support me at all. Not one of them gave me 
a vote. The person who won the candidacy in Ma’in,32 a man, had a 
very high position in the military. Of course people preferred to 
vote for him. He promised voters that he would find them jobs and 
other benefits. My tribe supported me, but not all of them knew me 
so well and they do not all live here in Madaba. Since there is a 
huge degree of loyalty to your own tribe, even if people know that 
the candidate is not good enough, they vote for him because he is 
part of their tribe. This is loyalty to your tribe (Madaba, 4 February 
2011).  
 
Moreover, sometimes women told me that the tribe’s influential members and the 
mukhabarat tried to discourage them from running so that the man supported by the 
tribe would have not had any ‘troublesome’ competitors. One candidate revealed to 
me that someone from the mukhabarat tried to convince her not to run; according to 
her, some of her votes ‘disappeared’ during counting, recalling Toujan Faisal’s 
previous account: 
 
Inside my tribe, another man ran for election. Two days before the 
elections I received a phone call from someone from the 
mukhabarat inside the government, urging me not to run. But I did 
not care and I ran. The funny thing is that apparently I got 2,079 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ma’in is a town in the governorate of Madaba. 
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votes, but I do not know how at the end I had only 279 votes. That 0 
disappeared… [she laughs]. The man from my tribe got 8,000 votes, 
which is a huge number for a person in my city. Nobody before has 
ever had such a high number of votes in a parliamentary election. 
That was fraud, and I was the victim. This man was a good friend of 
someone in the government (Amman, 12 January 2011). 
 
Unfortunately the discouragement of female candidates from participating in 
elections did not only take the form of telephone calls and alleged fraud, but also 
involved cases of violence. Two women I met complained of acts of violence against 
them during their candidacy, which they presumed had come from their tribe, because 
the tribe was firmly against their candidacy. One woman who lives outside Amman 
told me, still upset and crying:  
 
All my banners have been burned down. I received creepy phone 
calls and text messages that made my husband and me very upset. I 
know my tribe does not support me, because they want their man to 
win. But I have also been threatened with a knife while picking up 
my car. I am scared, yes, but I believe in what I am doing and I 
hope the institutions will be there to help me (Amman, 23 January 
2011). 
 
Often when tribes do not support a candidate they will try to hamper that 
candidate’s campaign. Women not only have to live in a context where political 
participation is still considered a male arena, but they also have to bear physical and 
psychological violence against them. Dr Sabah, the candidate from Karak, also 
explained to me how tribal divisions reinforce violence and how, through an 
implementation and modification of the election law, this situation may change with 
time: 
 
All the problems that Jordan is suffering now come from the 
election law, especially the violence. All the tribes hate each other. 
If it becomes possible to vote for two or three candidates, the tribes 
will cooperate with each other. Now, even within the same tribe 
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there are problems, using guns and spreading violence. People are 
very close to their tribe; thus to vote for your tribe is almost 
necessary (Amman, 18 January 2011). 
 
Violence may help to signal a tribe’s strength, and it also reveals the complicated 
and multifaceted relationship between tribes and the state. Moreover, in order to be 
represented in parliament, a tribe can nominate a candidate and mobilise votes for that 
candidate not only from that specific tribe, but also through campaigning among other 
tribes, especially those small enough not to warrant their own candidate (Al-Attiyat, 
2005: 53). This was the case with Dr Sabah, who explained to me that another, 
smaller tribe that had agreed to vote for her ultimately failed to support her on 
election day because a bigger tribe had offered them more services. Such a system 
works to the advantage of bigger tribes: 
 
With this law only the big tribes win. In my community there are 
two big tribes: the Tarawnah and the Sarayra. In every election they 
win. A lot of tribes are smaller and do not have a chance to win. 
The big two tribes usually go to the small ones and convince them 
not to run, promising services. In my community there is another 
tribe, called the Qatawna, they live in my village and they are 
smaller. We called them in order to support them in the local 
municipal councils, and they were to support us in this 
parliamentary election; this agreement lasted 24 hours. The 
Tarawnah went to them and convinced them not to support us. Until 
the last minute they [the Qatawna] said that they would support me. 
But on election day, they disappeared. I was the only one running in 
my tribe. In the Tarawnah tribe there were four people running 
(Amman, 18 January 2011). 
 
Family ties and social connections shape citizens’ expectations about a candidate. 
Indeed, as Lust and Hourani argue (2011: 120), Jordanians expect that people from 
the same tribe, family, neighbourhood or personal network will give each other 
special support, and the bigger and more influential the tribe, the more services might 
be on offer.  
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In relation to the introduction of quotas, the advantages of such a measure have not 
been lost on either the tribes or the Islamists. Although both sectors are conservative 
with regard to the promotion of women’s rights, they have recognised in gender 
quotas an opportunity to serve their own interests through new means. One of the 
risks inherent in the apparent advantage of quotas is that a woman candidate might be 
supported not because of her professional or social background, but simply because 
the quota gives her a better chance of winning and therefore of representing the tribe’s 
interests. In this context, there is also the risk that women will be merely proxies, 
since in practice they are excluded from the networks of patronage, which are entirely 
male-dominated.  
May Abu Alseemen, the President of the JNFW, was clear about the risk of the 
instrumentalisation of women by certain tribes and of having ‘token’ women in 
power: ‘One of the main problems in the current system is that tribes will support any 
woman, without caring about their qualifications and preparation to be a good elected 
member of parliament. We need to have good and structured parties: parties will push 
and promote qualified women’ (Amman, 13 January 2011). Five of the women 
elected to quota seats in 2003 were described as ‘tribal’ or Islamist candidates: the 
Islamic Action Front’s candidate, Dr Hayat al-Museimi; three women from the very 
conservative southern towns of Tafilah and Karak; and a tribal candidate from the 
north. These women often voted against amendments to legislation such as on honour 
crimes and divorce measures. Adab Saoud of Tafilah, for example, complained that 
the government’s proposed amendments failed to ‘develop women’s causes in a way 
to safeguard their Islamic and Arab identity’, and that increased divorce rights for 
women would harm families and be used frivolously (quoted in Warrick, 2009: 131). 
As with women in Jordan, some women politicians in Morocco have also complained 
of ‘tokenism’, referring not to their tribes but to their political parties. According to 
Liddell’s (2009) study of clientelism and quotas in Morocco, women are active in 
politics, but currently no ‘parties are convinced of the importance of gender issues; 
they just use women as pawns and objects’ (85). 
The tribal nature of the elections in Jordan makes them seem more like family or 
social celebrations, and gives the legislature a service-oriented aspect which distances 
it from wider political-ideological discourse and weakens the impact of political 
institutions. Because women have a limited presence in political institutions and 
positions of influence, the belief that they can provide services is very limited as well. 
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Similarly, the SNTV system gives tribes the strongest influence in securing victory 
for their candidates. Tribes tend to support male over female candidates, and when a 
female candidate does win the support of her tribe, the risk that she will be 
instrumentalised by tribal interests is high.  
 
Corruption and financial issues as impediments to political participation 
 
As described in the previous section, some of the women I interviewed made 
allegations of fraud on election day. International delegations were sent to Jordan, 
mainly in collaboration with local and international actors working in the country. 
The NDI, for instance, had a delegation that visited Jordan between 5 and 10 
November 2010, which was deployed throughout the country and was comprised of 
61 credentialed observers, both long and short term, from 18 countries and territories 
(NDI, 2010: 1). Lust and Hourami (2011: 126) argue that both domestic and 
international monitors have limited capacities: on the one hand, domestic monitors 
tend to be young, inexperienced and afraid to be critical of the process overall; on the 
other hand, international monitoring is conducted by too many international 
organisations, without being comprehensive or generating a critical analysis of the 
process. However, although these observers said that new improved procedures 
during the 2010 election marked a clear improvement over the conduct of the 2007 
elections, there was some criticism of the election’s transparency. According to the 
observations written in the al-Hayat Centre Report (2010), some candidates and their 
agents committed very serious violations and electoral crimes on election day, 
especially in relation to forging IDs as well as vote buying. These violations seriously 
impacted on the integrity and transparency of the elections, and the government was 
clearly remiss in combating these crimes. A candidate from Jerash revealed to me that 
a man in her tribe had started to buy votes in order to gain more support: 
 
Towards the end of my campaign I had some issues with my tribe. 
A man from my tribe decided to run at the very last moment. He 
started buying his votes for 200 JOD each, and he spent almost 
200,000 JOD to buy votes. He did not win in the end, but the 
‘political money’ problem affected my campaign (Jerash, 12 
February 2011). 
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The ‘political money’ problem was often connected during the interviews with the 
lack of finance for campaigns; candidates’ financial capacities play an essential role 
in this. Much of the cost of campaigning consists of expenses related to ‘hosting’ 
voters – which is not illegal – and in too many instances to vote-buying, which is 
illegal (Al-Attiyat, 2005: 21). Moreover, some voters without personal ties to any 
candidate sell their votes to the highest bidder (Lust and Hourami, 2011). This may be 
particularly true of voters belonging to the lower classes, whose plight may be abused 
for political ends. However, the government did not take any clear position on the 
issue: indeed, the situation enhanced the government’s ability to manipulate the 
outcome. A female candidate from Jerash was very upset that there were no effective 
measures against corruption at the time: 
 
I had financial issues because the campaign was very expensive. 
Not all of the tribe supported me, because there were another three 
women in my tribe and they split the vote. In 2010 I decided to run 
because they said that there was less corruption this time. But it was 
not like that. Political money is a problem. The policemen saw 
votes being bought and sold right before their eyes, but they did not 
say anything. I saw it with my own eyes as well. I didn’t denounce 
it this time, because I knew it would be pointless (Jerash, 12 
February 2011). 
 
This candidate revealed that there is a lack of trust in anti-corruption measures, 
particularly because the government does not enforce them, and that there is a need 
for a strong political will on the part of the government to monitor the situation. After 
a long pause to think about her experience, she went on: 
 
Before the elections I wrote a report for my municipality, giving the 
names of people involved in cases of corruption. But it did not have 
any consequences for them. The truth is that the government wants 
only certain people in office, and political money constitutes a 
favour to them. I mean that, since there are a lot of poor people, 
with the money they receive from the candidates, the government 
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does not have to bother about them for that period of time. I was not 
scared about denouncing them, but my family is. The problem is 
that the people I went to in order to denounce these facts are also 
involved in manipulation and corruption. It is a closed circle. 
Talking and denouncing had a bad effect on me, because now I am 
being left out of the high level of society; they know that I am going 
to talk... I wish I could talk to the King and reveal everything 
(Jerash, 12 February 2011).  
 
Political money is not the only issue. Monitoring activities revealed that numerous 
violations and problems also took place during the counting process, most importantly 
in the discrepancy between the number of ballots counted and the number of voters at 
polling stations. The number of votes counted at the polling stations did not match the 
number of votes announced at tabulation centres (al-Hayat Centre Report, 2010: 5). A 
candidate from Madaba explained to me that she was not sure about the counting of 
her votes: 
 
The results are not transparent. The way they calculated it was not 
fair. In Madaba there were five other women candidates. I got the 
highest number of votes (526) and I was number 13 in Madaba in 
relation to the quota. The committee responsible for counting in 
Madaba contacted me before the official announcement of the 
results and they said I had won. Three hours later, the official 
results were different. First they told me that my percentage was 
8.55 (the one who won in Madaba had 8.2%), and then they 
announced I had got 7.92%. How that happened, I do not know. It is 
a statistical program. The members of the committee know how to 
amend the results, but they were not allowed. Only the Ministry of 
the Interior was allowed (Madaba, 18 February 2011). 
 
The 2010 elections have been described as ‘déjà vu’ in the context of Jordanian 
politics (Ryan, 2010), both in terms of the candidates elected and in terms of the lack 
of transparency in the election process. The latest Corruption Perceptions Index 
Report for 2012, released by Transparency International, showed that Jordan ranks 
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58th out 176 countries worldwide (CPI, 2012: 5): this report measures perceptions 
and not actual cases of corruption. The 2010 elections restored neither legitimacy to 
the government nor public confidence in parliament (Lust and Hourami, 2011). Since 
the elections, criticism has accelerated and people’s frustration has gained force. 
Women activists and people demonstrating in the streets since February 2011 have 
been asking for serious reform on this issue, together with a reform of the election law 
and of political parties, as discussed in chapter two. Alongside the demonstrations, 
there are also some active advocacy groups in the country that have tried to provide 
some recommendations.33  
 
Recommendations from local organisations 
 
Before and after election day in 2010, some debates came up among civil society 
organisations regarding possible ways of reforming the political system in Jordan. In 
this section I aim to give voice to selected organisations’ recommendations, together 
with some possible scenarios for a different quota system.  
One of the first organisations I met was the al-Quds Centre for Political Studies in 
Jabal Hussein, a research centre that focuses on socio-political studies in the region. 
The director and a researcher welcomed me in an extremely friendly manner and kept 
me there for four hours, discussing the election law, the quota system and possible 
reforms. They were very open and, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, they were 
very critical of the government’s role. The researcher repeated more than once that 
there is a need for recognition of stronger political parties and for a different election 
law. Such suggestions were the main recommendations I also heard from female 
candidates and activists: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 There are also individual actions taking place. For instance, while I was in Jordan I met two women 
from Amman who have founded an ‘anti-corruption’ group on Facebook. They are trying to denounce 
cases of corruption online; they know that they are being closely watched by the mukhabarat, but they 
are not afraid of this. Moreover, they are also trying to formulate some proposals for new laws to fight 
this issue, together with other professionals whom they met through the social network or whom they 
already knew. This initiative was inspired by their personal experiences of candidacy. One of the two 
women, a very well-known figure in Jordan because of her current occupation in an advertising 
company, has stood repeatedly for parliament since 2007. She is very outspoken and radical in her 
ideas. She believes in the role of parliament, and she is also convinced that only pro-regime candidates 
are able to get elected – and she is not one of them. During several meetings we had, she revealed to 
me that she had survived a poisoning attempt during the 2007 campaign, and that during the 2010 
elections the counting of the votes had been unfair. After these experiences she decided to create the 
group and to campaign for just and fair elections. 
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We need political reform, strong political parties and a very strong 
electoral law that will give political parties the authority to work in 
parliament and to have an influence on legislation. Now candidates 
run for elections with the support of tribes, not of parties. Political 
parties in the 1950s were stronger than parties today. The main 
obstacle is the electoral law. At the moment individuals represent 
their tribes. Parties do not have a voice. Getting elected gives you a 
lot of benefits – your children’s school is paid for, for instance – 
and gives you prestige. Most of the MPs only do services for their 
small community, and these services should be provided by the 
governorates and not by MPs. The government agrees with this 
situation because they do not have strong MPs that can ask for 
proper reforms (Researcher, Amman, 7 December 2010). 
 
The government controls parliament through its loyal tribesmen, and this situation 
gives it stability – but only at the institutional level, because people in the street are 
very frustrated. There is a widespread inclination towards stronger political parties 
and a different voting system in order to decrease the political relevance of tribes, and 
for all of this to be built into a national strategy. It is true that ‘tribes play such a 
dominant role in the symbolisation of Jordan’s national identity’ (Layne, 1994: 138). 
However, people involved in politics and with a clear political ideology appear to 
want a different representation of interests in parliament.  
After monitoring the elections, the al-Hayat Centre together with a coalition of 
other civil society organisations came up with some firm recommendations regarding 
the election law in particular (al-Hayat Centre Report, 2010). They proposed the 
adoption of a mixed electoral system combining majoritarian and proportional 
systems, improving the fairness of the distribution of parliamentary seats and 
adopting smaller electoral districts. They also called for the annulment of the virtual 
district system, which has caused great confusion, not only among voters but also 
among candidates. In order to eliminate or at least decrease the phenomenon of 
‘political money’, they suggested setting a ceiling for campaign finances. Finally, 
they proposed the creation of an independent commission for election administration, 
unconnected with the Ministry of the Interior; the link with the latter was also 
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denounced by some female candidates as a factor that may encourage corruption.34  
Lastly, regarding the issue of quotas, the al-Quds Centre organised a workshop 
with women’s organisations and other activists in March 2010 in order to discuss 
different scenarios for the development of the quota system for the representation of 
women in parliament.35 Although according to an activist and lawyer I interviewed, 
‘creating a fair quota system is impossible’ (Amman 7 December 2010), this group of 
organisations tried to propose something new. The first scenario is based on the 
adoption of a system of proportional representation – full or partial (mixed) – 
whereby women have a guaranteed number of seats on the national lists, with at least 
20% of parliamentary seats. The second scenario redistricts constituencies on an equal 
basis, reducing the representation gap. The third scenario proposes a new type of 
calculation36 of the quota in order to make it more equitable for female candidates in 
highly populated governorates. The fourth is based on the national women’s list 
system, where each voter has two votes, one for the constituency representative and 
another for his/her choice from the national women’s list. More than one woman I 
interviewed suggested this idea. Finally, the last scenario proposes the allocation of at 
least one seat for women in each governorate, with the remaining seats to be 
distributed among the larger governorates according to the size of their population, so 
that the governorate system will be treated as a single constituency. 
As stated above, in June 2012 the election law was modified. The SNTV system 
was abolished, and a mixed electoral system was introduced. Voters were granted two 
votes, one for a candidate and another to be chosen from a national list, which 
guaranteed 27 seats for political parties. The number of MPs was increased from 120 
to 150, and the reserved-seats quota for women was increased from 12 to 15, 
encompassing the Bedouin areas. An Independent Electoral Commission (IED) was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The JWU started to develop a draft reform proposal after the 2010 elections as well: this brought 
together women activists, lawyers, political observers and experts to discuss a new election law 
proposal to be submitted to the government. The main idea consisted of strengthening the role of 
political parties by having them more represented in parliament, creating a list of parties, and 
eliminating virtual constituencies from the current system. Moreover, the JWU called for the 
elimination of the one-person one-vote system and the introduction of the option for voters to vote for 
at least two candidates (JWU Conference on the Election Law, Dead Sea, Jordan, January 2011). Most 
importantly, the JWU together with experts discussed the possibility of establishing fixed criteria for 
access to candidacy, so that candidates would be more qualified, at least in theory. 
35 Personal interview with research at al-Quds Centre, 7 December 2010. 
36 The new formula for calculating the winning seats will divide the number of votes for each female 
candidate by the total number of voters in her constituency, multiplied by the number of seats allocated 
for that constituency, and then choose the highest average. 
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also established to oversee the process, replacing the previous role of the Ministry of 
the Interior. Some of the recommendations demanded by civil society and women’s 
organisations have been taken into consideration. However, these modest 
amendments have not changed the structural over-representation of individual tribal 
candidates, and political parties still remain under-represented. Moreover, the new 
electoral law has also not substantially changed the gerrymandering of electoral 
districts, thanks to which the traditionally more government-critical cities of Amman 
and Zarqa – which also have the highest concentrations of Palestinians – are 
disadvantaged in relation to the rural Transjordanian areas, which represent the 
traditional backbone of the monarchy. Since the parliament still has a majority of 
conservative and tribal candidates, providing the King with a solid support base, the 
institution still does not function as a representative body, but rather as a clientelist 
system. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I do not aim to find solutions for the electoral law or the quota system in 
Jordan, but I would like to give voice to the efforts of civil society organisations and 
researchers involved in such debates. As I emphasise throughout my thesis, I believe 
that cooperation between the local, national and international actors is a fundamental 
step towards political reform.  
Although the majority of the female candidates and activists I met considered 
quotas to be a temporary tool that was necessary to increase women’s political 
participation in the country, I argue that the adoption of quotas might not always serve 
to promote women’s rights. Governments and societies, in different contexts, can 
instrumentalise the use of quotas. As Krook (2009) suggests, with a ‘closer look at the 
effects of quotas on the election and empowerment of women […], particular 
measures may in fact “mean” different things within distinct political contexts’ (16). 
As I will go on to demonstrate in chapter four, Jordan is closely connected to the 
international community, and especially to the US, for political and financial reasons. 
However, this cooperation does not always work in favour of women’s agendas. The 
instrumentalisation of the use of quotas in order to gain financial benefits does not 
improve women’s rights in the country, but actually reinforces the exclusion of 
women’s issues from the broader political agenda.  
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As Phillips (1999) among others has argued, within the global context of growing 
neoliberalism, the adoption of quotas may contribute to an increasing separation 
between political empowerment on the one hand and social and economic 
empowerment on the other. Moreover, as I have demonstrated through the interviews 
I have collected, the introduction of quotas in Jordan may have rapidly increased the 
participation of women in politics, but it has left out of the political agenda other, 
more important issues that would improve women’s rights, such as a revision of laws 
against honour crimes, a discussion of the nationality law and a reform of the personal 
status law. As long as the government and certain international institutions are merely 
interested in increasing the number of women per se, without addressing other central 
issues for women’s empowerment, women risk being used as the easiest means to 
help the government to maintain a clean façade in international and regional eyes. 
Dahlerup (2006) argues that a country’s international image has become more and 
more important across international and national contexts, pushing countries to 
market themselves as innovative.  
Moreover, in a context where parliament functions as a patronage institution, the 
adoption of gender quotas risks becoming another way of co-opting women’s issues 
for other ends. Therefore I believe that it is not enough to be for or against quotas in 
and of themselves, and that a deeper analysis of the context and material conditions of 
quotas is needed. We also need an analysis of the intersections of candidates’ 
different identities: here it is important not only to focus on the gender dimension, but 
also to understand how tribal support and place of residence might encourage a 
woman to run for office. Indeed, in the case of Jordan, I have shown how the adoption 
of quotas has been instrumentalised not only by the government, but also by certain 
very conservative tribes. If tribalism generally seeks to limit women’s rights and 
restrict them to subordinate and ‘traditionalist’ roles within the family, the quota 
system gives even these conservative actors an interest in supporting women for 
public office. Often this support takes no consideration of women’s demands, but 
rests merely on tribal interests. Moreover, the election law in use during the 2010 
elections was itself an obstacle not only for women, but also for men who were not 
related to regime-supporting tribes and who wanted to be members of parliament. The 
spread of corruption affects female and male candidates alike, and the adoption of 
quotas is a double-edged sword, which, in the case of Jordan, has mostly been used 
not in favour of women, but as an instrument to gain international recognition. People 
	   146 
are demonstrating in the streets: some recent events37 have revealed the frustration of 
women and men in the country, highlighting the sense of uncertainty hanging over the 
Kingdom, and a new parliament was formed after the 2013 elections. However, real 
political reform seems to be a long way off. 
Adding women and stirring is not enough to promote women’s empowerment, and 
substantive representation is difficult to achieve, especially in a context where the 
hurdles faced by women in politics do not only arise from the adoption (or rejection) 
of a quota system. In empirical studies, the conceptual framework most often 
employed to analyse the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation has been defined as ‘critical mass theory’ (Childs and Krook, 2008), 
which argues that once women constitute a specific proportion of parliament, 
‘political behaviour, institutions, and public policy’ will be transformed (Studlar and 
McAllister, 2002: 234; Waylen, 2008). However, I believe that simply counting the 
number of women representatives is too simplistic; the analysis should consider not 
only ‘when women make a difference’, but more especially, as Celis et al. (2008) 
argue, ‘how the substantive representation of women occurs’ (99), taking into 
consideration informal as well as formal political actors and roles. In a country where 
the authoritarian state tries to control the overall political process, the risk is high that 
women will parrot government views, as has happened in other countries in the 
region, such as Tunisia during Ben-Ali’s regime38 (Goulding, 2009) or Morocco 
(Liddell, 2009)39. The use of quotas in the region, and in Jordan specifically, if not 
supported by other structural changes, may result in a generation of ‘yes women’ 
(Goulding, 2009: 77) who will defeat the goal of encouraging unique female voices. I 
argue that where women are qualitatively strong, acting in association with a 
supportive women’s movement and network both inside and outside the parliament, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 At the beginning of 2012, prosecutors ordered the detention of former intelligence chief Mohammad 
Dahabi on corruption charges; young demonstrators in the southern city of Tafilah faced teargas as 
they protested to demand jobs; and an 18-year-old youth was sentenced by a military court to two years 
in prison for burning a picture of the King (Barnes-Dacey, 2012). 
38 Ben-Ali was the President of Tunisia from 1987 until 2011. In 1999, 11.5% of the parliament was 
female (21 out of 182 members), and the percentage rose to 22.8% in 2004 (43 out of 189 members). In 
2007 Ben-Ali announced an increase in the ratio of women on the Rassemblement Constitutionnel 
Démocratique (Constitutional Democratic Rally) lists of candidates to at least 30%. In Goulding’s 
analysis of women’s political participation in Tunisia, the co-option of women’s issues and women’s 
organisations becomes evident (Goulding, 2009),  
39 For instance, in the case of Morocco, despite an increase in the representation of women in 
parliament since 2002, the implementation of the national list with gender quotas ‘has not come close 
to fundamentally changing the patriarchal power dynamics in parliament or parties themselves’ 
(Liddell, 2009: 85). 
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and are seeking policies that are ideologically congruent with the governing party, 
they are more likely to generate social change. However, unfortunately, this does not 
seem to be the main political trend in Jordan, as I will depict in the following 
chapters.  
	   148 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
IS TRANSFORMATION POSSIBLE? WOMEN’S POLITICAL 
EMPOWERMENT PROJECTS FOR THE 2010 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter with reference to the introduction of a reserved-
seats quota system for women in parliament, the participation of women in political 
life has been a concern particularly for, but not limited to, women themselves.1 In 
fact, this interest in women’s participation in politics has involved international and 
local organisations, especially in cases where ‘political empowerment’ projects 
receive substantive financial support. As described in chapter two, Jordan is the sixth 
largest recipient of US aid, and although the majority of resources are funnelled into 
military and security assistance, women’s empowerment activities are an easy option. 
The mushrooming of activities directed at women’s empowerment projects increased 
especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001, and developed in Jordan as well as 
other countries in the region2 (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009a-b; Richter-Devroe, 2009; Jad, 
2004; Mojab, 2007; Kandiyoti, 2007). These activities are often known as ‘democracy 
promotion’, ‘good governance’ or ‘capacity-building’ training, and in the Jordanian 
context they target female candidates for parliamentary or municipal elections.  
The NDI and the IRI continue to be the major international actors in Jordan, and 
collaborated with local implementers3 in relation to female candidates’ empowerment 
before the 2010 parliamentary elections.4 Most of the female candidates I interviewed 
considered these two organisations to be the main ‘international institutions’ in the 
field of women’s leadership training. Local organisations were also involved in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See chapter three for a longer discussion of the obstacles and experiences of female candidates before 
the 2010 parliamentary elections. 
2 The increase of funding in Jordan was also related to donors’ location in that country in order to fund 
activities for Iraqi refugees. However, these donors have recently reoriented their work towards 
Jordanian organisations (personal interview with activist, London, 15 November 2012). 
3 As I will discuss in the final chapter of this thesis, not all of the organisations in Jordan collaborate 
with the IRI and NDI. Two women’s organisations, the JWU and the AWO, boycott them. These and 
other organisations took the political stand of refusing US funds after the war on Iraq in 2003.  
4 Held on 9 November 2010.  
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programmes that addressed female candidates, particularly the country’s main 
women’s organisations.5 Women’s participation in these leadership training sessions 
is high; although, as I will discuss throughout the chapter, the reasons for this 
participation are diverse, not only has financial and donors’ support influenced the 
mushrooming of these activities, but the demand for these programmes from women 
at the grassroots is increasing. Twenty-five of the 26 female candidates I interviewed 
had participated in at least one of the training sessions organised by local and 
international organisations. Participation in IOs’ training programmes is higher than 
in local training: 25 women had participated in international organisations’ 
programmes, while 17 of the 25 had participated in local organisations’ activities. 
This difference may be related to the supposed lack of trust in local women’s 
organisations, as I will discuss in greater detail in chapter five.  
Starting from an understanding of what women’s interests in and expectations of 
leadership training are, throughout this chapter I aim to analyse selected international 
and local organisations’ reasons, aims and agendas for activities organised before the 
2010 parliamentary elections in Jordan. Drawing on interviews I conducted with 
practitioners in selected international and local organisations and female candidates 
participating in these programmes, and on my own participation in some of the 
activities, I explore how empowerment and gender mainstreaming have been 
operationalised and translated into practice at the international and local level.6 
Focusing on specific projects run by the organisations in question concerning 
women’s political training for the 2010 elections, and comparing international and 
local practices, I will delve into practitioners’ different understandings of 
empowerment, and I will discuss whether social change has been a motivation behind 
such projects. Moreover, by addressing the ways in which gender has been 
conceptualised and integrated into selected institutions, I will question whether the 
transformative potential of the organisations’ projects forms part of their broader 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For an analysis of the women’s organisations in the country, refer to chapter two. The activities 
promoted by local organisations will be further discussed throughout this chapter. The relationships 
among and between female candidates, MPs and women’s organisations will be discussed in chapter 
five. 
6 As the concepts of empowerment and gender mainstreaming have been discussed and debated in 
greater detail in chapter one, here I refer to empowerment as the expansion of people’s ability to make 
strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them. In Kabeer’s 
understanding of the concept, empowerment entails change (Kabeer, 2005: 14). In line with Rai (2008), 
I understand gender mainstreaming as a ‘process of gender democratization, including women and their 
own perception of their political interests and political project into the policy-making processes’ (72). 
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agenda. Since women’s experiences are central to my research, I will focus on female 
candidates’ concerns and feedback on political training, and I will address the 
question of whether training activities reflect women’s expectations, contributing with 
a bottom-up analysis to literature on gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment. I will conclude the chapter with some emerging recommendations for 
political empowerment projects.  
 
Reflections on women and gender interests 
 
As explained in greater detail in chapter one, women’s interests are distinct from 
women’s gender interests (Molyneux, 1985: 232). Interests have to be understood not 
in an essentialist way, but as historically and culturally constituted as well as 
politically and discursively constructed; thus when I use the term ‘interests’, I am 
referring to specific gender interests. One of my first questions during interviews and 
discussions with female candidates related to the reasons why they had decided to 
participate in these training programmes. Learning more skills, tools and techniques 
in order to run a more effective campaign was one of the main practical and technical 
reasons for participating in such activities for many of the female candidates I 
interviewed. Seham, a middle-aged woman and lawyer from Jerash – the mother of 
three children, and a candidate in the 2003 elections as well – was very clear about 
her participation in training organised by international and local organisations, as she 
told me while we were enjoying tea in her office: ‘I was expecting to learn practical 
skills, and it was like this: how to dress, how to smile, how to convince people to vote 
for me’ (Jerash, 5 February 2011). Similarly, Kawthar – a middle-aged woman, the 
mother of five children and the vice-president of the Family Guidance and Awareness 
Centre7 in Zarqa – was very interested in learning the practical tools to run an 
effective campaign, since it was the first time she had been a candidate, as she told me 
in her office: ‘I wanted to learn skills such as how to communicate in public… and 
how to run a campaign, gaining more votes’ (Zarqa, 2 February 2011). Kawthar had 
participated only in activities promoted by local organisations. Other women I 
interviewed said that being a candidate for the first time had pushed them to learn new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The centre was established in 1996, focusing on social work, especially with families and women. It 
deals with violence against women, youth and community rehabilitation. It is a non-governmental 
organisation (Personal interview with Kawthar, Zarqa, 2 February 2011). 
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skills and tools to run for parliament. This was the case with Fayza from Irbid, who 
has been involved in volunteer work with her community for the past 30 years. While 
drinking strawberry juice in the colourful living room of her house in Irbid, referring 
to her participation in activities with the IRI, the NDI and a local organisation, she 
told me:  
 
Since it was the first time I was running for candidacy, I was 
looking to get more information on the process and to learn how to 
communicate with voters. I was also hoping to find strategies on 
how to advocate, but yes, the main reason that pushed me to 
participate in such activities was to build my own skills (Irbid, 16 
May 2011). 
 
At first glance, Seham, Kawthar and Fazya’s interests in participating in training 
could be perceived as practical, in line with Molyneux’s analysis (1985) of gender 
interests, which differentiates between strategic and practical interests. Theoretically, 
practical interests reflect women’s immediate and contained demands for better 
conditions of work, childcare, housing and so forth. These interests do not challenge 
the wider framework of patriarchal power structures (Rai, 2008: 77) or the broader 
political context in which women live and operate. But were the women I interviewed 
not already challenging the status quo? In particular, is the very act of participating in 
political life not a challenge to unequal power relations and gender hierarchies within 
society? 
Dr Sabah, the manager of the Karak Educational Directory, was the first woman to 
attain this position in the south of Jordan. I met her only once, but we talked for 
several hours. Like many of the other candidates I met, Dr Sabah is extremely 
passionate about her work and her involvement in politics. I have referred to Dr Sabah 
in the previous chapter, since her story was particularly powerful in revealing that the 
counting of votes is often unclear in a system where corruption and patronage persist. 
As she was already aware of such difficulties and obstacles even before election day, 
Dr Sabah’s participation in ‘capacity-building’ training was in order to find solutions 
to the situation, as she explained to me: ‘I participated only in activities with the 
NDI… and I wanted to learn how to run the campaign, how to get money in a suitable 
way, how to manage the election day, and especially how to behave with those people 
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that act illegally during election day’ (Amman, 18 January 2011).8 Dr Sabah’s 
account reflects some of the main hurdles female and male candidates face during 
their campaigns, as I explained in the previous chapter, especially when patronage 
support is weak. Her interests go beyond technical skills, trying to find ways of 
challenging the existing social order and power relations within society. In this sense 
Dr Sabah’s needs could be perceived as strategic. As Molyneux (1985: 233–234; 
1998: 235) argues, strategic interests imply an explicit questioning of the existing 
gender order and power relations. Strategic needs are formulated on the basis of an 
analysis of women’s subordination to men. In Dr Sabah’s case, her willingness to 
challenge the pre-existing social order might be perceived as a strategic interest; the 
same could also be said of Seham, Kawthar and Fayza, given their willingness to 
become elected women in parliament, thus challenging the prevailing status quo of 
politics as a male arena.9  
Seham, Kawthar, Fayza and Dr Sabah’s experiences are not representative of all of 
the 134 female candidates who ran for parliament in the 2010 elections. But their 
different backgrounds, experiences and expectations of participation in ‘capacity-
building’ programmes help me to introduce and analyse the extent to which political 
and leadership training took female candidates’ interests into consideration.  
 
The NDI and IRI’s operationalisation of empowerment 
 
Only once while in the field did I have the chance to understand the dynamics 
between different institutions, international and local. Thanks to the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) – a political foundation closely associated with Germany’s 
Christian Democratic Union, which contributes to the ‘promotion of democracy, the 
rule of law and a social market economy’ in Jordan10 – I began the creation of my 
network. As discussed above, the NDI and the IRI are the two major international 
institutions that provide training and activities for political empowerment in the 
country. I therefore decided to start from there. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Dr Sabah is referring to the practice of so-called political money, which consists in buying and selling 
votes. See chapter three for a broader discussion of the topic. 
9 As I will explain in chapter five, not all of the women I interviewed participated in the candidacy 
process because they wanted to challenge the existing social order. Some wanted only the prestige of 
the position or a chance to get their tribe or family represented in parliament; they therefore perceived 
the training programmes as being merely of technical use. 
10 http://www.kas.de/jordanien/en/about/ [accessed 12 February 2013]. 
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The NDI and the IRI define themselves on their websites and brochures as 
‘nonprofit, nonpartisan organization[s]’11 that support, promote and advance 
democratic institutions worldwide. While they are not legally under the control of the 
Democratic (NDI) or Republican (IRI) parties, they are ‘indistinguishable’ from them 
(WaNgugi, 2008: 21). A look at the boards of directors of the two organisations 
reveals that they both have members who are directly connected to the parties in 
question, such as US Senator John McCain, who is chairman of the IRI. Moreover, if 
one looks at the history of the organisations’ international activities, it is fairly clear 
that they are firmly linked to their parties: Naiman (2009), writing for the Huffington 
Post, denounced the IRI for supporting the 2004 coup in Honduras and raised 
questions about the NDI’s involvement. According to its website, the IRI engages in 
what it calls the ‘consolidation of democracy’. It facilitates the coming together of 
opposition parties, human rights organisations, workers’ unions, women’s 
organisations and student groups. However, as WaNgugi shows (2008) with particular 
reference to IRI projects in Latin America, these activities appear to be controversial. 
In Haiti in 2002 and 2003, the IRI helped consolidate the opposition to the 
democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the ‘US ambassador to Haiti at the 
time suggested that the IRI was instrumental in Aristide’s downfall’ (WaNgugi, 2008: 
22). As explained in chapter two, both the IRI and the NDI receive funding from 
USAID and the NED: this in itself is deeply problematic, because there is the risk that 
they will systematically impose the US government’s agenda through their funding. 
The NDI has sponsored ‘democratic development’ programmes in Jordan since 
1993, and has maintained an office in the country since 2004. The focus has recently 
shifted to women’s political participation in parliament, municipal councils and civil 
society. During the first interview I conducted at their office (Amman, 6 December 
2010), my respondent told me that the projects related to the political participation of 
women were sometimes conducted in collaboration with the al-Quds Centre for 
Political Studies, an independent research institute based in Amman; the JNFW, a 
semi-governmental organisation established and headed by Princess Basma; and the 
GFJW, a governmental organisation. Such partnerships serve primarily to facilitate 
the creation of a network within Jordan: for instance, the GFJW has offices in all 12 
governorates, and this makes the identification of participants for the activities easier, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Available at www.ndi.org [accessed 12 February 2013] and http://www.iri.org/learn-more-about-
iri/history [accessed 12 February 2013]. 
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especially for governorates in the south, which are less connected to the capital, 
Amman. Moreover, according to my respondent, through such vertical collaboration 
the NDI and local partners engage in dialogue to understand and emphasise what 
would be the most appropriate projects to develop.  
In relation to the projects organised for the 2010 elections, along with election 
monitoring activities,12 the NDI focused on female candidates through the so-called 
women ‘candidate training programme’.13 The programme involved more than 100 
women who were considering running for parliament, and focused on campaign 
strategy development, communications and outreach. Twelve of the 13 women who 
were elected had participated, as was pointed out quite clearly during the first 
interview I conducted at the NDI office (Amman, 6 December 2010). Candidates also 
learned about campaign structure, voter identification, and how to organise election 
day ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts. ‘We work with individuals and for individuals and we 
aim at reaching individuals,’ my respondent at the NDI office told me, ‘and we work 
especially outside Amman, in the north, centre and south of the country’ (Amman, 6 
December 2010). During the same meeting she stressed that they were trying to be a 
‘grassroots’ organisation, albeit with an international structure. The activities planned 
for the 2010 parliamentary elections started right after the announcement of the 
election date14 at the beginning of 2010, and only few months were available before 
voting day in November of that year. Alongside their main programme they also 
organised a conference in Amman and events in six governorates in order to explain 
the new temporary election law.15 However, one of the main strengths of the NDI’s 
activities, according to the accounts of the female candidates I interviewed, was the 
opportunity to hold individual consultations between candidates and NDI staff, both 
before and during the campaign, to provide personalised guidance on issues relevant 
to their specific campaigns.  
One of the crucial aspects of my research was to understand how practitioners 
perceived notions of empowerment and gender mainstreaming. The definitions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 During the 2010 and 2013 elections the NDI sent an international observation delegation to monitor 
the electoral process, (http://www.ndi.org/2013-jordan-elections [accessed 14 February 2013]). 
13 Respondent at NDI, Personal Interview, Amman, 6 December 2010.	  
14 King Abdullah dissolved parliament on 23 November 2009. However, the date of the elections was 
not announced until early 2010.  
15 Civil society and candidates contested the temporary election law for its problematic division of 
districts and virtual constituencies, and particularly for the one-person one-vote system. See chapter 
three for a detailed explanation of the election law. 
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empowerment that I collected during the interviews were very closely related to the 
types of activities that each organisation was planning. In the case of projects focused 
exclusively on capacity-building and leadership skills, such as those organised by the 
NDI, the understanding of empowerment was related to the provision of tools and 
skills: ‘Empowerment is the way we give women and civil society the right tools and 
the experience in order to learn how to do something. Empowerment is connected to 
the concept of capacity-building,’ according to my respondent at the NDI (emphasis 
added, Amman, 6 December 2011).  
As Eyben and Napian-Moore (2009) point out in their analysis of the use of words 
such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘gender equality’ in international development practices, 
‘opportunities’ and ‘potential’ are frequent descriptors of empowerment. Indeed, 
during the second interview I conducted with the project director at the NDI, she 
explained the concept as a guarantee of opportunities for open dialogue: ‘We build 
capacity-building… we try to introduce people to different processes that they can 
take or not. But at least they think about it. We open up a space for women to work: 
it’s not just increasing skills. We create opportunities for dialogue, an open space,’ 
she stressed (Amman, 12 April 2011). Although my second interview at the NDI was 
more in-depth than the first, the attention to capacity-building and skills remained one 
of the priorities, together with the desire to export certain values – ‘democratic ones’. 
Giving the right tools presumes, first, that the tools an institution is providing are 
those that will best help the recipients, and second, that the institution knows what is 
right and not right for participants. There is a risk of having preconceptions about 
women’s interests, in that a unilateral decision about what is ‘good for women’, 
coming from the top and from a limited number of ‘experts’, can end up framing 
empowerment as a ‘power to’ intervention.16 Most importantly, to what extent does 
this approach take into consideration the intersections between different classes, 
religions, tribal relationships and levels of education? This question will need further 
analysis. 
The IRI has been working in Jordan since 2005, and has focused on ‘connecting 
citizens and government by promoting good governance, strong political parties, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 As described in chapter one, starting from Mayoux’s (1998) analysis of empowerment, there are four 
dimensions to the concept: ‘power within’, which refers to changes in confidence and consciousness; 
‘power to’, which implies an increase in skills and abilities, including income earning and access to 
markets and networks; ‘power over’, which refers to changes in power relations within households, in 
communities and at the macro level; and ‘power with’, which implies the organisation of the powerless 
to enhance individual abilities and the abilities to challenge power relations. 
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public opinion research’.17 More recently, it has addressed the development of 
political parties throughout the country’s 12 governorates, along with election 
monitoring.18 Focusing mainly on parties,19 the IRI does not use intermediary local 
organisations, because it directly contacts parties and governorates, through which it 
meets participants. With regard to activities before the 2010 elections, the 
organisation held debate sessions ‘where everyone, as in the US and UK, can ask the 
candidate some questions, and debate is open to the public,’ according to the man 
responsible for party projects at the IRI office (Amman, 30 January 2011). The IRI 
supported the creation of women’s committees within the parties, and facilitated 
interaction between women in political parties and local councils. They also organised 
so-called school campaigns, which were mainly skills-based training focusing on the 
media. This programme was aimed at male and female candidates, and eight of the 13 
women who made it into parliament had participated – this was underlined as an 
achievement during the interview. Campaign management was another skill taught 
during the training programmes, and one-on-one consultancy sessions were also 
provided.  
As for the NDI’s understanding of the concept of empowerment, the US resident at 
the IRI stressed the importance of creating a dialogue between the IRI and its 
participants: ‘Empowerment is helping people determine what is important to them. 
You establish what is most important to you, now go and do it. It is not giving people 
money, it is having a dialogue’ (Amman, 30 January 2011). This conceptualisation 
reflects the IRI activities in which they provide one-on-one sessions with candidates. 
However, one Jordanian consultant on gender issues who works for the IRI focused 
not on opportunities for dialogue, but rather on the provision of capacity-building 
skills: ‘Empowerment is raising awareness of capacity-building for men and women 
to be able to reach their goals’ (Salt, 2 March 2011). Attention to life goals is 
highlighted in Eyben and Napian-Moore’s analysis (2009) as another common aspect 
of empowerment, and this was stressed by my last respondent at the IRI, the man in 
charge of programmes related to political parties: ‘Empowerment is to let people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Available at http://www.iri.org/learn-more-about-iri/history [accessed 12 February 2013]. 
18 During the 2010 and 2013 elections the IRI sent an observation delegation to monitor the electoral 
process, (http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-announces-delegation-observe-
jordan%E2%80%99s-parliamentary-elections [accessed 14 February 2013]). 
19 Not all political parties agree to work with the IRI. The most influential parties, such as the Islamic 
Action Front, not only refuse to work with them, but have also attacked the IRI and the political parties 
who do work with them (personal interview with independent activist, Amman, 23 April 2011). 
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know what their role is within society. To let people know that they have a goal, and 
to let them know how to reach it’ (Amman, 30 January 2011). The point of 
commonality between the three interviews lies in the idea that people have a life goal, 
and once they reach it, they feel empowered. In this there seems to be an 
individualistic understanding of life goals and decision-making, rather than of their 
also being a collective effort. 
NDI and IRI activities seem to be limited to the promotion of training in technical 
and leadership skills, with the exception of specific events organised by the NDI and 
local organisations that aimed to explain the election law. Learning skills and tools, 
gaining self-confidence and receiving support are among female candidates’ first 
expectations before they participate in these training programmes. Thus the NDI and 
IRI’s projects apparently reflect the women’s expectations. But to what extent do 
women benefit from these programmes? And is a focus on ‘capacity-building’ enough 
to ‘empower’ women politically? Most importantly, for what reasons are leadership 
training programmes and activities often conducted in isolation from other demands 
for social justice and equality?  
It was not clear to me whether women were considered to be competent but 
socially constrained, or to be ‘passive clients in need of enlightenment’ (Kabeer, 
1994: 234): in either case, women are seen as lacking something. According to 
Longwe (2000), such training programmes implicitly blame women for their lack of 
access to resources, and for their lack of participation because of their supposed lack 
of confidence and leadership skills. Could the exclusive attention to and accent on 
skills and capacity-building just be a way of neutralising a political issue by proposing 
a technocratic response to it? 
 
Beyond training 
 
During my fieldwork, I was extremely pleased to participate in an event organised by 
Vital Voices in February 2011 in Amman, where a number of activists (including 
some men) from different countries in the region, as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen 
and Iraq, had the chance to come together, discuss advocacy campaigns and start their 
own national campaigns with the financial support of the organisation. Vital Voices is 
a US-based non-governmental organisation that supports women leaders and social 
entrepreneurs around the globe. I happened to have learned about the workshop 
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through one of the female candidates I had interviewed. The workshop lasted four 
days, and it was a combination of training in team-building and the use of social 
media, success stories from advocacy campaigns in Morocco and Jordan, and group 
consultations on the new campaigns. I was somewhat sceptical about the exclusively 
technical training – and I was not alone in this. After a training session on the use of 
social media for political activism, which had been extremely detailed on its technical 
and professional aspects, a participant from Yemen complained to me that the seminar 
had not addressed issues such as ‘how to formulate messages considering different 
contexts and audiences’, and she continued: ‘I know how to use Facebook or I can 
learn how to create a blog, but I need to know how I can speak up in an effective way, 
without endangering myself and my family’ (Amman, 21 February 2011). Her 
comment clearly demonstrates that her interest was a strategic one. 
I very much appreciated that the main aim of the workshop was to enable the 
delegations from different countries to understand and choose the topic they 
considered most relevant to the needs of their society so as to start their advocacy 
campaigns. ‘We are not going to be the one who is going to be driving the campaign. 
We can provide the tools, but we can’t establish their goals,’ Christine, the 
programme manager of Vital Voices, told me during an interview after the workshop 
(Amman, 23 February 2011).  
I was included in the Jordanian delegation: seven women from different 
backgrounds, including politics, business, the media and women’s rights activism, 
who were extremely enthusiastic at having this opportunity. Gender justice was their 
main motivation and motto, and challenging inequalities was their goal. It was 
difficult for them to come to a conclusion within such a limited time frame, but what 
made me feel that I was in the right place was that all their ideas started from the 
needs of the women they dealt with on a daily basis. The majority of these women 
were not members of Jordan’s main women’s organisations, but they saw this event 
as an opportunity to challenge gender inequalities and to push the government into 
action. Their dissatisfaction with the role of women in society led them to focus on a 
common aim: although they knew it was going to be a small campaign, in terms of 
both financial support (US$25,000 had been allocated for this campaign) and their 
own time and resources (all of them also had full-time jobs), they knew they could 
promote change. They chose to campaign for a ‘family-friendly’ workplace, planning 
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to contact ministries and local councils in order to push for the establishment of 
nurseries in certain workplaces.20  
I particularly appreciated this workshop: unlike many of the IRI and NDI’s 
activities, it was not a short one-off intervention, and it tried to go beyond mere 
technical skills. Enabling participants themselves to decide where to focus their 
campaign, on the basis of their connection to everyday problems in the specific 
context in which they operate, could be a way to mobilise public action for gender 
equality in a transformative way. In this particular case, all of the women came from 
the middle and upper classes, were educated and were employed in high-level 
positions, and they reflected the interests of their particular life contexts. Going 
beyond technical training might be a means to tackle the political system and unequal 
power relations between men and women. But even if this vision is taken on board by 
organisations such as Vital Voices, this is not the case with the NDI and the IRI. For 
this reason, it is important to understand the real goal behind the NDI and IRI’s 
activities. Is it the organisations’ political agenda? Is it ‘capacity-building’? Or is it 
women’s empowerment? In the cases of the NDI and the IRI, their political agendas 
are a matter of record, as explained above: their close links with the Democratic and 
Republican parties respectively, together with their connections to USAID and the 
NED in terms of funding, cannot be hidden, although during my interviews these 
aspects never came up and the non-partisan nature of the organisations was deeply 
underlined. It is therefore important to understand whether a transformative approach 
is employed in the IRI and NDI’s missions. 
 
Discussing ‘transformation’ 
 
Do the NDI and IRI’s activities imply social change? This was one of the questions I 
was asking myself while listening to my interviewees and participating in certain 
activities.21 In order to understand whether transformation was possible, I investigated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 After the Jordanian delegation launched the project, two members of the group, Randa Naffa and 
Lara Ayoub, registered the campaign, dubbed SADAQA (https://www.facebook.com/sadaqajo 
[accessed 12 March 2013]), as an NGO in order to continue its advocacy work, 
(http://www.vitalvoices.org/blog/2012/08/dispatch-jordan-ground-sadaqa [accessed 12 March 2013]). 
21 I did not have the chance to participate in any of the pre-election activities, but I had the opportunity 
to be involved in a workshop with the NDI with female candidates after the elections, and in a 
workshop with Vital Voices on the participation of women in the 2011 revolutions. Unfortunately, I 
was never allowed to participate in other activities.  
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the aims of such activities, what informed them, and how they were integrated into 
the broader development scene in Jordan.  
During preliminary discussions with interviewees, it became apparent that 
attention was given to participants’ needs and feedback. Indeed, during the first 
interview I conducted at the NDI office, my respondent told me: ‘Before each project 
we do a programme assessment, we meet with activists, with women in the media and 
with women’s organisations, in order to understand their interests’ (Amman, 6 
December 2010). During the interview with the party project officer at the IRI, the 
importance of women’s needs was also outlined: ‘We start from what they [women 
activists] need, from what they demand. They are activists, they are part of their 
communities, they know what they need, and we listen to them’ (Amman, 30 January 
2011).  
However, when I asked why they focus on women, on political participation and 
on these activities, I received completely different answers. For both the NDI and the 
IRI the enhancement and promotion of democracy are their primary goals, ‘through 
the right tools’ and ‘without imposing anything’. Their agendas are clear: support for 
and strengthening of democratic institutions for the NDI, and the advancement of 
freedom and democracy for the IRI. For the NDI, when it comes to women’s projects, 
their activities seek to increase the number of women in decision-making positions, 
because ‘women are half of the population, and women need to have the same 
percentage as men as representatives just because of that’ (Amman, 6 December 
2010). The IRI takes the same approach, underlining the importance of having large 
numbers of women in politics: ‘There is a small number of women in political parties 
and we want to increase that number’ (Amman, 30 January 2011). 
International practices and institutions across the world are demanding higher 
numbers of women in politics, and not just in the Middle East, as the discussion in the 
previous chapter of the introduction of gender quotas also revealed. However, the 
focus on numbers and statistics runs the risk of robbing empowerment of its 
transformative potential.22 Tadros (2010) uses case studies from the MEPI’s work in 
the region and from the women’s movement in Egypt to point out that there is a 
preference to conceptualise and operationalise empowerment as ‘power to’, and to a 
lesser extent as ‘power within’. Thus the ‘lack of support for projects involving a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The different theoretical conceptualisations of empowerment, together with its transformative 
potential, are discussed in the first chapter of the thesis. See also notes 6 and 16 in this chapter. 
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power over dimension or power with is reflective of the general trend toward the de-
politicisation of empowerment’ (Tadros, 2010: 236). This depoliticisation is evident 
in the willingness to train women in campaigning skills but not to address either the 
environment in which they operate, which might undermine any initiative they 
pursue, or their transformative potential. This was highlighted by my respondent at 
the NDI, who said: ‘We are just interested in empowering women’s political skills 
and in increasing their number in parliament’ (Amman, 6 December 2010). The idea 
was mentioned that women might contribute to the enhancement of women’s rights 
and policies once elected, but to try to push candidates in that direction was not part 
of the programmes. The political dimension of the problem seems to get overlooked; 
the interest in increasing women’s access to politics, offering female participants 
more resources and skills, only addresses a superficial aspect of gender inequality. 
Agreeing with Longwe (1998), I argue that these training programmes could enable 
participants to recognise the political and ideological dimensions of gender inequality, 
through what she calls the ‘conscientisation’ process (Longwe, 1998: 21) – becoming 
able to step outside the patriarchal culture and adopt a more feminist consciousness.  
The NDI and the IRI are consistent in their understandings of their goal to 
strengthen democracy, but will this attitude lead to social change? I argue that there 
are two main aspects that may lead empowerment projects to fail, with particular 
reference to the case of political leadership training in Jordan. 
First, as Kabeer argues (2004) and as explained in chapter one, one of the 
requirements for empowerment to be transformative consists in having a long-term 
agenda and plan, avoiding activities that promise quick results. One of the most 
widespread criticisms I heard from women participants concerned the length of the 
training: usually activities are concentrated in a short period of time, and are provided 
only three or four months before election day.  
I discussed this issue with two candidates, Ahlam and Hind, in a café in the south 
of Amman. Sometimes they would talk over each other because of their excitement 
during the discussion. It was challenging to try to get them to speak in turn: they 
would interrupt to support each other, or even to answer back. Referring to the NDI’s 
activities in particular, they agreed that such trainings could be organised in advance, 
as Ahlam told me: ‘I think they [the NDI] need to start to do these trainings and 
workshops at least four years before the elections’ (Amman, 1 February 2011). 
Furthermore, more than one woman revealed to me that often several organisations 
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would offer activities and training during only the last few months before the 
elections, when candidates are extremely busy and do not always have the time to 
dedicate to the training. This was the case with Dr Sabah, the candidate from Karak. 
Dr Sabah found it very difficult to manage her work schedule, her campaign and her 
participation in such activities: ‘They [the NDI] offered the training in the last two 
months before the elections… A candidate has not a lot of free time before the 
elections. The trainings should last at least six months or one year. Two months are 
not enough’ (Amman, 18 January 2011). On the one hand, female participants 
complain that a longer project is necessary, especially because of the lack of time 
during the last few months of a campaign. On the other hand, I would suggest that 
such activities could be made part of a broader project, particularly in order to raise 
political awareness among women and men. As Sekhon (2006) demonstrates in her 
study of women’s political participation in India, a long-term and structured project 
will help to challenge ‘entrenched traditional power structures and renegotiate power 
at institutional, collective, interpersonal, and personal levels’ (120). Short bursts of 
intervention cannot affect the strategic interests of women who want to bring about 
social change. The lack of a long-term programme, and the consequent organisation 
of activities right before election day, was also pointed out by some of the 
practitioners I met. Randa, a freelance gender consultant, revealed to me at her office 
at the UNDP: 
 
Trainings are very short, and the problem is that they are not part of 
a longer and comprehensive programme/strategy: they are not part 
of a well-defined thought programme. There are no two-year 
programmes. The organisations just do workshops to feed into the 
trainings. And this is often a matter of a lack of proper and enough 
funding (Amman, 8 March 2011). 
 
It was there that I also met two women working at the gender unit of the UNDP, 
and I managed to conduct a short interview with them as well. The executive manager 
of the UNDP’s gender unit supported Randa’s statement, referring to the activities 
they had organised in collaboration with the parliament: ‘In terms of the orientation 
and education of MPs, it is impossible to educate them only through one training; 
there is a need for a long-term programme’ (Amman, 8 March 2011). The realisation 
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that there is a need for long-term projects is there; however, this lack of any long-term 
plan is usually justified in terms of the difficulties of getting sufficient funding. Long-
term strategies would help to break down the social structures of inequalities between, 
yet not exclusively, genders, classes and ethnicities. 
Second, there is a risk that such organisations will impose certain ‘democratic 
values’ that are connected not to Jordan’s specific social context, but rather to the 
broader political agenda behind the organisation themselves. Ala, the passionate 
young woman activist and volunteer for local organisations, told me about a training 
session she had participated in with the NDI before the elections: ‘They [the NDI] are 
not selling us democracy; they are selling us their democracy. But I don’t want their 
democracy. What might work with you, does not work necessarily with me’ (Amman, 
4 April 2011). Other female candidates I interviewed who had participated in these 
‘capacity-building’ programmes stressed the same point. Dr Sabah was clear about 
the risk of the imposition of certain ‘democratic values’, when she emotionally told 
me:  
 
They [the NDI] trained us, but the trainings they gave us are not 
suitable for our community. They considered us as if we were 
Americans, but we are not citizens of the United States. They did 
not know anything about our traditions, our circumstances. I told 
them that it would have been better to have some persons from 
Jordan who had lived the experience of the elections and train other 
people who want to run for office. For instance, they taught us how 
to fundraise: they told us that you can ask for money from people 
close to your family for the campaign; […] but it is a source of 
shame for us in Jordan to take money from people living in my 
community (Amman, 18 January 2011). 
 
Dr Sabah’s comments and frustrations resonate with El-Kassem’s (2008) critique 
of the ‘democracy training’ offered to women’s NGOs in Iraq. El-Kassem (2008: 130) 
notes that the curriculum of these training courses is strikingly similar to those being 
employed in other parts of the world; this could be perceived as the IOs’ 
‘transnational strategy’ for promoting democracy. Women are the instruments 
through which ‘their democracy’ can be exported. El-Kassem’s critique was 
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confirmed by my respondent at the NDI, who pointed out during my first interview 
with her that they use the same schemes and techniques for workshops in different 
countries: ‘We did a campaign simulation with women from Bahrain: we usually use 
the same techniques in different countries – we study the training skills for an 
imaginary country, and then we apply it to each country’ (Amman, 6 December 
2011). The idea of strategising for an imaginary country certainly does not take into 
consideration the specificities of particular national contexts. The differences between 
types of governments or regimes, the structures of society and the perceptions of 
women’s role within it, are not taken into account. Failing to put planning in its 
historical context, separating the content from the context, leads to the depoliticisation 
of planning, resulting in what has been defined as the ‘applied’ methodology23 in 
development planning traditions (Moser, 1993: 85), which emerged in the 1950s and 
1960s and is still widely adopted by donor agencies. This practice has been widely 
criticised, because it focuses more on the means of planning rather than on the end 
product, assuming that a distinctive type of planning thought and action can exist 
without reference to any particular object. Thus its adoption within any social context 
is both ‘contextless’ and ‘contentless’ (Thomas, 1979 in Moser, 1993: 86).  
Although knowledge of Jordan’s socio-political and economic context is necessary 
in order to understand the implications of ‘promoting democracy’ in the country, I do 
not think that that is enough. In the context of women’s political participation, female 
candidates are not only ‘women’ or ‘candidates’, but they also come from different 
social classes, have diverse ethnic origins, adhere to different religions, and have 
various relationships with their families or tribes. Usually women as a ‘whole group’ 
are assumed to be the main recipients of empowerment programmes. However, 
women do not constitute a homogeneous category. In particular, women in Jordan 
differ in more ways than between being a ‘full’ Jordanian, of Palestinian or Iraqi 
origin, or Muslim or Christian, as outlined in the thesis introduction. International 
development institutions, as well as some local organisations, often seem to assume 
that women are a coherent group or category. The assumption that all women 
somehow constitute a homogeneous group binds women together into the 
‘sociological notion of the sameness of their oppression’ (Mohanty, 1988: 65).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The ‘applied’ tradition characterises planning as a set of rational procedures and methods for 
decision-making, consisting of several logical stages: problem definition, data collection, formulation 
of goals and objectives, and the design of alternative plans (Moser, 1993: 85).  
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If female candidates are considered a homogeneous category, with no recognition 
of their different problems, needs and interests, the transformative potential of 
empowerment is neglected and empowerment depoliticised. This depoliticisation is 
evident in the disconnection between what the IRI and the NDI teach and promote as 
‘democracy’ and what women can actually use. This lack of understanding of 
different ‘cultures’ and priorities within Jordanian society seemed to be perceived by 
my interviewees in a similar way – exemplified in Dr Sabah’s comments on 
fundraising – and reflected their difficulties in using what they had learned during the 
training sessions. This is particularly the case for women living outside Amman, 
where tribal and family pressures are much stronger and more socially entrenched, as 
in the case of Zachieh, a candidate from Madaba: 
 
One thing I found difficult was how to implement the theoretical 
information that we were learning. The educational/knowledge level 
was good, but using it, that was hard. For example, the slogans and 
media statements they taught us are not suited for our society, 
especially outside Amman; you need to go to a different level when 
talking to the tribe. Slogans and media statements have no worth in 
our society. If a tribe wants to support someone, the people will 
vote for them, independently of what they believe in and say. All 
the people who won were selected by their own tribe, not because 
of their statements. (Madaba, 4 February 2011). 
 
Zachieh is raising a valid point, one that is also discussed in the previous chapter. 
In a context where tribal support is strong, and is still a basic necessity if one wishes 
to attain a position of power, the role that women might play in the political arena is 
often overlooked or neglected. Teaching her how to formulate an effective statement 
might be useful for improving a woman’s ability to communicate her message; but 
finding the proper ways to communicate with the tribe or community would elevate 
the training to the level of challenging the patriarchal order and gender hierarchies 
within the political system. International organisations as the NDI and IRI state that 
they promote ‘democracy’, but their attention to the dynamics and the reasons why 
women are not elected could be taken further. Why do they not think of strategies for 
challenging the preconceived idea that politics is a male arena? Why do they not 
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focus on empowerment as a process of self-development and the ‘conscientisation’ of 
a woman’s own capacities?  
The failure to employ a deeper analysis of the multiple difficulties and 
multifaceted obstacles that a woman who wants to run for parliament may face, or to 
understand the roots of these difficulties – i.e. the unequal power relations within 
society – derives, I think, from the IOs’ exclusive attention to practical needs related 
to skills and techniques, without properly recognising women’s wider social role. A 
study conducted in Nigeria by Erinle (1986) found that one training programme on 
basic health and nutrition only recognised the reproductive role of women, forgetting 
about their productive role and their need to earn an income. That training included 
the teaching of new recipes to be cooked in Western-style ovens. The majority of low-
income women dropped out of the programme, preferring to cook their traditional 
food for sale. The training recognised women’s reproductive role and might well have 
met nutritional needs, assuming that the new recipes had a greater nutritional value 
than traditional food, but it failed to recognise women’s productive role and the 
applicability of what they had learned, which was the priority for the women 
themselves (Erinle, 1986 in Moser, 1993). In the case of leadership training, such 
organisations recognise the role of women as potential candidates, but forget (or 
choose to ignore) to challenge the wider context in which women live and the 
different roles that they play in society, failing to provide women with useful tools 
and strategies that they could use in their campaigns. Why is the focus on women’s 
skills so compelling? Why is there no interest in addressing the psychological and 
personal empowerment of women, rather than merely technical and practical skills? 
And why is there no focus on their male counterparts?  
The neoliberal agenda informing democratisation processes is evident in the cases 
of the IRI and NDI. In light of their underemphasis on empowerment, I would argue 
that women’s needs are not their priority, and that the transformative potential of such 
projects is not taken into consideration. Referring to the impact of neoliberal agendas 
on Kurdish women’s organisations, Mojab (2007) shows that Kurdish women’s needs 
and an in-depth knowledge of Kurdish women have been overtaken by 
bureaucratisation, lack of transparency and lack of autonomy in the work of those 
organisations. Moreover, Al-Ali and Pratt (2009b: 84) have demonstrated that in Iraq, 
women’s empowerment has been instrumentalised by the US administration for its 
own foreign policy ends. Women’s needs were not the priority: even though large 
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amounts of money were poured in to fund ‘democracy training programmes’ and 
facilitate women’s political participation, basic needs such as the reconstruction of 
education, healthcare, water and electricity, and the maintenance of law and order 
were not on the agenda. Several women interviewed by Al-Ali and Pratt (2009b) 
stressed that these international development programmes should have been 
constructed through better engagement with Iraqi women activists in order to 
understand their needs first, and should not have started from ‘generic prescriptions of 
how to build civil societies’ (148).  
Empowerment projects in the Middle East, and NDI and IRI activities in Jordan in 
particular, are shaped mostly by larger political and economic policy concerns, which 
follow the neoliberal agendas and global gender regimes of international bodies. As 
such their activities remain at the superficial level of increasing the numbers of 
women and filling out development reports, and do not properly take into 
consideration the transformative aim of empowerment itself. I am not asking for the 
IRI and the NDI to become ‘feminist’, but I argue that a perception of women that 
does not see them as ‘lacking something’, and a taking into consideration of gender 
interests, could be a starting point for transformative women’s empowerment. Having 
discussed international organisations’ approach to empowerment, I will now turn my 
attention to the question of how the concept is understood and operationalised at the 
local level. 
 
Social change as understood by local organisations  
 
In contrast to IOs, local organisations’ understanding of empowerment is more related 
to the idea of producing change, with an accent on outcomes rather than on the 
instruments and tools needed to attain one’s ‘life goal’. According to Eyben and 
Napian-Moore (2009), ‘empowerment is increasingly imbued with a theory of 
change’ (297), and in line with Kabeer (2005: 14) I consider empowerment as 
entailing social transformation. This conceptualisation of empowerment reflects the 
diverse activities that local organisations promoted for the 2010 elections. 
The significant international focus on political empowerment in terms of funding is 
closely linked to the importance given to it by local organisations. Both because it 
attracts relatively ‘easy’ funding and for the purposes of the interests behind these 
projects, several local organisations planned activities for the 2010 parliamentary 
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elections. Resources and activities were not organised under any comprehensive or 
broader structured project, such as the ‘women’s movement.’24 Each organisation had 
its own plan concerning the elections.  
Even the JNCW, a semi-governmental organisation that supposedly serves as an 
umbrella body, worked independently of other organisations. The JNCW started a 
training programme for female candidates in June 2010. The activities focused mainly 
on media and strategy training: they organised around 20 sessions on how to deal with 
the media, how to present ideas in public, how to behave in front of the camera, how 
to write an agenda and how to deal with voters. ‘The need for this training came up 
from the previous trainings we had and what female participants asked us to work on,’ 
the project director at the JNCW told me (Amman, 21 November 2010). These 
training sessions were offered right across 12 governorates, in partnership with local 
organisations, which had responsibility for appointing the trainers. Through 
newspaper advertisements they were able to get 150 participants. Along with that 
activity, they also focused on political awareness among youth and people in general, 
addressing two distinct aspects. On the one hand, they wanted to highlight the 
importance of women’s votes and women’s contribution to political life as equal to 
that of men; on the other hand, they wanted to clarify the procedures set out by the 
temporary law regulating the elections. For these purposes, three events were 
organised in the north, west and south of the country to which everyone was 
welcome, with the aim of raising awareness among women voters, talking to them 
through a ‘common language’, and presenting success stories such as that of Toujan 
Faisal.25 Their political awareness campaign was pursued through advertisements in 
posters and on the TV and radio in order to encourage women to vote, and this 
reflected the JNCW’s vision of empowerment, as the secretary general, Asma Khader, 
revealed to me during an interview at her office in Amman: ‘When our organisation 
advocates for women’s empowerment, it means that we aim at building self-
confidence for women and awareness of women’s rights in society’ (Amman, 28 
November 2010). In order to address not only women, but also society more broadly, 
the JNCW established an ‘emergency room’ consisting of an open phone line to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For a discussion of the problematic subsumption of women’s organisations under the notion of a 
movement, refer to chapters two and five. 
25 Toujan Faisal was the first woman member of parliament, elected in 1993, and her story is often 
taken as example to encourage more women to participate in politics, especially within women’s 
organisations.  
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answer questions about the elections and the candidates’ profiles. The JNCW also 
organised the Youth Tech Festival, which brought together around 150 young people 
to discuss their participation in the election process and how technology could be used 
to run a campaign. Unlike the NDI’s and IRI’s approaches, the JNCW combines 
technical skills training and events with projects to promote the importance of 
women’s role in political life. 
All of the main organisations that work on political empowerment and have 
national scope in terms of their participants and activities are ‘royal’ organisations, 
even if they define themselves as non-governmental ones. There were other two 
organisations of this kind that I wanted to contact: the GFJW and the JNFW. The 
GFJW serves as an umbrella organisation, with a network of 145 local organisations 
spread all over the country and an office in each governorate. Although I did not have 
the opportunity to collect very much material about this organisation, they have 
organised trainings sessions on capacity-building and leadership skills; however, they 
have done little work on awareness and advocacy campaigns, let alone encouraging 
open debate.  
The JNFW is royal-sponsored organisation as well. When I went to the JNFW 
office in Amman, I detected a less informal atmosphere compared to the organisations 
I had visited previously, as described in chapter two. Samar, the project director at the 
JNFW, is a young woman activist and very passionate about her job; she was curious 
about my research and wanted to support me. I was pleased to hear from Samar that 
the JNFW had tried to concentrate on both voters and candidates with regard to their 
activities for the 2010 parliamentary election. Not only had they organised a variety 
of activities, but they had also tried to address different audiences. First they planned 
public meetings between voters and candidates in order to give an opportunity for 
open debate and discussion, as well as meetings for voters only in order to stress the 
importance of voting at such a crucial historical moment. ‘Some people are not 
enthusiastic about participating in the elections. It is a citizen’s right to vote and we 
wanted to motivate them,’ Samar told me during our meeting at her office in Amman 
(13 January 2011). They organised workshops especially for female candidates that 
focused on practical tools such as communication and organisational skills. During 
the interview she stressed the ‘uniqueness of our workshop’, because, according to 
her, ‘it was extremely needs-related.’ She thought that the JNFW’s approach was 
different compared to that of other local and international organisations. They aimed 
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to teach tools that women could use practically in their campaigns. She complained 
that there was a risk that the utility of such training would remain restricted to the 
theoretical level, without reaching the practical level – a criticism that female 
candidates often make in relation to the NDI and IRI’s activities, as previously 
discussed. Samar gave an example of how such activities can be implemented by 
female candidates, and how they can be useful in practice: 
 
We helped candidates to do a quick revision of their election 
campaign; we helped them to think or rethink what they had 
achieved until that moment – we did it in October and at the 
beginning of November. For instance, we discussed ways and 
possibilities of expanding and increasing volunteers’ opportunities 
in their campaign, in order to overcome financial issues; and we 
helped participants to prepare a plan for election day (Amman, 13 
January 2011). 
 
Samar was extremely passionate about the activities she organised, and I could see 
this in her eyes and her smile when she told me about something that had happened to 
her in Karak: 
 
During a workshop in Karak, a man was trying to manage the 
campaign of one of his sisters, and during a break he came to me 
and said: ‘Please, please, stop the training, you are destroying us 
[men]. Through these trainings you are opening their [his sisters’] 
eyes; they are learning and they will learn how to organise their 
campaign. They won’t need our help any more.’ I was satisfied! 
(Amman, 13 January 2011). 
 
This is how Samar considered that the training went beyond the merely theoretical 
level, addressing not only women participants, but also the people around them. That 
was her goal, and the anecdote above neatly summarised her idea of empowerment as 
a structured concept, as she stressed: ‘Firstly, women need to know about their rights, 
how to access to their rights and to benefit from their rights’ (Amman, 13 January 
2011). The second step consists in knowing how to use the information one has 
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obtained: ‘It is not enough to know your rights, but it is important to know how to use 
them’ – evidently, the women in the workshop were benefiting from this. The third 
and final step towards empowerment, according to Samar, coincides with an ability to 
produce change, both in one’s own life and in society. Samar’s conceptualisation is a 
combination of ‘power over’ and ‘power with’: the first involves a direct and open 
contestation of the status quo after learning how to use one’s personal rights; the 
second, focusing on collective and individual mobilisation with the purpose of 
inducing change, also involves a ‘direct challenge to the existing hierarchies of 
power’ (Tadros, 2010: 227). Samar’s conceptualisation recalls Dr Sabah’s 
expectations of participation in leadership training, since she wanted to find strategies 
to challenge the hierarchies of power within her tribe and community. This 
organisation appeared to be extremely connected to women on the ground: women’s 
needs and requests came first, and this was happening thanks to their presence all over 
Jordan, especially in remote areas. 
During interviews at the JNCW and the JNFW I finally began to hear phrases such 
as ‘political awareness’, ‘the needs of the voters’ and ‘the needs of participants’. I 
heard similar words when I went to the JWU. Together with the AWO, the JWU did a 
great deal of work on advocacy and awareness campaigns. The first time I went there, 
I was welcomed as ‘one of them’. The JWU has a completely different approach 
compared to the other major organisations in the country. As described in chapter 
two, it is an independent organisation, which developed out of a leftist political 
project. I went to the JWU more than once, and each time I spent long hours talking to 
the director, Nadia Shamrouk, a bold and passionate woman. Similarly to the JNFW, 
during the 2010 elections the JWU had preferred to focus on voters rather than 
candidates. ‘There are a lot of other organisations that concentrate on candidates and 
no one on voters… We want to fill the gap,’ Nadia told me during our first meeting 
(17 January 2011). She went on to explain other activities, which revealed that the 
JWU works with women as both voters and candidates on a continuous basis, rather 
than just at election time: 
 
Our project for the elections lasted nine months, and it was divided 
into two parts. First we organised courses, with 15 women in each 
one, discussing what is the parliament? What are the role and 
function of parliamentarians? Do we have a ‘real’ parliament? 
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When we say that the parliament is weak, whom should we elect? 
Second, we concentrated in the reform of the election law: we 
created a five-person committee, and we are going to propose a new 
election law, after consultations with other organisations and 
experts in the field (Amman, 17 January 2011).26 
 
The interest in political awareness at the level of society in general is central to the 
JWU, particularly in relation to women, and the reason for this emerged very clearly 
when Nadia Shamrouk told me: ‘We would like to build a good atmosphere and 
context. We want to liberate women and society, and in order to do so we have to 
liberate both’ (emphasis added, Amman, 17 January 2011). The JWU not only 
addresses voters and candidates, but also organises training and seminars for its own 
staff on themes such as democracy, the occupation of Palestine, and civil society. 
Although the objective of this programme, as was explained to me while I was there, 
is to enable the staff to understand the politics and vision behind the JWU itself, this 
initiative also serves to educate the staff on topics that are extremely relevant to the 
organisation’s activities. The political background of the JWU gives it the chance to 
address issues that other local organisations do not.  
This focus on social change was very clear when Nadia Shamrouk explained to me 
the JWU’s main vision: ‘We want to give women the chance to be able to make their 
own decisions, independently; women should be able to raise and gain their voice’ 
(Amman, 17 January 2011). In the same spirit, Leila Hamarneh, the project director at 
the AWO, who has been an activist for women’s rights for several years, told me: 
‘Empowerment is raising awareness; it is creation of values; it involves teaching the 
sense of justice. We empower in order to mobilise’ (Amman, 11 January 2011). The 
understanding of the concept as a collective form of mobilisation is clear in Leila’s 
words. The transformative aspect of empowerment also came up during the interview 
with the young activist Ala, who underlined women’s opportunity to speak up on 
behalf of other women as a path for change when she enthusiastically told me: 
‘Empowering women is to let them realise that they don’t have to follow, but they can 
lead. Giving them the space to do that. Opening a door to let them go through and 
allow them to speak up for other women’ (Amman, 7 April, 2011).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In chapter three I address the role of the JWU in campaigning for a modification of the temporary 
election law. 
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In IOs’ understanding of the concept, tools and skills seem to represent the final 
aim of their activities, alongside their own political agenda. However, local 
organisations consider skills and tools to be an instrument that must be brought 
together with knowledge, self-reliance and action; empowerment entails as an 
ultimate goal ‘the ability of the disempowered to act collectively in their own 
practical and strategic interests’ (Kabeer, 1994: 256).  
 
Numbers, awareness and funding at the local level  
 
The interest in increasing the number of women in political office is also shared by 
local organisations, and by most of the female candidates I interviewed; the argument 
that ‘since women are half of the population they should be equally represented’ is the 
most common rationale. However, the differences between IOs’ and local 
organisations’ approaches emerge when one asks how women’s numbers might be 
increased in the political arena.  
Most of the local organisations placed an emphasis on the quality of the 
candidates, and on the capability of women MPs to address and support women’s 
rights once they had got into politics – something that never came up during my 
interviews with IOs. Moreover, the aims of local organisations, which revolved 
mostly around women’s projects, were more related to women’s ability to become an 
active part of their society, rather than to building a ‘democratic’ country. This is 
especially true of those organisations that considered empowerment as effective for 
change and mobilisation, such as Samar at the JNFW: 
 
We aim to enable women to be aware of their rights, and to take a 
leading role in decision-making positions. We believe in a woman 
who can effectively contribute to sustainable development and in 
the realisation of a Jordanian society built on the principles of 
equality, justice and efficiency (Amman, 13 January 2011). 
 
Nadia Shamrouk at the JWU also pointed out issues of equality, justice and 
respect, with a strong accent on the goal of mobilisation, and this was in line with the 
JWU’s political agenda: 
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We aim to organise and unify women’s efforts to protect their rights 
and achievements. We emphasise the role of women in society so 
that they will be able to practise their rights as citizens on the basis 
of equality, justice, equal opportunities and respect (Amman, 11 
April 2011). 
 
The connection to society is much more evident in local organisations. Although 
there are many criticisms and problems in the relationships between female 
candidates and some local organisations, which I will discuss in the final chapter of 
the thesis, some of the women I interviewed were very grateful for the activities 
organised by local organisations. As a form of appreciation of the work of local 
organisations, compared with the different approach employed by the NDI and IRI, 
Khawla, a candidate from Jerash and a very outspoken lawyer told me: 
 
There have been some differences between the activities of IOs and 
local organisations. They have different aims and approaches. The 
activities of IOs are more generic, more focused on general skills. 
The activities of local organisations are more detailed. I learned 
how to deal with and talk to the community. These [local 
organisations’] activities were more connected with our society. 
They taught us how to enter families, how to reach communities, 
how to talk to people, especially if you live outside Amman (Jerash, 
5 February 2011). 
 
In Khawla’s words and in the previous comments of women’s rights activists, the 
transformative politics of local organisations and their desire to produce change 
through their participants are evident. Certainly, among women who are not interested 
in inducing change or challenging the status quo, learning skills and tools, gaining 
self-confidence, and receiving psychological and even financial support are their 
major expectations of the training provided by local and international organisations. 
However, among those women who consider these training programmes an 
opportunity to learn how to bring about change in their lives and within their 
communities, Jaleela, who lives in Jerash and was the first woman I interviewed, told 
	   175 
my translator and me that such activities are important, but there is still a need to dig 
deeper within the community and to promote political awareness programmes: 
 
Women’s organisations need to focus more on building capacity for 
women, as political and social workers. Women need to be more 
active in their society and community. If the organisations give 
them the strength and awareness of being good and believed 
activists in their communities, women will be trusted. The problem 
is that there is not enough attention to empowerment at the 
community level. The community, after seeing that a woman is 
empowered herself, would trust her and would vote for her. There is 
a need to be recognised in the community before gaining political 
support (Jerash, 16 December 2010). 
 
 Jaleela is raising a valid point that is also noted by Mohanty (1999) in the context 
of local government in India: ‘once women become aware of the issues they try to 
execute programmes successfully and in the process their self-perceptions undergo 
change. This has a multiplier impact on the children, the family, the neighbourhood 
and the village’ (31). We might learn from a successful experience in the field of 
women’s political participation from India (Sekhon, 2006): employing a feminist 
approach, a local organisation called Aalochana enabled its members to engage in 
participatory research using dialogue and conversation, to develop a training 
programme that questioned the role of women within their community, and to create a 
network to ‘sustain and promote progressive analysis and alternative political 
strategies’ (Naples, 1998: 18, cited in Sekhon, 2006: 104). Sekhon’s research findings 
have motivated several women’s and other non-governmental organisations to work 
‘as catalysts for enabling participatory politics at the local level’ (2006: 108) and to 
consider women the enriching half of society. In line with Sekhon’s findings, 
Kawthar, the candidate from Zarqa, was very clear about the potential of these 
empowerment programmes: ‘They [NGOs] were helping us not financially, but 
through raising our awareness of what we could do as women. In this sense these 
activities have been very useful’ (Zarqa, 2 February, 2011). That was the first and 
only time a woman gave this as the reason for her satisfaction. Kawthar referred to the 
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activities of the JNFW and the JWU, which addressed political awareness in their 
programmes.  
Although the GNFW is an exception, the other three major local organisations 
described do not focus only on training and capacity-building skills. Although their 
approaches differ from the activities of international organisations (as I will further 
discuss in the final chapter of the thesis), local women’s organisations are more 
interested in addressing the awareness aspect of political empowerment, trying to 
move beyond technical skills. They therefore focus on strategic gender interests and 
the recognition of women’s role in the political sphere. Although female candidates 
face many hurdles during their campaigns that no organisation can solve, I think that, 
in order to include women in the political arena in a more comprehensive and 
transformative way, it is necessary to address the surrounding context in which 
women operate, such as the voters and the community – which is what the three local 
organisations described are doing. But it is also apparent that a stronger collaboration 
between different organisations is necessary in order to use resources efficiently and 
to address participants more comprehensively. There is certainly a risk that 
organisations’ internal agendas will prevail over women’s interests and needs; this is 
the challenge that organisations face, especially when proper coordination between 
them is lacking, financial support is low and the state’s co-optation is increasing (as I 
have described in chapter two and will further discuss in the fifth chapter). Indeed, the 
necessity of funding, coupled with a lack of structured long-term plans and 
programmes, has made some organisations lose sight of the transformative potential 
of their activities, as Jad (2004) has described with reference to the NGO-isation of 
women’s organisations in Palestine. However, I argue that through the involvement of 
the entire community, including men and young people and not exclusively women, 
women’s concerns and gender interests could become part of wider social debates: it 
is only through the spreading of gender-sensitive activities that look at gender needs 
and society in general that women will be listened to and supported.  
 
From empowerment to gender equality  
 
The integration of gender issues into both international and national institutions is a 
step towards the promotion and advancement of gender equality, at least in theory, as 
is outlined in chapter one in greater detail. Although gender mainstreaming and 
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women’s empowerment are complementary strategies for achieving gender equality, 
during my interviews with practitioners in the field, empowerment was the most 
frequently mentioned word, coupled with gender equality as its complement. This 
shows that among international development practitioners there is a preference for 
using the word ‘empowerment’ rather than ‘gender equality’. 
During an interview with Randa, the independent gender consultant who works for 
UN bodies in Jordan, I heard the connection between gender and empowerment for 
the first and only time: ‘Empowerment is the foundation, the essence of gender. 
Gender is the combination of the social, economical and psychological empowerment 
through which you can achieve equality’ (Amman, 8 March 2011). Randa stressed 
that there is a need to focus on psychological empowerment, because women need to 
believe in themselves, and she gave an example: 
 
I was in Wadi Araba for a workshop with a local organisation, in 
the south of Jordan. We expected to have middle-aged women 
participants but they ended up being in their 20s. Our workshop was 
designed for older women and we decided to change it. We started 
asking questions such as, ‘who would you like to be?’, ‘what are 
your aspirations in life?’. Some of them started crying and I was 
shocked. Until that moment they had thought of themselves as an 
extension of their family, not as individuals, and those questions 
made them think differently. With those simple questions they 
realised that they were individuals and they could have their own 
lives. We also did the same with older women and the reaction was 
similar. This is to say that there are no organisations that address 
this type of psychological empowerment. Psychological support 
does not need to be a separate programme, but it should be 
mainstreamed into the main programme. Often psychological 
support came up only in relation to projects against violence or for 
rehabilitation, but we need self-awareness campaigns in other 
sectors of life also (Amman, 8 March 2011). 
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In line with Randa’s statement, empowerment understood as ‘power within’, which 
refers to changes in confidence and consciousness, could go together with a different 
conception of women’s role in society, as she continued: 
 
Women are considered to be second-class citizens in our patriarchal 
society. There should be more awareness campaigns: how to speak 
out and how to respect themselves. We need to drastically change 
how we look at women’s issues: it is no longer a women’s issue, it 
is a society issue, a gender issue (Amman, 8 March 2011). 
 
In relation to Randa’s last point, having a clear idea of what equal opportunities 
imply leads to a conceptualisation of gender according to the organisations’ agendas. 
Randa and I spoke a similar language in terms of academic concepts. However, this 
was not the case with other interviewees. When talking to practitioners I would ask 
for a definition of gender, and I would usually receive answers that did not reflect a 
proper understanding of the term; instead they related to the influence that gender 
might have on their projects. This might have been because of the difficulties of 
translating the concept from English into Arabic, as Shirin, the director of UN–
WOMEN, pointed out:  
 
When the word ‘gender’ appeared in the 1995 Beijing Platform for 
Action for the first time, no one knew how to properly translate it 
into Arabic. We have preferred to use words such as ‘equal 
opportunity’ and ‘equity’ when talking to participants in our 
workshops, so that they can better understand what we are working 
on (Amman, 16 January 2011). 
 
The implications of the translation of the term have been a challenge not only for 
organisations, but also for the Women’s Studies Centre at the University of Jordan, 
which considered changing its name to the Gender Studies Centre, but postponed the 
decision because of possible misunderstandings of the term.27 They did not want to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 It is not part of this research to engage in debates around the translation of the word ‘gender’ into 
Arabic. However, misinterpretation might result from an understanding of the word as jins (sex) rather 
than al-naw’ al-ijtima‘i (social species/kind). 
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categorised as a centre that focuses its activities on sex and homosexuality. According 
to them, because of the translation issue, the term might be misinterpreted not only by 
men, but also by women. 
In relation to practitioners’ understandings of gender, sometimes I did not receive 
any definition at all, such as in the case of the NDI, where my interviewee argued that 
since they were an organisation that worked on women, gender was not taken into 
account: ‘I can’t give you an answer on this [the definition of gender] because we are 
not involved in gender issues, but we work on women’s activities’ (Amman, 12 April 
2011). When I was able to get an answer, most of the time it was related to women’s 
and men’s roles in society with the final aim of achieving equality, as the Jordanian 
woman at the IRI told me: ‘Gender refers to the role of men and women in society: it 
is our culture that put us [women] back. We need time in order to achieve equality’ 
(Salt, 2 March 2011). 
Many of the people in these organisations see gender as the biological quality of 
being male and female. But gender also refers to the social and cultural construction 
of masculinity and femininity. It can be seen in how we understand men’s and 
women’s different social roles, in the relationship between men and women, and in 
relationships among women and among men. My interviewees did not stress these 
relationships openly, and our discussions never reached an in-depth analysis of 
existing power relations, gender norms or social hierarchies. However, I did detect a 
desire to integrate men and young people into projects that have primarily focused on 
women, such as during the interview at the IRI, when I was told: ‘We concentrate 
both on men and women. We have programmes specifically for women, but most of 
the time we have men and women participants in the same workshop’ (Amman, 30 
January 2011). This inclusiveness has led to the generation of discussion of the role of 
women and men in the political arena, in order to address the broader environment in 
which the organisation operates. Samar at the JNFW was clear on this when she said: 
‘In some trainings we had male and female participants, in order to encourage the 
discussion between them and in order to let women and men benefit from each other’s 
experiences. From my point of view it is important to do trainings not only for 
women, but to include men as well’ (Amman, 13 January 2011). Local organisations 
especially highlighted attention to the prevailing atmosphere and environment, and 	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this was in line with their conceptualisation of empowerment and social change, as 
Samar continued:  
 
We want to raise awareness across the entire community about their 
[women’s] rights. We want to reach men, women and young 
people; especially when we work towards women’s empowerment 
we focus also on men and young people, so they can support 
women in their activities (Amman, 13 January 2011). 
 
There is a need to understand that women’s rights involve the entire community, as 
the president of the GFJW told me: ‘We do not focus our activities only on women, 
we also train men, because it is important to enable men to be aware of women’s 
issues as well. Women’s rights are not only about women, but they concern the entire 
society, including men’ (Amman, 14 November 2010). According to these 
explanations, gender issues seem to be related to women’s issues, in the sense that it 
is from activities that address women that issues of gender may arise, as Hala at the 
GSF complained: 
 
In Jordan, gender experts and women advocates think that gender 
mainstreaming is women’s mainstreaming; it is not addressing 
gender issues at the core. This is one of the main reasons why 
gender mainstreaming has not been so successful. We as the GSF 
are engaging in research in order to look at gender issues from the 
perspective of men. We conducted a study to try to understand the 
main gender challenges within the private sector, and we found out 
that the private sector is unfriendly to gender issues. Some policies 
of some companies appear to be gender sensitive, but, in reality 
they are gender blind. We had a call for proposals for projects that 
focused on men’s and boys’ empowerment, but no one applied. 
Gender issues are not men’s issues in our society. This is having an 
impact on the gender mainstreaming approach we are experiencing. 
It has always been an approach from the women’s side. Women are 
disadvantaged, of course, but the issue is not just about women; it 
should be also about men (Amman, 20 December 2010).  
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The failure of gender mainstreaming policies is related not only to the difficulty of 
understanding the term ‘gender’, but also to the absence of any focus on policies that 
are targeted towards both men and women; the focus seems to be on women’s 
mainstreaming rather than gender mainstreaming. Although there have been some 
improvements, as demonstrated by the interviews, in the sense that more men are 
getting involved in activities concerning women’s rights, human rights and 
development issues, the trend appears to be to support disadvantaged women, and the 
concept of gender is still not well understood at its core. International and local 
institutions have an important role in terms of women’s empowerment. In order to 
‘gender’ their policies, such organisations could create the conditions and provide the 
necessary instruments and access to resources so that women can exercise their 
autonomy and self-empowerment as a process.  
 
Emerging yet controversial recommendations  
 
One of the main challenges for us as feminist researchers is to find ways to translate 
empowerment and gender mainstreaming processes not into technocratic logics, but 
into potentially transformative language. In order to get beyond the validation or 
criticism of such activities, both as a researcher and as an activist, I tried during my 
interviews to look for recommendations on the basis of female candidates’ 
experiences. Ahlam was the first who gave me concrete ideas on this issue. She has 
been a trainer for several years in the field of business. We were discussing the topic 
in her cosy apartment in Amman, where I used to go often, since she lived by herself 
and invited me every other day. She introduced me to the idea of listening to more 
success stories from women who had made it into the political arena, as well as using 
more trainers from the country or the region: 
 
Organisations could bring women who have previous experience in 
their local community and who have already been through the 
election campaign process and won. We want to know their 
experiences. How did they run? Why did they win? There is a need 
to provide experiences from the grassroots. Also, most 
organisations bring trainers from Canada or the US, but not trainers 
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from Jordan. This is not fruitful. I am from Jordan, I know how the 
governmental budget works; I know how donors such USAID work 
in Jordan because I have previous experience in the field. I can give 
my experience on this (Amman, 4 March 2011). 
 
Ahlam is referring to the lack of connection with society discussed above, and she 
recommends having more trainers and experts from within the country. But will 
trainers from within the country reflect women’s gender interests? I will address this 
question in the next chapter too, but it is worth considering here the case of the Vital 
Voices workshop, at which the women in the Jordanian delegation were all middle-to-
upper class and had prestigious occupations. They were ideal reflections of the 
interests of their own specific contexts, but what about the interests of women like Dr 
Sabah or Jaleela, who come from remote areas? Challenging a very conservative tribe 
and finding ways of communicating with a remote community would also be 
extremely difficult for women who deal with international bodies and live in rich 
West Amman, and who therefore risk falling into and reproducing the same pitfalls 
imputed to international organisations. 
Moreover, in line with Ahlam’s suggestion, Hailineh, a Christian candidate from 
Amman who had participated in the activities of both local and international 
organisations, stated that she was very satisfied when she was able to listen to the 
experience of female MPs: ‘They told me how to be a strong woman, how to use my 
charisma. They were the best… and I learned so much from them’ (Amman, 12 
January 2011). The JNFW organised meetings between former MPs and candidates. 
The programme manager at the UNDP also suggested that there is a need to make 
people more aware of women’s success stories: ‘Trainers [in women’s organisations] 
have never been through candidacy: teaching only soft skills is not enough. It would 
be useful to learn from the experiences of women who won’ (Amman, 8 March, 
2011). More people who are involved in the field and have an in-depth experience of 
Jordanian society and its communities seem to be needed, since women are clearly 
crying out for them. They are asking for training, activities and networking 
opportunities, and they are eager to learn; but they also want to practise what they are 
learning and to implement these skills and tools effectively. However, we need to be 
careful when analysing the outcomes of these activities, and to look at the nuances in 
relation to participants and practitioners alike.  
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I argue that these political empowerment activities give women a great opportunity 
to raise their voices, to get to know each other and to open up spaces for dialogue. 
However, I believe that female candidates, just like their male counterparts, are not 
always consistent between what they think and what they report to organisations. I 
had a chance to participate in a focus group organised in Amman in January 2011 by 
the NDI, which reunited 12 female candidates after the election in order to discuss 
topics such as corruption and their expectations of women in parliament. There were 
12 women around the table engaged in passionate discussion. I was extremely 
surprised when I heard the questions from the NDI programme manager: ‘What do 
you suggest for the future in terms of programmes we can organise? What did we 
miss?’ Only a few women raised their voices and made suggestions, and these 
suggestions were different from those I had heard during private interviews. For 
example, a candidate from Amman said: ‘There should be more interaction, more 
individual meetings between candidates and decision-makers.’ Another woman who 
proposed some recommendations gave some new ideas for training topics: ‘The 
trainings focused on candidates; they were about skills and techniques. But the 
organisations may want to ensure that women have free space in the media, in the 
newspapers, so that women will be able to deliver their message.’ Some of the women 
I had interviewed and who had criticised the organisation’s approach were at this 
workshop, but they did not comment. I was disappointed at first, but I also thought 
that this was another example of how women participants rely on these organisations 
as providers of benefits in terms of financial support, the enlargement of their 
networks or possible space in the media. Other than those two suggestions, the 
discussion revolved around the issue of quotas and the representation of political 
parties – extremely important issues, of course, but they were not related to the 
questions that were being asked, and they did not yield any other recommendations.  
Organisations such the NDI and the IRI represent ‘neutral and international 
support’28 for candidates, and I had the feeling that women were hesitant to offer any 
suggestions that might implicitly criticise the NDI’s work. The questions raised by the 
project manager were very relevant, and this was an indicator that they try to involve 
participants in the decision-making process, although the questions were more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Interview with a candidate, Amman, 15 February 2011. My interviewee spoke about ‘neutral 
support’ in contrast to support from local women’s organisations, which in the majority of cases are 
connected to the regime. 
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directly focused on suggestions rather than needs. I could feel the difference between 
the interviews I had conducted and that roundtable discussion: through one-on-one 
discussion I was able to get both feedback and suggestions, thanks to my being an 
independent researcher unconnected with any organisation. The answers at the 
workshop were not so pertinent, and they demonstrated a kind of timidity on the 
women’s part: if women were asking for change, that space would have been a great 
opportunity for them to speak out. This prompted me to question the interests behind 
women’s participation in IOs’ activities: there is the risk that such events will serve as 
an opportunity to show off, or to be a part of a certain international community, which 
would give prestige to women. 
At that point I understood that I had to take advantage of my role as a researcher, 
and I met the project director of the NDI one more time. I wanted to raise some of the 
issues that had come up during my interviews with candidates, and I was hoping to 
make my contribution and suggestions. My respondent emphasised that it was 
difficult to receive feedback from participants, but she justified this in cultural terms: 
‘It is difficult to get feedback because they [female participants] are hesitant to tell us 
what they think; this is also due to the fact that they are very grateful, which is part of 
their culture. I think there is also too much victimisation: they tend to romanticise the 
problem, but without finding proper solutions’ (Amman, 12 April 2011). I personally 
believe that it is more related to their fear of losing the support and opportunities they 
might obtain through a connection with the NDI.  
During our meeting, we discussed the risk of imposing certain ‘values’, and of 
detachment from local ‘cultures’, which many women had described to me. My 
respondent at the NDI seemed to be fully aware of this issue, and she gave an 
example: 
 
They [women] criticise the fact that we talk about and discuss 
fundraising, saying that this is not applicable to their community. 
But what we want to do is that we try to bring up those issues, we 
want them to think about and discuss those issues. Some women 
refuse to understand the concept, some others are more open, 
especially the youngest. Three young women at a workshop said: 
‘Fundraising might not be applicable here, but we want to learn 
more about it.’ Some other women change their opinion, especially 
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when they see that they can find support through it. When you 
introduce a new concept there will always be someone who 
criticises it. But if at least one of the participants will think about it, 
I am happy and satisfied with that (Amman, 12 April 2011). 
 
My respondent was raising a valid point, and I found some similarities between 
what she was saying and some of my interviews. Some of the women I interviewed 
who were very critical of IOs’ political training seemed to dismiss certain ideas and 
concepts as ‘foreign’ and ‘not authentic’ rather too easily. Whatever was not part of 
their ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ became the ‘other’, and they often rejected and sidelined 
this ‘otherness’ without investigating its potential or even its weaknesses. Although 
this ‘cultural clash’ – recalling Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ (1993) – is a 
problem many practitioners may face, and although the NDI appears to be listening to 
participants’ needs, I also think that the NDI makes the choice to present certain 
‘Western’ schemes without questioning their legitimacy. I therefore tried to suggest 
some of the things that women had recommended, such as the involvement of local 
experts or the presentation of success stories, but my respondent was not so keen on 
these recommendations: 
 
In terms of local experts, we tried that, but they are not so credible. 
They do not respond in a good way. We have a woman, a local 
expert, but she just had an opinion on the issue and she was not 
credible. I have more credibility, because I am here for this reason. 
In terms of success stories, in theory this is an excellent idea, but 
again, when you come to practice, it is difficult. Female candidates 
before the elections don’t have time, and when you give them the 
practical example, through the success story, each woman has a 
particular background and it will not be credible enough (Amman, 
12 April 2011). 
 
It is true that in the eyes of some people, locals may lack credibility. Many 
Jordanians, like most people in the region, will feel more respect for a foreigner than 
for a local. That is a true legacy of the colonial mindset. But it is also true that 
listening to success stories might be empowering and enriching for women who are 
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willing to become candidates. Moreover, I still think that greater attention to the local 
contexts, to the different stories and experiences of women, and to the diversity of 
needs in relation to location, education, class, religion and ethnicity would help to 
bring gender interests into empowerment projects.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Kawthar, Seham, Ahlam, Hind, Khawla, Fayza, Hailineh, Dr Sabah, Jaleela and 
Zachieh have very different backgrounds, stories, experiences and politics. Their 
participation in political training programmes may be problematic, since it is not clear 
whether it is driven by a desire to increase their skills, to find new ways of promoting 
social change, or whether it is mainly a matter of prestige and gaining international 
support. However, I argue that their and other women’s experiences and accounts are 
useful, not only for understanding their expectations, but also for grasping the 
relationships and tensions between the interests of participants, trainers and 
organisations, whether local or international. 
Needs are a response to a perceived necessity, in a specific context, without 
necessarily challenging women’s subordinate position in society. In the case of some 
of the narratives described in this chapter, that perceived necessity might be learning 
how to communicate and behave in public and consequently gain more votes. 
However, in line with Sekhon’s study (2006) of women’s participation in India’s 
panchayats, the very fact of being elected to parliament or to a lower political position 
is in itself a challenge to patriarchy. For this reason, although female candidates’ 
interests might be perceived as merely practical, women were trying to find new 
strategies to win and be accepted as ‘women’ in politics in their society, community 
and families, thus challenging the status quo. Although I have used Molyneux’s 
analysis (1985) to understand the differences between and the necessary combination 
of practical and strategic gender interests throughout this chapter, in line with some 
scholars (Beckwith, 2007a; Moser, 1993) and in light of female candidates’ 
experiences, I consider that analysis to be too dichotomous and polarised. Interests 
vary depending on the particular cultural and socio-political context within which 
they are formulated. In the case of Dr Sabah, the candidate from Karak, the lack of 
support from her tribe and family negatively affected her campaign, thus requiring her 
to learn how to deal with these difficulties. Moreover, the fact that Fayza, the 
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candidate from Irbid, had not participated in previous elections was reflected in her 
interest in learning about the process of elections. But Fayza’s interest was not shared 
by Seham, the candidate from Jerash, who had already run in 2003. Thus in the 
specific context of women’s presence in politics, women’s gender identities are just 
one among many alternative sources of loyalty and identification (tribal, ethnic, class, 
etc.), and Molyneux’s classification of interests appears to be too reductionist. 
The intersections between gender, class, tribal and kin allegiances, together with 
different places of residence and location, are some of the factors that might be 
included in an understanding of strategic gender needs. However, the vast majority of 
interventions for women worldwide are intended to meet women’s practical gender 
needs, such as in the case of the NDI and IRI, and do not look at the intersections of 
the factors above. As long as the aim of these activities is to increase skills and tools 
without questioning women’s position in society and the political arena, these 
interests cannot be considered strategic. As previously stated, I am aware of the great 
opportunity for dialogue and networking that forums such as the NDI and IRI can 
offer. However, I am still cautious about the larger benefits that they might provide. 
In line with Moser (1993), I argue that these interventions will help to challenge the 
unequal relationship between men and women and the consequent power relations 
within society only ‘if and when, they are transformed into strategic gender needs’ 
(41). In order to achieve strategic gender needs, top-down and bottom-up 
interventions need to be integrated, but the failure to do this continues to be a 
widespread reality. 
As long as practical interests are at the core of these projects, and as long as 
women are considered to be ‘lacking something’, gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment projects may end in failure. One of the main challenges facing 
women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming policies is for them to become 
transformative projects, and not to be reduced to technocratic language and processes 
(Kelly, 2005: 473; Kandiyoti, 2007: 514). The key issues that are often ignored are to 
be found in the ‘discriminatory systems of male resistance to women who dare to 
challenge male domination’ of the political system (Longwe, 2000: 30).  
The risk is that empowerment and gender mainstreaming might foster adaptation 
without transformation (Nusair, 2009: 151). As Kabeer (2004) outlines, this failure at 
the practical level has resulted in an emphasis on interventions that promise fast 
results, such as those promoted by the NDI and IRI, but which fall short of realising 
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their full transformative potential because empowerment is never really the intended 
goal. As long as empowerment and gender mainstreaming are not completely 
understood in terms of their full potential, and as long as such activities are 
‘mechanistic quick fixes, that assume that problems of gender inequality can be 
addressed by redirecting some resources towards women’s […] education, (and) skills 
development’ (Hawkesworth, 2006: 100), these programmes will lack transformative 
potential.  
Finally, what the women I interviewed seemed to be observing during ‘democracy 
promotion’ activities is what has been defined as the ‘mix of ignorance and arrogance 
that the democratisers have demonstrated’ (Kodmani, 2010: 159). It is true that 
female candidates might too easily dismiss whatever is ‘foreign’ and ‘not authentic’, 
as described above. However, I agree with Kodmani (2010) that a major flaw in the 
‘democracy promotion approach to the Middle East has been and remains the lack of 
trust in Arab societies’ in pursuing a ‘democratic culture’ (165). The 
instrumentalisation of women’s issues is not new, especially for democracy 
promotion purposes, as I have demonstrated with reference to Iraq and Palestine. 
Global gender regimes, neoliberal international organisations and foreign government 
agendas have influenced and are still affecting women’s empowerment and gender 
mainstreaming processes. Although Jordan is not undergoing a post-conflict 
reconstruction programme, the promotion and use of women’s political participation 
may merely constitute a form of ‘embedded feminism’ that operates to cloak other 
political and economic aims (Hunt and Rygiel, 2007). Since Jordan occupies a 
strategic position in the region, the US, followed by European countries, is trying to 
use women as the apparent recipients of its development programmes, pouring in 
large amounts of money, but without properly addressing the women’s cause. 
Similarly, although local organisations place greater attention on local needs and 
gender interests, I think it is important to challenge the origins of their funding and 
their collaboration with/co-option by the government/state/royal family. This 
questioning is vital, as is an understanding of who is deciding which gender interests 
form part of a movement’s political agenda. These are questions that I will further 
discuss in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN: 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN WOMEN IN POLITICS AND 
WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS  
  
During a very busy week in the middle of February 2011, I conducted six interviews 
with women from very different backgrounds. First, I spoke with two women activists 
working at the JNFW and the JWU; later, I spoke with two extremely passionate 
female candidates, one living in Amman and the other in a beautiful house in the 
countryside in Madaba; and finally, I met a female MP at her office, and also the head 
of the gender focal point at the Ministry of Social and Political Development.  
Not just during that week, but throughout the whole of my stay in Jordan, each 
interview I conducted was a different and unique experience. During that particular 
week, for instance, I moved from the formal atmosphere of parliament and ministry 
offices, through the friendly environments of the JNFW and JWU, to the pleasures of 
interesting discussion accompanied by delicious sweets, tea and even full meals at 
female candidates’ homes, both in and outside Amman. Different types of locations 
certainly made me feel more or less comfortable with my interviewees, depending on 
the level of formality required, and the diversity of the people I met no less certainly 
influenced the discussions I engaged in. Most of the time I found myself asking my 
interviewees similar questions, especially when I was trying to understand the means 
used to promote women’s rights and gender justice in Jordan. How did the 
intersections between different classes, types of education, jobs, levels of tribal 
support, religious beliefs, ethnic origins and places of residence manifest themselves 
in relation to campaigns against gender inequality? While the woman working at the 
ministry focused on the implementation of gender mainstreaming as her priority, the 
female candidate from Madaba was pushing for change in the election law in order to 
limit discrimination against women in the specific context of elections. While the 
female activist at the JWU prioritised gender-based violence issues, the MP was 
worried about striking a balance between promoting projects for women’s economic 
empowerment and fulfilling her voters’ requests for services. These diverse women 
seemed to me to be acting for and driven by the amelioration of women’s rights in 
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Jordan. However, as I reflected on that week’s meetings, I wondered how the 
intersections outlined above, coupled with the diverse roles each woman played, 
would impact on the representation and improvement of women’s rights. 
This reflection introduces the main debates I aim to address in this chapter: while 
continuing to develop the concept of the substantive representation of women, 
previously discussed in chapter three with reference to gender quotas, I aim here to 
understand who the proponents of this representation of women’s rights in Jordan are 
and, most importantly, how they relate to each other. By introducing the different 
agendas of the female candidates and female MPs I interviewed, I aim to understand 
the extent to which women’s rights and gender justice form part of the programmes 
and agendas of women in politics.1 Furthermore, through the analysis of the 
relationships and tensions between female candidates, MPs, women’s organisations 
and national machineries in Jordan, I will assess the extent to which women’s rights 
are promoted in a systematic manner. What is the relationship between a bottom-up 
method of bringing women’s rights to the fore – which female candidates might 
favour – and the role of women’s organisations in voicing such demands? And what 
might this analysis tell us about the promotion of women’s rights in Jordan and the 
related role of the state? 
 
‘Critical mass’ or ‘critical actors’?  
 
Substantive representation, as analysed in chapter three with reference to the 
introduction of gender quotas, is the most important dimension of representation 
(Severs, 2010: 411), and consists in ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a 
manner responsive to them’ (Pitkin, 1967: 209). Research on ‘critical mass’ – which 
assumes that a higher number of women in parliament, coupled with changes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As explained in the introduction to the thesis, since women do not constitute a homogeneous 
category, I am going to pay attention to intersectionality throughout my analysis. Women are not 
characterised by a set of shared attributes; rather, their position in society is the result of ‘social 
processes, generating relational differences, situations of clustering and affective bonding in which 
people feel affinity for other people’ (Young, 1997: 254), with differences of class, ethnicity, 
background and education. In debates over representation, the problem of essentialism ‘haunts every 
group that hopes to organise politically around a facet of identity’ (Young, 2010: 204) and treats ‘group 
interests as a priori undefined, context-related and subject to evolution’ (Celis, 2006: 87–8). Since I am 
aware of the risk of essentialising women’s gender interests, when I refer to ‘women in Jordan’ I will 
pay attention to the intersections between class, education, tribal support and place of residence, 
attempting to deconstruct the category ‘women’ in order to understand the interactions between the 
‘critical actors’ in the substantive representation of women in Jordan. 
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parliamentary culture, will lead to female MPs being more successful in promoting 
women’s gender interests2 – has not supported the hypothesis that adding women will 
automatically make a difference to the promotion of women’s rights (Childs and 
Krook, 2008). As I have demonstrated with reference to the introduction of 
affirmative measures such as quotas, it is not sufficient to ‘add women and stir’ in 
order to get women’s rights recognised at the national level; a deeper analysis of the 
context, and of the hurdles for women who want to run for office, is needed. 
Moreover, the idea that ‘being one of us’ will automatically guarantee loyalty to ‘our’ 
interests (Mansbridge, 1999: 629) has been refuted by empirical research indicating 
that not all women in parliament seek to promote women’s gender interests (Celis et 
al., 2008: 104). This is particularly true in a context such as Jordan, where the 
parliament functions not as a representational system but as a clientelist one, as 
outlined and discussed in chapter three. The value-added role of descriptive 
representatives is therefore increasingly seen as ‘probabilistic rather than 
deterministic’ (Dodson, 2001: 11), and the concept of ‘critical actors’ has been put 
forward to emphasise the importance of multiple actors within and outside parliament 
(Childs and Krook, 2008; Childs and Withey, 2006).  
On one hand, debates about representation distinguish between authorisation and 
accountability: what makes a representative is the fact that she or he is authorised to 
act by a set of official institutions that also bind together the represented group. The 
legitimate representative must be accountable to those whom she or he represents 
(Young, 2010: 194). Thus representation, in line with Pitkin’s work (1967), moves 
between moments of authorisation and moments of accountability. Disconnection 
between constituents and representatives is always a possibility, and the connection 
can be maintained over time through anticipation and recollection in moments of 
authorisation and accountability (Young, 2010: 194). Moreover, according to Young 
(2010) and Weldon (2002), authorisation and accountability will occur through 
official institutions and in the public life of independent civic associations – which 
includes women’s organisations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As discussed in greater detail in chapter one, when I use the term ‘interests’ I am referring to gender 
interests. Please see chapter one for a theoretical discussion. In chapter four I analyse the interests of 
women who have participated in leadership training programmes organised by selected international 
and local organisations. My attention in that chapter was more focused on why women choose to 
participate in activities promoted both by international and local organisations. In this chapter I refer to 
gender interests in a broader way, referring to the promotion of women’s rights in Jordan.  
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On the other hand, debates about the representation of women’s gender interests 
have often concentrated on questions such as ‘do women represent women?’, as 
pointed out by Celis et al. (2008). Some contributions to the debate on descriptive and 
substantive representation have tried to bridge the gap between debates on women’s 
legislative behaviour and those on women’s policy agencies (Celis et al., 2008; 
Weldon, 2002). Weldon (2002), for instance, recognises that individual legislators 
may constitute one means of representation, but suggests that other sites, such as 
women’s movements and women’s policy agencies, offer alternative means. Weldon 
(2002) justifies this argument on the grounds that women’s gender interests are best 
defined through collective processes of the articulation of such interests, rather than 
simply from the perspective of a single legislator. In their theoretical analysis of new 
approaches to the study of substantive representation, Celis et al. (2008), in line with 
Weldon (2002), believe that it is crucial to broaden the scope of enquiry to 
acknowledge multiple actors who are engaged in representational activities in a 
variety of different sites, abandoning questions like ‘do women represent women?’ or 
‘do women in politics make a difference?’ in favour of questions such as ‘who claims 
to act for women?’ and ‘where, why, and how does substantive representation of 
women occur?’ (Celis, et al., 2008: 104).  
If the goal is to capture the richness of ‘what is going on in representation’ 
(Saward, 2006), this approach leaves open the question of who might act on behalf of 
women’s rights, where substantive representation might take place, and what the 
substantive representation of women might entail. It thus does not presume that the 
substantive representation of women requires a ‘critical mass’ of women; rather, it 
explores the many ways in which ‘critical actors’ in various locations may seek to 
promote what they regard as women’s concerns (Celis et al., 2008: 100). In addition, 
as Squires (2008: 190) suggests, in analyses of representation attention might also be 
paid to how the representative’s claim-making might constitute gender relations in a 
specific context, thus taking into consideration not only women’s gender interests 
from a bottom-up perspective, but also top-down representative processes, such as in 
the case of gender mainstreaming policies. There is no doubt that the types of politics 
involved in conditionalities of gender mainstreaming and the system of electoral 
politics come from very different universes. However, in light of the new framework 
presented by Celis et al. (2008) and the suggestion proposed by Squires (2008), I aim 
to address the debate on the substantive representation of women in Jordan by not 
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only focusing on the role of parliamentarians, but also analysing the relationships and 
tensions between candidates, MPs, women’s organisations and national machineries.  
 
Female candidates’ and MPs’ campaigns 
 
During the run-up to the parliamentary elections in early November 2010,3 trying to 
get used to the confused and heavy traffic of Amman, I was driving around the city 
looking for female candidates’ banners and posters. As I had expected, the majority of 
banners represented male candidates, and all of those I saw bearing a female picture 
were for the same three or four women. When I interviewed some female candidates, 
both from Amman and from outside, it emerged that a lack of financial resources was 
one of the reasons for this paucity of banners. Amneh Zu’bi, the president of the 
JWU, confirmed this during an interview with journalist Rana Husseini, stating that 
‘the majority of women candidates lack funding or are incapable of supporting their 
campaigns financially on the same level as male candidates’ (Husseini, 2012). 
Moreover, some of the banners depicting female candidates had been taken down or 
even burned, as I described in chapter three.  
Although I saw only a few banners for female candidates, I was very curious about 
their content and message. At first glance the banners in the streets, for male and 
female candidates alike, were devoid of any convincing or specific statements about 
how to challenge the country’s social, political and economic problems. For instance, 
one independent candidate from West Amman used the very generic slogan 
‘Homeland’s daughter... everyone’s sister’ (ibnat al-watan… ukht al-jami). Reem 
Badran, another candidate from West Amman and the only woman to be elected 
outside of the quota system, chose an original way to promote herself with the 
statement ‘Without slogans’ (badun shi‘arat).4 Emily Naffa, a women’s rights activist 
and former candidate interviewed by Rana Husseini, confirmed my perceptions and 
criticised these banners for the weakness of their messages: ‘The slogans are below 
our expectations and do not address the political challenges that Jordan is facing in 
the region,’ she said (Husseini, 2012). Moreover, none of the female candidates’ 
banners I saw made any particular statement about women’s rights or gender issues; 
they were just generic messages calling for justice, democracy and freedom. Although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The elections were held on 9 November 2010. 
4 For more banners and statements, see Abu-Rish and Ghannam 2010. 
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it is not the aim of this research to conduct an analysis of statements, banners or 
representations in this sense, this lack seemed to me to provide a starting point for 
exploring whether and to what extent female candidates addressed women’s rights in 
their programmes. An understanding of the gendered nature of representative politics 
will ‘show how the constraints of real political situations affect the capacities of 
actually existing women politicians’ (Lovenduski, 2005: 9) – and of candidates too. 
This analysis will enable me to better understand the relationships between 
candidates, MPs, women’s organisations and national machineries.  
One of the most challenging questions I had to ask during my fieldwork was to 
understand whether a given candidate was running a campaign that addressed 
women’s rights. The difficult part did not relate to the content of the question in and 
of itself, but rather arose when I had to engage in discussions of women’s rights. My 
realisation of the candidates’ limited knowledge of women’s rights at the national 
level left me struggling during the interviews. The majority5 of the female candidates 
I interviewed were very general in their explanations, and did not want to get into in-
depth discussions of the subject. To be sure, the content of a candidate’s agenda may 
be shaped by several phenomena, as I will discuss throughout this chapter: a 
candidate’s decision not to deal with women’s rights might be an implicit 
acknowledgement that demanding rights for women will not ‘fly’ and might alienate 
parts of both the male and female electorate. There could also be a lack of 
acknowledgement that there is such as a thing as ‘women’s rights’ in the first place. 
However, as I will further discuss, educational levels, professional positions, places of 
residence, religion, and ethnic and tribal relations also constituted some of factors in 
the diverse female candidates’ campaigns.  
When I met Jaleela, a middle-aged Muslim woman and activist from Jerash, her 
close relationship and connection with her community came up immediately. I met 
her in Amman, in the office of the GFJW; she is the head of the GFJW’s Jerash 
branch, and I had made contact with her through the organisation. Jaleela was 
extremely frank, kind and willing to share her experiences of candidacy with me. Her 
self-confidence resulted from her being a ‘good’ wife and ‘good’ mother, and from 
her involvement in community work, as she put it: ‘A woman is first of all successful 
in her house, and then in her community’ (Amman, 16 December 2010). Jaleela has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Out of the 26 candidates I interviewed, I was able to have in-depth discussions about the status of 
women’s rights in Jordan with only seven. 
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been working in her community for 20 years, and she stood in the parliamentary 
elections of both 2003 and 2010. When she told me that she would have promoted 
university-level study in her community if she had been elected, her attachment to her 
town became clear: ‘There is no university here [in Jerash], and with the creation of a 
loan/scholarship office in Jerash, students and women as well will know about the 
opportunities they have to study’ (Amman, 16 December 2010). Her focus is certainly 
on how to improve education among the new generation. However, instead of 
thinking about national policies that will encourage the spread of education, she limits 
her area of action to the governorate from which she comes – something that falls 
within the remit of a municipal councillor, rather than of an MP. But in a country that 
institutionalises the representation of sectoral interests, be they tribal, familial or 
regional, why would a candidate think beyond her (or his) own electoral base? 
Jaleela’s story was echoed by the case of an elected female MP from Tafilah whom 
I interviewed in her office in parliament. As we sat surrounded by three men, who 
were chatting and apparently paying us little attention, her words revealed her 
attachment to the community: 
 
In my campaign, I focused on the development of women in the 
community, especially on issues concerning violence against 
women, as I am doing in my organisation, Fatima Al-Sahra, in 
Tafilah. But also, I advocated the establishment of a children’s 
garden in Tafilah (Amman, 2 March 2011). 
 
This female MP’s platform arises from her strong and ongoing relationship with 
her community, and this relationship reflects the structure of Jordanian society, which 
is founded on tribes and tribal support, as described in chapters two and three. As Lust 
and Hourani (2011: 120) showed in their analysis of the 2010 elections in Jordan, 
people often expect that those who belong to the same family, tribe, neighbourhood or 
personal network will give each other privileged support; this is particularly true of 
MPs. Such expectations from the family, community and larger social network shape 
the parliamentarian’s role as service provider.  
On the one hand, voters will choose the candidate that promises the most favours 
and services, as Reem, a well-known activist on violence against women, told me 
during an interesting conversation in her office in Amman: 
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If I were a person with low income and from a poor area… I would 
choose a candidate who can give me services. For instance, if I need 
my son or my daughter to go to university, I will pick the candidate 
who will help me with that. Why? Because parliamentarians are 
perceived as service-oriented… service providers. I am not saying 
this is right. But I am saying this is the reality (Amman, 28 April 
2011). 
 
On the other hand, parliamentarians will offer and promise services in order to get 
more votes. The fact that candidates campaign mainly for their community’s interests, 
instead of for national reforms, reveals the extent to which their agendas are shaped 
by tribal and social ties in a system where patronage rules parliament; this is the case 
for both female and male candidates.  
Candidates’ blood relationships to their tribes or families also emerged in the 
discourse about ‘why women do not vote for women’. Although more than one 
candidate told me that this was because of the alleged jealousy factor among women, 
tribalism and blood relationships were the most cited reasons: voters expect favours 
and services from the candidate they support, whether a man or a woman. Once 
elected, MPs have to juggle between the promotion of their own agenda and the 
services that they are expected to provide. One day at the end of May 2011, I was at 
parliament waiting to talk to MP Reem Badran. I had an appointment and was waiting 
for her in her office with her assistant. While I was waiting, three different people 
came into the office in the space of 10 minutes, all asking to see her. During my 
interview with Reem Badran I realised that all of those people had come to ask for 
personal favours, and she expressed her frustration to me as she talked about the 
expectations placed upon her candidacy: 
 
To make change is not easy at all. I knew it was not going to be 
easy. But receiving personal kinds of requests, it is really too much 
for me; they ask me to help their brother, their daughter, their wife. 
Every day I receive this kind of request. And the people who are 
outside the office right now [those I had seen entering her office], 
they expect this. I understand that families have challenges and 
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unemployment is really high, but I want to focus on major issues. 
Although I place importance on families, I place it also on the 
public sphere. It is important to balance individual and group needs. 
Being an MP is much more challenging than I had expected. People 
contact me a lot, by phone, email, fax, coming here, a lot… A lot. I 
used to say that my priority was to serve groups, not to serve 
individuals. How to find the balance it is not an easy task, because 
you can easily get too involved in the details and forget about the 
broader picture (Amman, 26 May 2011). 
 
The fact that attempts to receive entitlement through patronage tend to supersede 
the rights of the community has been considered by scholars to be characteristic of 
politics in most countries in the Middle East, and this makes it more difficult to 
pursue democratic reform, ‘because these reforms basically focus on protecting 
individual rights’ (Ben-Meir, 2006: 207). Adding to the problem are traditional 
loyalties to the family and the tribe, which naturally erode the principles of 
democratic government such as advice, consent and majority rule. These factors are 
not limited to the Jordanian case, but are extendable to other countries in the region 
where tribal and familial ties are strong. 
Striking the balance between offering personal services and promoting a 
programme is not an easy task, either for MPs or for candidates. The pressure of tribal 
or family relationships often influences and shapes a candidate’s campaign, leaving 
the campaign’s potential gender dimension unexplored. However, close relationships 
with one’s tribe or family are not the only factors that contribute to the shaping of a 
candidate’s agenda. 
The limited presence of the promotion of women’s rights on a candidate’s agenda 
was often related to the reasons behind her candidacy. Those who were not willing to 
champion gender justice revealed to me that they wanted to gain prestige in their 
community, as one very honest candidate from Jerash put it: ‘I have been involved in 
a lot of volunteering activities during recent years, but I have always been behind the 
scenes. I wanted to become a well-known member of my community’ (Jerash, 12 
February 2011). This woman is representative of the male and female candidates who 
consider the elections an opportunity to gain better recognition within their 
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community, irrespective of the qualifications and experience needed to become an 
MP.6 
Although the desire for prestige and public recognition may influence some 
candidates’ campaigns, some of the women I interviewed were extremely passionate 
about the opportunity to make changes in the political sphere. This was particularly 
the case with women who had been involved in community work and had been 
activists for several years, as Terez, a middle-aged candidate from Madaba and a 
long-standing member of the JWU, forcefully told me: 
 
I have been an activist since 1977 and I have been demanding the 
development of women’s rights throughout all those years. I feel 
that women need to be represented by good women. I know and 
believe that the situation of women will not change if there is no 
development in the political field. And this is why there is a need to 
change some discriminatory laws against women (Amman, 17 April 
2011). 
 
Terez is mainly referring to the family law,7 which does not guarantee equal rights 
in the provision of pensions and social security benefits, and the nationality and 
citizenship laws,8 which bar women from passing Jordanian citizenship to their 
spouses or children, as described in chapter two. Interestingly, yet not surprisingly, 
the amendment to the Nationality Law was a topic particularly raised by women of 
Palestinian origin.9 Moreover, some of the women who addressed the topic of the 
Nationality Law did so by presenting it not in terms of women’s rights, as it tends to 
be presented by women’s rights activists, but in terms of a child’s right to obtain 
nationality. This is a by-product of Jordan’s bizarre citizenship regime, which turns 
Palestinians into refugees and stateless people; the issue of children’s nationality is 
therefore not just about women’s rights.10  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The issue of candidates’ qualification is also discussed in chapter three with reference to quotas. 
7 First promulgated as Temporary Law No. 61 of 1976. 
8 Nationality Law No. 6 of 1954 (last amended 1987). 
9 Only a minority of the women I interviewed (seven out of 26) declared themselves to be of 
Palestinian origin.  
10 The legal status of Palestinians in Jordan is complicated, particularly with reference to citizenship’s 
rights. Although it is not the aim of the thesis to analyse this problematic categorisation, Palestinians 
receive different legal treatments in regard to citizenship’s rights whether they have had any connection 
with Gaza or the West Bank, whether they have been living in the West Bank or in Jordan, whether 
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Foz, a middle-aged widow and mother of eight, mentioned the Nationality Law as 
the first reform she would have promoted if elected. Foz welcomed me into her home 
in Amman, specifying that this was ‘her second home’, since her first is still in 
Palestine. I went to meet her with Ahlam, another candidate from Amman, also of 
Palestinian origin. Foz’s participation in political life has been influenced by her 
husband’s previous experience, since he was an MP in 1989. Foz was very proud of 
him, showing me all her pictures of him with prominent political leaders, including 
one with Yasser Arafat. Her national origin was a constant part of the interview, 
together with her feeling that she is not considered a full citizen, as she bluntly told 
me: ‘Palestinians living here [in Jordan] with a national number can vote, but most of 
them did not go and vote, because this is not their country, and because they believe 
that all the decisions and positions have already been taken by the government’ 
(Amman, 24 May 2011). Although Foz appeared a little frustrated with – and yet 
sympathetic to – the Palestinians she was referring to, and although she had no faith 
in the position of the state, Foz was very interested in contributing to Jordan’s 
political life, and this had been reflected in her campaign. Although the nationality 
issue was her priority, she was also very dedicated to the challenge to gender 
inequalities, as she continued: ‘Women are not considered to be as strong and 
powerful as men in our society. You struggle too much as a woman, at the economic, 
political or social level’ (Amman, 24 May 2011). Ahlam, who had insisted on coming 
with me since she had introduced me to Foz, very much supported what Foz was 
saying. However, when Ahlam learned that Foz was a member of the National Party11 
and had not run independently, at one point she challenged her: ‘I do not see any 
reason for you to be part of this party. They will act in their interests, not yours. Your 
party pay their MPs to promote their agenda.’ Foz did not agree with her, but their 
discussion focused on how to build trust between candidates and voters, given that, 
according to Ahlam, being part of a party might undermine this relationship.  
The majority of the female candidates I interviewed (19 out of 26) had run as 
independents. The presence of political parties in Jordan’s political life is extensively 
discussed in chapter two; however, the decision to adhere to a party (or not) can also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
they have been refugees from the occupied Gaza Strip or whether they have been Jerusalem residents. 
For an extensive explanation see Jamjoum, 2013. 
11 It was founded in 2007 and asks for the creation of a democratic environment within the country, 
(http://www.jordanpolitics.org/en/index.php/parties/current-parties/745-the-jordanian-national-party- 
[accessed 27 May 2013]). 
	   200 
be related to Ahlam’s comment on the risk of co-option of the candidate’s agenda, as 
other female candidates I interviewed also confirmed. Moreover, as recently 
happened in Egypt (in 2013), political parties may disfavour their female candidates, 
who have lower chances of election, by placing them at the bottom of their lists 
(ECWR, 2012). The preference for standing as an independent is also a result of the 
lack of representation of political parties in parliament – something that slightly 
changed in the 2013 elections.12 Candidates might therefore prefer to rely on the 
support of their tribes, families and voters.  
Among those women who had run as members of a party, the majority were 
related to the al-Wasat Islamic Party.13 Towards the end of my fieldwork, in June 
2011, I went to do one last interview with a female candidate from Amman. She was 
Dr Mahara, a member of al-Wasat Islamic Party, and she welcomed my translator and 
me into her home. Religion had influenced her campaign, along with her adherence to 
the party. It was not easy for her to get through the elections, as she told me: ‘I did not 
have the support of my family, because I was a member of a party. In their mind I 
would support the party more than the family. And it was not a matter of services, 
they did not believe in my party’s ideology’ (Amman, 2 June 2011). Dr Mahara did 
not link her family’s lack of support to the provision of services – which was 
constantly pointed out during interviews with other female candidates as an elected 
MP’s expected duty – but focused more on her campaign. The al-Wasat Party 
supports a moderate interpretation of Islam, and criticises extreme religious ideologies 
that do not support pluralism or that promote violence.14 While explaining her 
campaign to me, Dr Mahara stressed the importance of implementing already existing 
laws in cases where the source of the law is Islam (shari‘a), particularly with 
reference to marriage, women’s education and women’s labour participation.  
Another member of the same party, a candidate from Jerash, had focused her 
campaign on combating violence against women, especially within the family, where, 
in her words, ‘the husband still controls and decides what a woman can do or not 
do… and this is not what Islam teaches us’ (Jerash, 12 February 2011). Islam and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 As described in chapter three, the temporary election law for the 2010 elections was changed for the 
2013 elections, allowing voters to cast two ballots: one for a candidate in their constituency, and one 
from party lists, elected by proportional representation at the national level. 
13 It was founded in 2001, and it emphasises its role as a political, national and democratic party with 
Islamic reference; not as a religious party, (http://www.wasatparty.org/ [accessed 10 March 2013]). 
14 Although it is not the aim of this research to analyse the Islamic Movement in Jordan, it should be 
stated here that the party is independent of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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implementation of shari‘a law came up exclusively with women who were members 
of this particular party. Although I interviewed many Muslim candidates (21 out of 
the 26 interviewees), when they were discussing their campaigns, religion was rarely 
mentioned. Tribal relations, ethnic origins, class, professional background and 
previous involvement in community work appeared to me to have influenced the 
campaigns more than religion, reflecting Jordan’s social and cultural structure.  
Modifying and amending laws to reduce discrimination against women was a 
priority for the women I interviewed, especially for those who were lawyers or active 
members of women’s organisations. In the case of Seham, a lawyer I met in her office 
in the busy centre of Jerash, the connection between her daily work and her campaign 
was clear: 
 
Thanks to my job as a lawyer I constantly deal with family rights, 
civil law and legitimacy law. I already work for women and I 
represent them in my work. Women’s rights are closely related to 
my job. I know what their problems are. Even women who are 
considered to be ‘free’ or more liberal, they face problems within 
society. As an MP I would have focused on the revision of some 
laws. I believe that laws influence society in a greater way than 
awareness campaigns (Jerash, 5 February 2011). 
 
Like Terez, Seham was very influenced by her work and her active participation in 
the community. A focus on the amendment and modification of laws that discriminate 
against women appeared in the interviews I conducted not only with reference to 
family laws and the personal status code, but also to violence against women. Eman, a 
candidate from Balqa, was very concerned about this, as she told me in the library 
where she works: ‘In my campaign I focused on family issues and particularly on 
violence against women. Violence inside the family is a big problem’ (Balqa, 12 
January 2011). Eman is mostly referring to laws that grant leniency for murders 
committed in the name of family honour and impose reduced penalties for such 
murders.15 Although the focus on laws was greater than I had expected, particularly 
among middle- and upper-class women, some female candidates who lived in remote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Articles 98 and 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code.  
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and poor areas outside Amman and came from lower social classes focused their 
campaigns on economic empowerment as a way to emancipate women, trying to find 
ways to offer women more work opportunities and to increase women’s 
representation in the workplace.  
As became clear to me during the interviews, the majority of the female candidates 
I talked to had had a relatively explicit focus on gender inequality and disadvantage in 
their campaigns. However, a minority of the women I interviewed had preferred to 
use a different strategy. Some highly educated candidates involved in the field of 
business had chosen not to address women’s rights in their campaigns for strategic 
reasons, as Hind, from Amman, neatly told me: 
 
I do not have an agenda focused on women’s rights. This issue is 
very sensitive. And men prefer not to have women talking about 
women’s rights. That is why I focused my campaign on the entire 
community and not exclusively on women. But if elected, I would 
have addressed women’s rights, especially with reference to 
education. At the moment, our educational system weakens the role 
of women in our society. For instance, in books, the mother of the 
family is always described as a housewife, and the father as the 
paterfamilias. The daughter stays at home with her mother to clean 
the house, and it is the boy who goes out with the father to do the 
grocery shopping. So, if elected, I would have focused on the 
curricula, for instance (Amman, 1 February 2011). 
 
The patriarchal nature of society, and the ways in which women are perceived by 
their male counterparts, are reflected in Hind’s decision not to explicitly address 
women’s rights in order to gain the legitimacy to serve as a representative, since being 
a woman in politics can be still considered taboo.  
The intersections between different professional backgrounds, levels of education, 
tribal relations, ethnic origins, (Islamic) party membership, involvement with 
women’s groups and places of residence led to diverse campaigns and strategies 
among the women I interviewed. A previous involvement with women’s groups does 
not automatically lead a candidate to focus her campaign on the promotion of gender 
justice at the national level. Indeed, in the cases of Jaleela and the MP from Tafilah, 
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their close relationships with their tribes and communities influenced their campaigns, 
leaving the gender dimension partially unexplored. However, if a candidate has been 
involved in women’s rights groups, her campaign is more likely to address gender 
justice: 15 out of the 26 candidates I interviewed were members of or connected to the 
main national women’s organisations, the JNCW, the GFJW, the JNFW and the JWU, 
and with seven of these I was able to have in-depth discussions about the promotion 
of women’s rights. If a candidate has had experience of or involvement with women’s 
groups in Jordan, this helps her to be more confident, and more aware of women’s 
rights and discrimination against women. This is not just the case for Jordan, but has 
also been argued with reference to other countries. In her recent research on narratives 
about women MPs in the Indian parliament, Rai (2012) shows that ‘social movements 
are the field of politics within which aspirant individuals develop their political 
networks and skills,’ providing the stage on which ‘political performance is crafted’ 
(202–203) – and I would add, increasing awareness of women’s rights among MPs, 
reflecting the diversity of strategies and visions. Moreover, adherence to a specific 
religion (Islam in this case), does not automatically lead to its promotion when it 
comes to women’s rights: Islam was addressed by women members of the al-Wasat 
Islamic party only. Lastly, being of Palestinian origin focused candidates’ attention on 
the modification of the Nationality Law more than on other laws that discriminate 
against women (such as the personal status code, or the penal code in relation to 
violence against women). 
Female candidates and MPs are not the only actors who are likely to represent 
women’s rights, especially according to the framework developed by Celis et al. 
(2008). What then is the relationship between the ways in which candidates bring 
women’s rights into public debate and the role of women’s organisations in 
campaigning on these issues? It is crucial for my analysis of the substantive 
representation of women to consider the diverse approaches, strategies and tensions 
between women’s organisations.  
 
Diversity in women’s organising: state control and donor influence 
 
In chapter two, I introduced the historical background and development of women’s 
organising in Jordan, and particularly highlighted the differences between 
independent organisations such as the JWU and their royal and semi-governmental 
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counterparts, as well as their activities and my own experience while visiting them. In 
chapter four I analysed how organisations such as the JWU, JNCW and JNFW 
understood, operationalised and translated political empowerment and gender 
mainstreaming policies into practice with reference to the activities organised for 
candidates in the 2010 parliamentary elections. In this chapter I will analyse the 
diversity among women’s organisations on the basis of external factors that contribute 
to the fragmentation of the women’s ‘movement’. This analysis will help me to 
discuss which women’s rights are advocated by women’s organisations, and the 
extent to which female candidates and MPs relate to women’s organisations in 
challenging gender inequalities. 
 As emerges from the activities of these organisations described in chapter two and 
four, the issues of concern to women activists are very similar, focusing on – but not 
limited to – economic and political empowerment, social security, and violence 
against women. As Reem, an activist working on violence against women, revealed to 
me during our discussion of the varieties of women activists: ‘We share common 
issues, such as the issue of nationality, the issue of changing the Personal Status Law, 
and the issue of violence. But each of us has different opinions and approaches’ 
(Amman, 28 April 2011). The activities of state-sponsored organisations are more 
focused on analysis and research directed towards the implementation or modification 
of laws through institutional channels; for grassroots organisations such as the JWU, 
and to a certain extent also the JNFW, services to women at the grassroots are more 
evident, and lobbying activities take place through civil society networks and street 
demonstrations. The JNCW is both a women’s coalition and a service-oriented 
organisation, in line with DAWN’s classification (Sen and Grown, 1987: 89–96); but 
given its explicit role in monitoring compliance with international conventions such 
as the CEDAW, it might be perceived partly as a think tank. The JNFW and the JWU 
might be considered service-oriented and grassroots organisations. Moreover, while 
for the JNCW lobbying takes place through institutional channels and by writing 
official reports, the JWU adopts different strategies, both by organising debates 
among various actors within civil society, and by demonstrating and protesting in the 
street.  
Although the different historical backgrounds and strategies of each organisation 
should ideally reflect the diversity of women in Jordan, this is not always the case. As 
Joseph (1997: 57) argues in relation to the status of women’s organisations in 
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Lebanon, women’s groups can reinforce inequalities based on class, religion, ethnicity 
or gender; thus they need to be scrutinised for their reproduction of social systems of 
discrimination. However, organisations (or think tanks) established through a top-
down approach, as is the case with the JNCW, do not seem to have been meant to be 
inclusive in the first place: they often over-represent ‘professionals’, such as lawyers, 
because they consider their role to be technical. This point recalls my criticism in 
chapter four of the ways in which gender mainstreaming rhetoric may treat 
compliance as a technical issue, rather than as a political issue with transformative 
potential.  
Furthermore, these systems of discrimination can be reproduced not only through 
the personnel of institutions, but also through the politics of the institution itself, 
which may reflect the politics the country. Indeed, although the state cannot 
completely control an organisation from the inside, by establishing and co-opting 
agendas and strategies, it may enhance it through the force of law. According to some 
activists with the AWO, the various laws16 that frame and regulate women’s 
organisations and actions in Jordan tend to limit women’s actions in relation to social 
services; this situation deteriorated particularly after 11 September 2001. Since then, 
the political and economic relationship between Jordan and the United States became 
closer and stronger,17 and at the same time the state’s control over civil society 
activities increased through the force of law. According to Leila Hamarneh, the 
project director of AWO:  
 
Civil society organisations have been strong and well established in 
Jordan. They had the power to affect government policies, but since 
2001, and because of the ‘war on terror’, the freedom of NGOs has 
been restricted. NGOs are no longer working for people; they are 
competing with the government. Especially since the 2008 law that 
limited NGOs’ freedom of action, this government has been 
suppressing NGOs: it wants to control them (Amman, 11 January 
2011). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Women’s organisations are regulated by the 2008 Law of Societies No. 51 and its amendments. 
17 After 11 September 2001, Jordan became the sixth largest recipient of US aid. See chapter two for an 
analysis of the relationship between Jordan and the US. 
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The 2008 Law of Societies (amended in 2009)18 restricts associations’ freedom of 
action by prohibiting any pursuit of ‘political objectives’ and activities that violate 
‘public order’ (HRW, 2009). Independent organisations such as the JWU and AWO 
have to balance state control with their political agendas; government-related 
organisations already know that they have limited space for action. The different 
ideologies behind the agendas of each group, and the different levels of control 
imposed by the state, lead to discrepancies between women’s organisations, thus 
potentially undermining the promotion of gender justice in Jordan. However, different 
relationships with the state are not the only reason for this diversity. 
Activists in Jordan feel that women’s organisations were more unified before 
donors started to influence civil society (interview at the JWU, 11 April 2011). 
According to Randa, the gender consultant, the lack of cooperation between women’s 
organisations can be attributed also, but not exclusively, to donors’ policies: 
 
Donors play a negative role here [referring to divisions among 
women’s organisations]. They split the pie: on the one hand, the EU 
and the UN support leftist organisations. On the other hand, USAID 
supports royal and governmental organisations. But they do not 
make enough efforts to work together (Amman, 8 March 2011).  
 
The role and impact of donors on civil society is certainly not peculiar to Jordan, 
and it raises questions for many post-colonial societies. The impact of foreign funding 
on civil society and the practices of women’s movements have been a concern of 
scholars and activists in the region, as in the cases of Palestine (Jad, 2004; Richter-
Devroe, 2009), Egypt (Al-Ali, 2000; Al-Ali, 2003) and Iraq (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009b; 
Mojab, 2007), and have produced new debates about the independence and political 
role of NGOs. In the case of Palestine, for instance, Richter-Devroe (2009) and others 
(Hammami, 1995; Jad, 2004) have shown that the NGO-isation of civil society in the 
wake of the Oslo Accords led to the fragmentation of the grassroots social movement 
into smaller NGOs, which often compete for the same funds (Richter-Devroe, 2009: 
169).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Law Amending the Law on Societies, No. 22 of 2009. 
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In Jordan, similarly to Egypt, where some of the debates among activists revolved 
around ‘good’ and ‘bad’ donors (Al-Ali, 2000: 202), I found myself involved in 
discussions with activists concerning which donors and countries to accept money 
from. Besides receiving support from national institutions such as ministries, 
government-related organisations such as the JNCW collaborate with UN agencies 
and USAID. On the other hand, independent organisations such as the JWU and 
AWO reject any type of support from US-related donors, including the NDI, the IRI 
and USAID itself, which is considered to be representative of ‘western hegemonies’, 
as Nadia Shamrouk, the director of the JWU, stressed: ‘The United States are the 
cause of many political crises all over the third world. And through their donors they 
provide money for development and projects. But we, as the JWU, do not trust their 
support at all’ (Amman, 17 January 2011). Nadia Shamrouk is mainly referring to the 
ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, but also to the more recent invasion of Iraq. Political 
and historical events have also influenced her attitude to UN agencies’ support, as she 
explained to me about the JWU’s recent collaboration with UNIFEM (now called 
UN–WOMEN):  
 
For a long time we were not in contact with UNIFEM. Two years 
ago UNIFEM started to contact us, and now we are collaborating on 
an anti-trafficking project with them. The UN system, if considered 
only for its humanitarian work and activities, is good. But if you 
consider its political influence over international relations, it is 
weak. In the case of Iraq and Palestine, for instance, the UN did 
nothing, and most importantly they did not try to influence the 
political situation in a positive way (Amman, 17 January 2011). 
 
In response to my question whether this cooperation with UNIFEM did not 
contradict her views on foreign funding, Nadia Shamrouk justified it as a matter of 
cooperation and changes in leadership: ‘During recent years, the UN agencies have 
become more cooperative: sometimes it is also a matter of the person in charge of the 
regional office. This made the difference.’ The relationships between activists and the 
types of person at the top of organisations constitute an influencing factor in the 
building of vertical collaborations not only between donors and organisations, but 
also between organisations and their members, as I will address in the following 
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sections. However, the JWU, like many other independent women’s organisations, 
mainly relies on ‘better-accepted’ donors, such as the EU or European (Swedish, 
Greek, Spanish and Italian) NGOs, which are considered less ‘hegemonic’. 
Surprisingly to me, the debate on foreign funding did not question whether it is 
appropriate to accept foreign financial support; it was assumed that funding support is 
necessary for the sustainability of organisations, and the search for funding is a well-
developed organisational practice. However, the reliance on foreign funding raises 
questions about the credibility of the agendas promoted by the organisations, 
especially the independent ones. Lucine, an anthropologist I met, was concerned 
about the spread of foreign funding and its potential to undermine an independent 
agenda: 
 
I feel that there is no independent feminist19 agenda in Jordan. 
There are many organisations that call for women’s rights, but all 
these get funds from outside Jordan. And I do not know whether 
they were active before they got the funds, or if they became active 
only after getting the funds. It is just that they are very dependent on 
external funds (Amman, 6 June 2011). 
 
While Lucine may be right in relation to some of the smaller independent 
organisations, the history of the main women’s organisations demonstrates that their 
agendas have been shaped by political and social factors. In the case of the JWU, for 
instance, Nadia Shamrouk convincingly explained that she relies on selected donors, 
but without compromising the JWU’s agenda: ‘I write the proposal considering what I 
want to do and to work on; I do not follow donors’ guidelines’ (Amman, 17 January 
2011). The significance of Nadia Shamrouk’s words needs to be considered in light of 
the fact that the JWU is a highly recognised organisation, both nationally and 
internationally. If the JWU has a close relationship with certain donors, the same 
cannot be said for new and younger organisations. In the latter cases, the having to 
follow strict donor guidelines might undermine the independence of certain groups. 
If foreign funding has helped to widen the already existing gaps among women’s 
organisations, the ‘lack of courage’ arising from different approaches and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 By ‘feminist’, Lucine means an agenda that promotes gender equality and justice.  
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relationships to the state is still a matter of concern, in relation not only to horizontal 
collaborations between organisations, but also to relationships between organisations 
and women at the grassroots, as I will discuss in the following sections. The creation 
of networks and attempts at collaboration are happening, but the links are very weak, 
as an activist I interviewed at the JWU told me: 
 
We try to collaborate with other organisations, but you get to a 
certain point and you do not go forward. Take the family law as an 
example: we made a coalition, but when the government and the 
Islamic movement criticised us, a lot of the organisations withdrew 
(Amman, 11 April 2011). 
 
The activist is referring to the moderation that royal and governmental 
organisations demonstrate in their campaigns for reforms of the personal status code, 
the Nationality Law, or laws that regulate so-called honour crimes. Given the 
political, cultural and social sensitivity of these reforms, economic or political 
empowerment in the form of women’s increased participation in politics and the 
workforce is a ‘safer’ and less compromising ground of action. This lack of radical 
change concerning women’s rights and gender justice has characterised the 
‘movement’ in the past no less than in the present. Scholars such as Brand (1998) and 
Warrick (2009: 143) describe the ‘movement’ as overly bourgeois, but consider the 
moderate approach a necessary condition for its success (Warrick, 2009: 143–144) – 
with an attendant risk that it will reproduce power relations and social hierarchies, I 
might add. I also believe that the lack of political will to build better cooperation 
among women’s groups, whether independent or state-driven, is at the root of this 
lack of collaboration, as Randa, the gender consultant, also pointed out: 
 
Local organisations say that they need to cooperate, but when they 
come together, nothing happens. There is no institution that is 
credible, including the JNCW. There are the Ministry of Social and 
Political Development and the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, with a gender focal point at the 
ministerial level – but what do these institutions mean to women’s 
organisations? The demands of these institutions are not clear to 
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them or to the organisations. Something drastic needs to be done in 
order to make them work together (Amman, 8 March 2011). 
 
Randa stresses the importance of stronger cooperation, but she also underlines that 
the actors involved in the representation of women’s rights are not limited to women’s 
organisations; they involve other women’s policy agencies at the national level, 
recalling Celis et al.’s (2008) argument about the multiplicity of actors in the 
substantive representation of women. As long as there are obstacles in the way of 
communication between different actors, change seems difficult to achieve. 
 
National gender machineries: lack of political will 
 
As I clarified at the beginning of the chapter, and as I have tried to address in my 
analysis of state-related organisations, in order to supplement the debates on the 
substantive representation of women, an exploration of the constitutive representation 
of gender is necessary. Drawing on the literature on gender mainstreaming (Verloo, 
2001; Rai, 2003; True, 2003; Squires, 2005), and on the assumption that all policies 
constitute gender relations in particular ways, some of them more conducive of 
equality than others (Squires, 2008: 190), representation may be understood as a 
constitutive practice. Highlighting the extent to which the effects of such practices 
will be determined by particular networks of power (Squires, 2008: 192), the analysis 
of representative practices needs to be extended beyond national legislatures; the use 
of national gender machineries can be considered as a strategy for distributing 
women’s gender interests across state and local institutions.  
Most of the critiques of the institutionalisation of gender at the national level are 
related to the lack of awareness in gender planning and the lack of resources (Moser, 
1993: 118; Larson, 2008; Staudt, 1998). While I was in Jordan I had the opportunity 
to meet Majd and Khulud, two women working in the gender units20 of the Ministry 
of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and the Ministry of Social and 
Political Development (MoSPD). Majd seemed to be very pessimistic, resigned to the 
fact that only ‘a few people care about gender’ (interview with Majd, 22 March 2011) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The institutionalisation of gender at the national level in Jordan started at the end of 1997, with the 
establishment of ‘gender focal points’ within ministries and public institutions. Refer to chapter two for 
a historical analysis of this. 
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and that people assigned to the gender focal points usually do not even know what 
gender means.21 She recalled how in 1995 a gender section had been established at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, but since it was not considered to be as important as other 
departments, it had quickly been closed down. This attitude on the government’s side 
is also reflected in the way ‘gender focal points’ are created and integrated within 
ministries. In line with Jahan (1995), there are two possible models for the inclusion 
of gender policies in an institution: the first is the integrationist approach,22 and the 
second is the agenda-setting approach23 (12–13). According to Majd, it is the first 
approach that is preferred at the national level. However, she was very disappointed 
about this strategy adopted by the government, because she felt that it was not the 
right one:  
 
Although they [the government] created around 45 gender focal 
points… gender focal points came just at the end of the process. I 
mean, referring to the discussion of the national agenda, we were 
not involved at the beginning of the meetings. At the end of it, they 
just told us: now review the agenda from a gender perspective 
(Amman, 22 March 2011).  
 
It is true that an integrationist approach is possibly the ‘easiest way to achieve 
tangible gains in gender equality’ (Larson, 2008: 10), but it leaves gender relations 
and socio-political norms unchallenged. Treating ‘gender’ as a component and adding 
a gendered lens only at the end of the policy process, as happened in the case of 
gender focal points in Jordan, will not interrogate the intersections between gender, 
race and ethnicity or the differences among women, leaving gender hierarchies 
unchallenged.  
This attitude reflects the lack of political will on the part of the government to 
champion women’s rights and gender issues. In March 2011 I participated in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Majd’s criticisms recall my analysis of the understanding and conceptualisation of gender and its 
mainstreaming among international and local organisations, discussed in chapter four.  
22 According to Jahan (1995), the integrationist approach ‘builds gender issues within existing 
development paradigms; the overall development agenda is not transformed but each issue is adapted 
to take into account women and gender concerns’ (12–13). 
23 The agenda-setting approach ‘implies transformation of the existing development agenda with a 
gender perspective […]. It is not simply women as individuals, but a “women’s agenda” that gets 
recognition from the mainstream’ (Jahan, 1995: 13). 
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conference organised by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 
(EMHRN),24 and one of the debates addressed ‘how far gender mainstreaming has 
been promoted nationally’. The attending crowd, which was mainly comprised of 
women’s rights activists and NGO representatives, seemed to be very sceptical about 
it, denouncing the government’s lack of political will to pursue social change. Such 
political will is necessary for gender mainstreaming to achieve positive effects 
(Unmüßig, 2009), and especially for it to be transformative. In her analysis of national 
women’s machineries in Afghanistan, Larson (2008) argues that political will is an 
‘essential component to the furthering of gender mainstreaming’ (61), although 
technical mechanisms or institutional contexts need to be considered as well.  
The lack of political will is also reflected in the technical difficulties faced by the 
women I interviewed in both gender units, thanks to the lack of interest in investing 
resources in the promotion of gender justice. First they complained of a lack of human 
resources. The gender units at MoPIC and the MoSPD have no more than three 
employees each, and not all of these have a background in or good knowledge of 
gender issues, as Majd and Khulud told me. Second, they depend on external sources 
for financial support, receiving funding from international donors or national 
organisations. Third, their lack of a clear mandate is detrimental to the recognition of 
and support for their work at the national level. In November 2008, in partnership 
with the JNCW, the GSF organised a meeting for representatives from 
gender/women’s units, gender/women’s focal points and gender/women’s directorates 
working in some of the governmental organisations. They discovered that, at that 
time, only MoPIC had a clear mandate for the promotion of gender equality, and that 
the work in the other ministries related to gender mainstreaming was always led and 
supported by outside agencies (Suliman, 2010).   
The combination of these three factors and the lack of internal credibility have 
pushed these gender units to the margins of decision-making processes at national and 
international levels in Jordan: they lack ‘resources, authority and expertise to achieve 
their objectives’ (Stienstra, 1994: 95).25 The difficulties already facing collaboration 
between women’s organisations do not help to achieve any kind of integration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 http://www.euromedrights.org/eng/ [accessed 8 March 2013]. 
25 This is not only the case in Jordan. As described in chapter one many countries established women’s 
policy offices, particularly during the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985). However, the limited 
number of instruments and resources actually provided to these units made fulfilling their broad 
mandates incredibly difficult. 
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between the agendas of national machineries and those organisations’ activities. Majd 
confirmed this during our discussion: ‘In recent years we have been trying to ask 
organisations and civil society to try to put forward their awareness of gender issues, 
but organisations are not cooperating with each other, and it is difficult to work when 
there is no unified network’ (Amman, 22 April 2011). As long as the reproduction of 
social hierarchies comes from institutions that are meant to work towards the 
promotion of women’s rights, and as long as cooperation and trust between formal 
and informal organisations is weak, there is a risk that gender relations will remain 
unchallenged even within the main representatives of women’s rights. 
Given the multiplicity of actors involved in the representation of women in Jordan 
and the tensions within and between them, I ask whether and to what extent this 
disconnection and diversity are reflected in candidates’ and MPs’ relationships with 
state-driven and independent organisations. This analysis will conclude my discussion 
of the substantive representation of women in Jordan. 
 
Tensions in the representation of gender interests 
 
The female candidates I interviewed came from different social classes – mainly the 
middle and upper classes – diverse ethnic origins and very different educational and 
professional backgrounds: during my time in Jordan, I met community workers, 
lawyers, businesswomen, women activists, teachers and housewives. The 
intersections between ethnicity, national origin, religion, social class, occupation, and 
tribal background – which is closely linked to place of residence, thanks to the tribal 
structure of Jordanian society – gave rise to criticisms of the legitimacy of 
organisations’ representation of gender interests and concerns.  
The tensions and problems between organisations of which women activists 
complained are very similar to those pointed out by the female candidates who had 
sought support from particular organisations before the 2010 elections. Although 
several of the candidates I interviewed were extremely grateful for the support of 
local organisations, some of them were very critical. Ahlam was one of them. As she 
took me home after a conference with representatives of women’s organisations, I 
looked at her young face, framed by the elegant hijab she always wears, and saw that 
she looked a little upset. I asked her whether anything was wrong, and she revealed 
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that she could not stand certain type of activism any more. I tried to ask her to be a 
little clearer, and she told me about her experience before the elections: 
 
Before the election law was approved I went to the JNCW. They 
know me on both a personal and a professional level. They know 
that I am a strong woman and that I can speak up. I told them that I 
was going to be a candidate. I asked them for help and support. 
They invited me only to an opening session, not to be a participant 
in their activities. After that, they disappeared (Amman, 3 March 
2011). 
 
Ahlam had been expecting to receive a different kind of support from the JNCW, 
since she had also had some contact with them in the past. However, when I asked her 
why she had not wanted to seek support from other organisations, she quickly replied 
that she did not trust any of the women’s organisations. For instance, she did not want 
to get support from the JWU because of their very politicised nature. As I listened to 
her I understood the political role the JNCW played among women in Jordan, 
especially before elections. Since the JNCW is a government-sponsored organisation, 
women like Ahlam want to get its support, as if its being government-related might 
improve their chances of winning the elections, a kind of government endorsement. 
This is particularly true for women who do not belong to big, powerful tribes, such as 
Ahlam, whose family still lives in Palestine. Since the support of the tribe is not 
consistent, some women turn to other state-related institutions. 
While Ahlam’s criticism and mistrust of the JNCW and women’s organisations in 
general might be traced back to her origin as a Palestinian, for other women it was 
more a matter of social class and professional background, both of which were linked 
to the issue of elitism. This was the case with Dr Sabah, whom I presented in chapters 
three and four. Dr Sabah, an educated and plain-speaking candidate from Karak, was 
hoping to get some support from the JNCW, but this did not happen, and her 
discussion of this with me raised the problem of elite women: 
 
Every woman in a good position in our community… and I am 
sorry to say this, but she just works for herself. The women running 
local organisations do not work for the women’s ‘movement’. 
	   215 
When you see women in these positions, they have been the same 
for 20 or 30 years. There are many good women in our community 
and they should take their chance. They do not listen to us. Not 
every change comes out of the struggles of women in Jordan. I did 
not have their support. I was expecting them to call me and 
encourage me. Why did the NDI call me? And why didn’t any of 
them [local organisations] call me? They did not want to support 
me. In my opinion, they ought to have asked themselves: where is 
there a good woman? Let’s support her. But they did not. They are 
jealous. I received a phone call from the JNCW only when they 
announced that I had won, but it was not the final result and I did 
not win in the end. They called me and congratulated me. But why 
didn’t they call me before and ask if I needed any support? They 
want to be the first women in Jordan – but they are old, and they 
should hand over to the new generation (Amman, 18 January 2011). 
 
Jealousy between women was also pointed out with reference to voting decisions, 
as previously discussed. However, I believe that Dr Sabah’s account neatly addresses 
the issue of the position of the older generation of women activists as leaders. And 
like Ahlam, Dr Sabah relies on the support of the JNCW, yet being critical; but the 
criticisms are limited to the role of single persons. Ahlam’s and Dr Sabah’s accounts 
lead me to two different aspects. First, there is the problem of elitism in the leadership 
positions of the main women’s organisations – although it has to be said that the 
whole country is dominated by a narrow elite, and that this phenomenon is not limited 
to women’s organisations. Second, why does a governmental organisation such as the 
JNCW retain its credibility when the very legitimacy of the state is being called into 
question, as the recent uprisings show?  
Most of the time the female candidates I interviewed were not complimentary 
about the efforts of the lone woman at the top of their local organisation: they were 
demanding generational change and better support for women who want to pursue a 
career in politics, with no discrimination on the basis of class or education. This is not 
only the case in Jordan: in her analysis of women’s organisations in Lebanon, 
especially of organisations that outlive their founders, Joseph (1997: 58) stresses that 
leaders tend to stay in leadership positions for long periods (10–50 years), thereby 
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creating a close identification between the leader and the organisation. In line with 
Joseph’s comment, a female candidate from Karak told me while drinking tea: ‘There 
is a need for a new generation of women in those organisations. We need young 
people’ (Amman, 23 January 2011). The words of the candidate recall Adnan’s 
(1982) comment on Arab leaders in general: ‘When they arrive in power they grow 
into their chairs, until they, body and chair, become inseparable’ (Adnan, 1982: 76 in 
Joseph, 1997: 64). One activist from Irbid went beyond the generational discourse, 
complaining that the main women at the head of women’s organisations do not trust 
women at the grassroots: ‘Also, leaders of these organisations need to believe more in 
volunteering work and in women’s role: they just work to get their position, their 
prestige’ (Amman, 4 May 2011). This activist confirms Suad Joseph’s argument 
(1997) that ‘organisational achievements are closely linked to the class privileges, 
personal networks, and the specific skills of the leader’ (58).  
The charges of elitism raise questions about the ways in which gender interests are 
represented, given the multiplicity of actors involved. On 23 May 2011, I had the 
chance to participate in a meeting at the Senate organised by Senator Leila Sharaf26 
and MP Abla Abu Elbeh27 with the representatives of the main women’s 
organisations in Jordan. The purpose of the meeting was to establish a coordination 
committee, comprising members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and 
leaders of women’s organisations, in order to work to identify legislative priorities for 
women. Senator Leila Sharaf opened the meeting, saying: ‘There are too many issues 
that are important for women. And if we do not speak up for women, nobody is going 
to do it’ (Amman, 23 May 2011). In her words, women’s organisations and women in 
politics serve as the main representatives of women’s rights in Jordan. However, most 
of the women in political office and at the head of women’s organisations were 
considered by many of the female candidates I interviewed to have been ‘hired by the 
government in order to show their faces at the international and regional level’ 
(interview with female candidate, Amman, 18 February 2011). This lack of trust in 
the women who serve as representatives of women’s rights reinforces the 
disconnection between organisations’ agendas and women’s gender interests at the 
grassroots.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 A Jordanian of Lebanese origin, Leila Sharaf is a Senator and former Minister of Information (1984–
1985). 
27 Of Palestinian origin, Abla Abu Elbeh is a member of the Jordanian parliament, and is the First 
Secretary of the Jordanian Democratic People’s Party.  
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In line with this critique, Toujan Faisal, the first female MP elected to Jordanian 
parliament, was very sceptical about the representative role of women’s organisations. 
She told me: 
 
Women’s organisations are a sort of elite in Jordan. Only the 
Jordanian Women Union, which fought against the state, is active. 
The women’s ‘movement’ is there, but it is more social and is not 
organised. The real ‘movement’ is integrated within the reforms and 
modernisation policies in Jordan (Amman, 7 June 2011). 
 
Toujan sees the ‘movement’ as included in the process of democratisation, and as 
part of the social fabric. The reforms and modernisation policies she cites form part of 
the demands made during the recent street demonstrations, which started in early 
2011. As outlined in chapter two, during the time I spent in Jordan, none of the main 
women’s organisations participated in the Arab uprisings, except for the JWU. Direct 
participation in the street is an act of resistance to state power, and only independent 
organisations such as the JWU tried to mobilise people to demonstrate. This non-
participation in demonstrations helped to widen the gaps that already existed among 
women’s organisations, and between women’s groups and women at the grassroots 
level. Similarly, Hanafi and Tabar (2005) point out that most of the NGOs in 
Palestine failed to take a leadership role in mobilising the grassroots for collective 
resistance, increasing the disconnection between NGOs and popular movements.  
This disconnection leads me to my second point: how can a government-related 
organisation retain its credibility when the state’s role and legitimacy are being 
questioned? I will attempt to answer to this question in relation to the JNCW, which 
serves as an umbrella organisation bringing different women’s organisations together, 
and which was the organisation most often referred to during my interviews with 
female candidates. Its role as an ‘umbrella organisation’ emerged from my brief but 
helpful interview with Asma Khader in her office, who told me: ‘The JNCW 
represents and coordinates the network of women’s organisations and activists all 
around Jordan’ (Amman, 28 November 2010). Her words seem to identify the 
women’s ‘movement’ with one organisation that encompasses other women’s 
organisations in Jordan; this excludes those organisations that are not members of the 
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JNCW, and raises questions about the legitimacy of the representation of gender 
interests. 
The role of the JNCW was often criticised by my interviewees, because of its 
government relationships, and for establishing its goals and mission from a top-down 
perspective that is ‘carefully orchestrated from above’ (Brand, 1998: 124; Al-Atiyat, 
2003; interviews with candidates, March – April 2011), without taking proper 
consideration of women’s needs at the grassroots. Its status as a governmental 
organisation adds to the impression that the JNCW is unable to sustain networks and 
collaborations among other organisations and groups. The activist from Irbid, who 
was a member of the JNFW, was pretty clear on this: ‘The JNCW should be the 
umbrella organisation, but it is weak. We, the JNFW, are the first partner of the 
JNCW. But they do not keep us informed of any changes or of their strategic plan’ 
(Amman, 4 May 2011).  
Given that organisations such as the JNCW find their raison d’être in their links 
with the government, I would question the value of such organisations in the first 
place. But again, this type of organisation makes no claims to independence, being a 
technocratic think tank. The question may be whether some sets of conjunctures 
might facilitate cooperation between institutions like the JNCW and the more 
independent NGOs, thereby creating a massive pressure for legislative change. 
Nevertheless, thanks to its state-sponsored structure, it seems to me that the JNCW 
is still regarded as the first port of call for female candidates who want the support of 
a women’s organisation. So why do some candidates, especially those with a higher 
level of education28 and a strong professional background, turn to this organisation, 
while at the same time they are challenging the state’s actions?  
In the current political situation of internal economic instability and regional 
uncertainty, as described in chapter two, the King and the government are constantly 
under the scrutiny of people in Jordan and across the region – now more than ever, in 
light of the crisis in neighbouring Syria. The legitimacy of the state has been 
questioned more than once in the last three years, especially when Friday 
demonstrations started to take place on other days of the week to call for economic 
reform and the ending of corruption. This situation has led to the appointment of five 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Those holding Masters or PhD degrees and in high-status occupational positions. 
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different prime ministers29 since the end of 2010, and to new parliamentary elections 
in January 2013. Although changing the political figure at the top of an institution 
may give people a degree of hope, it is only through real economic and political 
reform that the country will actually benefit.  
The female candidates I interviewed who were most critical of the government 
were also the most sceptical about state-sponsored women’s organisations. So if 
women are challenging and questioning the very authority of the state, why do they 
still seek the support of state-related organisations? Although it is extremely difficult 
to fully grasp the real intentions of candidates running for elections, at first I saw this 
unchallenged reliance on the JNCW as hypocritical. However, as I analysed the 
hurdles that most of the women faced before the elections (described in chapters three 
and four), I realised that the JNCW might be the only space where they would be able 
to get the necessary support. This is particularly true for women with little support 
from their families or tribes. Even if they are very critical of the government and the 
role of the JNCW, their desire to get into parliament may be so strong as to outweigh 
their concerns about the source of the support that enables them to do so. The same 
may also be true of women who are easily co-opted by their tribes or communities, as 
they consider support from their tribe to be their only way into a position in politics. 
The question is whether and to what extent the women will advocate women’s rights 
once elected – something that I have been questioning throughout this chapter. 
Finally, even though the ‘femocrats’ in state-sponsored institutions might represent 
the elite and be allied to the government, they might also be among the few people 
(together with independent groups as the JWU) who are trying to contest existing 
legislative arrangements, yet timidly, mainly because of their easy access to resources 
and networks. 
I do not seek to justify an unchallenged dependence on sources of support that 
might co-opt female candidates’ actions, whether those sources be political parties, 
tribes or state-related women’s organisations. However, I would like to point out that, 
in a society rooted in patronage and clientelism, these forms of support might be a 
way for a woman to become part of public life, especially when a candidate does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The last three appointed were Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh, Fayez al-Tarawneh and Abdullah 
Ensour. Jordanian prime ministers have always been royal appointees, but after the 2013 elections the 
new prime minister and government contributed to the nomination, following extensive consultations 
between the palace and the newly elected parliament (Ryan, 2013). 
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seek and/or does not want the support of an independent yet highly politicised 
organisation such as the JWU. Not all of the female candidates I interviewed 
questioned this opportunistic approach – an approach often taken in the game of 
politics, in which people try to maximise their options. A few of them were hoping 
that, although they were prepared to bargain with state co-option during the elections 
(i.e. by seeking the support of the JNCW), this would not continue once they had 
gained entry into parliament. However, as the development of women’s organisations 
has demonstrated, it is very difficult for those on the inside to advocate change 
without becoming instrumentalised by the state structure. In this regard, we need to 
bear in mind that there are also some women who refuse any connection with state-
sponsored organisations, and that there are fully independent bodies such as the JWU 
and the AWO. 
The tensions among and between female candidates, MPs and women’s 
organisations are complicated, nuanced and multifaceted. These problematic relations 
certainly have consequences for the promotion of gender justice and for the future for 
women’s rights in Jordan. 
 
Conclusions 
 
I am not pessimistic, I am realistic: if things will continue to work 
in this way, the status of women’s rights in the country won’t get 
any better (interview with JWU activist, London, 7 March 2013). 
 
As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, multiple actors constitute the 
substantive representation of women. However, the different relationships within and 
between female candidates, female MPs, women’s organisations and national 
machineries reflect the tensions within and among all of these groups. Through the 
analysis of the experiences of female candidates and MPs, I have been able to 
describe the negotiations they make in order to pursue their campaigns (in the case of 
candidates) and work in parliament (in the case of MPs). Through these experiences I 
have shown how each story helps to create what Rai (2012) describes as the ‘complex 
picture of gender politics’ (209). The intersections between class, education, tribal 
support, professional background, national origin, ethnicity, religion and location 
influence the political agendas of each candidate and MP, together with their 
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involvement with women’s organisations or groups. When candidates and MPs are 
involved with women’s groups, it is more likely that they will become aware of issues 
concerning women’s rights that have a national impact.  
The representation of gender interests reveals a very complicated picture, and the 
interests involved are multifaceted. In the current situation in Jordan, gender interests 
may continue to be defined from a top-down perspective by an elitist group of women 
who can be easily co-opted, not only by the government and the royal family, but also 
by the international community. With the exception of independent groups such as the 
JWU, the older generation of women who represent the official organisations for 
women’s rights risk becoming disconnected from the interests of women at the 
grassroots. Although their position is extremely complicated in regard to their 
relationships with their own tribes, communities or parties, female candidates might 
be more connected to the needs of women at the grassroots.  
The disconnection between different actors and the multiplicity of women’s 
organisations reflect the plurality of women in the country, raising questions about the 
representativeness of gender interests. Given that women (like men) do not constitute 
a homogeneous group, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for women’s 
organisations, female candidates and MPs to represent and speak up for all women in 
Jordan. Moreover, only independent organisations such as the JWU seem to be more 
willing to explicitly challenge gender inequality – but their work is often limited by 
the strict control of the state.  
The lack of political will to create better cooperation among women’s 
organisations and develop the role and impact of national machineries for the 
promotion of gender justice might therefore reinforce the existing disconnections 
within civil society in Jordan. Elitism, foreign funding and close relationships with 
the state are the main causes of these disconnections. However, I argue that as long as 
the intersections of gender, class, tribe, ethnicity, religion, education and professional 
background are not taken into consideration in the various organisations’ agendas, 
and as long as women are treated as a homogeneous group, the constitutive 
representation of gender will result in the reproduction of social hierarchies.  
When government interests are promoted in tandem with personal ones, the risk of 
a backlash against women’s rights is high. Women’s rights are a fundamental aspect 
of democratisation. But as long as the promotion of women’s rights is associated with 
government- and royal-sponsored organisations in a context where the role of state is 
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becoming increasingly discredited and challenged, there is a danger that attempts to 
promote women’s rights will not lead to transformative social change, as I will further 
problematise in the conclusion.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The current political situation: what future for women’s rights? 
 
As a human being I always have hope. But I am not optimistic right 
now. What is happening in the region is affecting us. And women’s 
rights, as always, are relegated to the back seat. […] The situation is 
stagnant. In a context where the economy is not doing so well, 
corruption is still spreading, and refugees from Syria are increasing 
day by day… women’s rights are not a priority right now. We are 
moving backward, not forward. […] In addition to the stagnation 
that we are experiencing, there are feelings of apathy and 
indifference among people in Jordan. And I feel it among my 
students as well. This critical political and economic situation is not 
helping us to see a brighter future… stagnation, apathy and 
indifference, what a deadly mixture (Professor Rula Quawas, Skype 
interview, 2 April 2013). 
 
I interviewed Professor Rula Quawas a year and a half after I left Jordan. During the 
interview we naturally talked about her experience at the University of Jordan: as 
described in chapter two, she had been dismissed from her post because she had 
assisted a group of students in her feminist theory class to make a short video about 
the sexual harassment experienced by female students on campus, an episode on 
which I will reflect later in this conclusion. But what left me puzzled and frustrated 
during our conversation was her idea of ‘stagnancy’. While I was in Jordan, 
interviewees with whom I discussed the uprisings in the region usually reacted with 
an attitude of ‘let’s wait and see what happens.’ Of course my interviewees did not 
represent the entire population of Jordan, but the comments I heard in regard to the 
situation in the region were striking. I detected an air of waiting, an expectation of 
action by the government or royal family. As discussed in chapter two, every time I 
engaged in such discussions my respondents would remind me that ‘Jordan will not 
end up with a regime change like in Egypt or Tunisia… because we are different.’1  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Field notes, Amman, May 2011. 
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During the last two years, however, something has changed in Jordan, albeit with 
less intensity than in other countries in the region. As Adely (2012b) recently argued 
with reference to the November 2012 uprisings, change is ‘an inevitable product of 
the constant power/resistance dialectic that characterises the politics of everyday life, 
is a constant in social life, even if it does not count as a “something” in policy debates 
in the United States’. Since Jordanian politics is connected to royal patronage, 
clientelism and strong tribal ties, and since the situation of refugees, whether of 
Palestinian, Iraqi or Syrian origin, is having an impact on Jordan’s demographic, 
political and social balance, it is very difficult if not impossible to compare the 
continuum of uprisings in Jordan with those elsewhere in the region.  
Change in Jordan may not come about through an overthrow of royal patronage, 
but it may occur through political and economic reform. During the last parliamentary 
elections (January 2013), the government established an Independent Electoral 
Commission (IED), which was in charge of administering the electoral process. 
Moreover, in response to some of the requests from civil society and people in the 
streets, a national list was adopted, and this increased the participation of political 
parties in the electoral process. Although the work of the IED and the introduction of 
party lists have been criticised by civil society actors (RASED, 2013: 2), they have 
nevertheless been recognised as attempts by the government to improve the very 
precarious political situation. Clearly, the modification of electoral law alone will not 
be enough to improve Jordan’s socio-politico-economic situation, but it is to be hoped 
that a small change might lead to more vigorous reforms in the future.  
However, although I am trying to be optimistic and to remain aware of the peculiar 
context I am analysing, I do feel, as Professor Quawas put it, that the current situation 
in Jordan is stagnant. The euphoria experienced at the beginning of the 
demonstrations back in 2011 is in danger of decreasing day by day, as unemployment 
rates soar,2 proper political reforms fail to materialise, and opposition to the 
government seems weak.  
At the moment, the oppositional forces standing against the government’s actions 
are few. One of the first of these forces, called the ‘alternative opposition’ (Ryan, 
2011), appears to have lost the ground it gained at the beginning of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In the first three months of 2013, percentage of the population of Jordan that is unemployed increased 
to 12.8%, up from 11.4% in the same period in 2012, according to the Department of Statistics. Male 
unemployment stands at 11.1%, compared to 20.5% for women (Derhally, 2013). 
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demonstrations in 2011. With specific reference to women’s rights advocates, as 
described in chapters two, three and five, a few independent women’s organisations 
seem to be taking up the challenge and cause of women’s rights, but their room for 
manoeuvre is still severely limited by the state.  
Apart from the main women’s organisations, during 2012 some independent 
groups of activists, comprising mostly young men and women, tried to openly address 
violence against women in Jordan. There has been an escalation of violence against 
women in the region generally (Kandiyoti, 2013), and it is a widespread problem in 
Jordan too, not only in terms of domestic violence and honour crimes, but also in 
regard to sexual harassment. In June 2012 a diverse range of protesters, organised by 
four groups of activists, took to the streets of Amman to peacefully demonstrate for 
gender justice, creating a ‘human chain’.3 They were particularly contesting the rape-
marriage law (which allows rape charges to be dropped if the perpetrator agrees to 
marry the victim4), the state of women’s citizenship rights, honour crimes, and the 
harassment of women. That protest provoked mixed and sometimes angry comments, 
particularly from those who considered the demonstration to have undermined Islamic 
precepts (Abu Hamid, 2012). Nevertheless, it indicated the extent to which the 
younger generation is starting to challenge gender norms and inequalities, against the 
background of popular uprisings and events in Jordan and throughout the region. 
Most importantly, they are very conscious that women’s and gender issues are not 
marginal but central to transforming the socio-politico-cultural climate of Jordanian 
society. 
As the controversy over this protest revealed, the small number of other opposition 
forces that are resisting co-option by the state appear to be Islamist political parties, 
particularly the Islamic Action Front, which is the main party of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Although the Islamic Action Front does not have any representatives in 
parliament, having boycotted the elections in 2010 and 2013, it seems to be the most 
organised and powerful oppositional force, as its capacity for mobilising on the streets 
during the last two years of demonstrations after Friday prayers suggests (Guarnieri, 
2012). Professor Quawas confirmed this during our interview: ‘They [the Islamic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The first of the four groups is called ‘No Honour in Crime’, and is a campaign to bring honour crimes 
into public discourse. The second, ‘My Mother is Jordanian’, addresses the discriminatory Nationality 
Law. The third group, ‘Mush Shatara’, aims to decrease the incidence of sexual harassment on the 
streets of Jordan. ‘The Crime of 308’ is the fourth group of volunteers, who are trying to repeal Law 
308 of the Jordanian Penal Code (Atalla, 2013). 
4 Article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code. 
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Action Front] are the only organised opposition. You can see the orchestration of their 
system – but they are against everything. We cannot underestimate their power, which 
seems to be latent… but it’s actually there’ (Skype interview, 2 April 2013). 
The Islamic Action Front has female followers, but their positions on gender 
justice are often very conservative. Although the role of the Islamic Action Front does 
not appear to be as overt as in other countries in the region, its power seems to be a 
latent presence. For how long will they remain silent? Only time will tell, but it is 
clear that the rise of Islamists in the region, such as in Egypt, demands more research 
and analysis, particularly in relation to the promotion of women’s rights, including in 
Jordan.  
Thus in this ‘stagnant’ context, to use Professor Quawas’s word, we may be 
witnessing a paradox. On the one hand, the state instrumentalises women’s rights as a 
democratic façade, either through ad hoc women’s organisations or through the 
introduction of ‘soft-option’ (Kandiyoti, 2011) measures such as gender quotas. On 
the other hand, the opposition movements have gender regressive platforms. In this 
context, demands for women’s rights risk being sidelined once again. 
The ‘burden’ of promoting women’s rights therefore inevitably comes back to 
women’s rights activists and women’s organisations, both in Jordan and in the region. 
As I have demonstrated throughout the thesis, each organisation in Jordan has its own 
agenda, was created with different goals, and gets its support from diverse 
institutions, organisations and people. However, given the high risk that the 
privileging of economic and political agendas will leave women’s rights at the 
margins of policymaking, there might be an urgent need to question the premises of 
gender equality and women’s empowerment, not only among national and 
international practitioners, but also among women’s groups, women’s rights activists 
and women in politics in Jordan.  
In the following sections I will clearly state the contributions I aim to make with 
this thesis. I will also discuss the notion of gender equality, and the significance of 
feminist research in light of my analysis. 
 
The politics of gender equality: between intersectionality and social change 
 
Throughout the thesis I have been trying to explore the idea of the politics of social 
change, focusing not only on the ‘Arab uprisings’ but also addressing the wider 
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continuum of social change – which, as described in chapters one and two, did not 
just begin in 2011. Since my specific angle on this research was to analyse the gender 
dimension of social change in democratisation processes, I have been interested in the 
attempts to engineer social change from the outside. The premise behind the rhetoric 
of gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment is linked to the achievement of 
gender equality. But in light of my analysis, what does gender equality actually mean 
in the context of women’s political participation in Jordan? And how can we move 
forwards? 
As previously discussed, I place the individual’s ability to make strategic life 
choices at the core of empowerment (Kabeer, 2005). Therefore, in an ideal world, 
gender equality will imply that individuals can freely choose how to live their own 
lives, and there will be no discrimination on the basis of gender, class, race, religion, 
sexuality or other such factors. However, when we refer to real life and to a specific 
socio-politico-historical context, the picture becomes extremely complicated and 
nuanced.  
Indeed, it is precisely around the notion of gender equality that my thesis makes its 
first contribution. Specifically, I have attempted to widen the debate on gender 
mainstreaming, women’s empowerment and gender quotas by focusing on an often-
neglected case study in the Middle East, i.e. Jordan, hoping to offer some new 
reflections on the promotion of women’s rights in that country. Gender 
mainstreaming is often analysed in relation to post-conflict or conflict situations and 
related to gender-based violence, particularly with reference to the Middle East, as 
discussed in the introduction. Jordan, being a ‘buffer state’ (Bustani, 2012), is not 
directly involved in any conflict situations; however, my research shows that the 
instrumentalisation of women’s rights and gender justice is not limited to conflict or 
post-conflict contexts. 
As has emerged from my analysis in relation to Jordan, there may be two major 
factors that shape and constrain efforts to mainstream gender and empower women in 
global and local policymaking: the gap between feminist theory and institutional 
practice, and the conflict between feminist concepts and values and the broader 
ideological framework of neoliberal economics. Practitioners in the field often 
understand gender equality in two different yet connected ways – that is, with a 
technocratic and/or a legalistic approach. Western multilateral institutions, and also 
some local organisations, often believe that mainstreaming gender means adding 
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women’s projects to their dossier, even though those projects can actually marginalise 
women by creating or sustaining unequal gendered power relations. Moreover, many 
(though not all) people working in the field often have only a superficial 
understanding of what gender means, and they use it simply as a key term to please 
donors, without engaging with its practical implications. Thus in the language of the 
promotion of women’s rights, the words ‘gender’, ‘equality’ and ‘empowerment’ risk 
becoming no more than buzzwords to satisfy the requirements of international donors, 
in a sort of box-ticking approach. As long as gender equality and women’s 
empowerment are reduced to technocratic and very formalistic language, they will not 
necessarily lead to social transformation.  
An exclusively legalistic approach to empowerment and gender equality might also 
be problematic. The gap between existing legislation and how laws are actually 
implemented is a widespread problem, not only in Jordan, but everywhere in the 
world. In the context of Jordan we have witnessed some ‘highlights’, such as the 
introduction of gender quotas analysed in chapter three; but as I have been arguing 
throughout the thesis, merely ‘adding women’ to politics does not necessarily mean 
that women are empowered. Although many of the agendas behind women’s 
empowerment and gender mainstreaming projects, such as those analysed in chapters 
four and five, find their roots in a technocratic, legalistic and rights-based 
understanding of gender equality, in order to achieve full equality in a meaningful and 
genuine sense, equality under the law is not sufficient. I certainly think it is necessary, 
but it is not enough. Achieving formal equality per se, which simply involves ‘adding 
women’ to specific policies, programmes or policies, is not an adequate response to 
gender-based discrimination.  
If we wish to understand and address the institutionalised nature of women’s 
disadvantage, tackling socio-political and cultural systems may be a way to switch 
from a formalistic understating of gender equality to a more substantial and 
transformative one. In this way gender equality will not seek its roots or raison d’être 
only in the rights-based approach, but will directly or indirectly help to address and 
challenge gender relations and norms. As long as a person has the opportunity and 
ability to choose, they will establish what gender equality means for themselves. We 
may therefore need to politicise gender equality in order to develop a framework that 
looks at people’s diverse interests, bearing in mind the differential impact not only of 
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gender but also of ethnicity, class, sexuality, religion and all markers of power 
relations specific to a particular context.  
This reflection leads me to the thesis’s second contribution: by bringing the 
experiences and accounts of women into my analysis, I have methodologically added 
a new perspective to discussions of gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment. Addressing female candidates’ experiences and women’s rights 
activists’ accounts might bring a different feminist viewpoint to the debate. As 
explained in chapter four, candidates’ participation in political training is a complex 
phenomenon: it can be done as a matter of prestige or to build a wider network; it 
might be an opportunity to receive support not found elsewhere (i.e. from the tribe, or 
from some local women’s organisations); or it might be done out of a genuine interest 
in increasing one’s skills and finding ways to challenge gender discrimination. 
However, as long as local and international practitioners do not take participants’ 
interests into consideration, the transformative potential of empowerment and gender 
mainstreaming projects may get lost. If we start from the interests of those involved in 
particular programmes, projects or policies, such as in the programme to increase 
leadership skills among women in politics, we might be able to move from an 
ethnocentric and westernised notion of gender equality to a more nuanced, complex 
and interest-related understanding. Although this might work in theory, it will be 
challenging for women’s rights activists to translate it into practice – yet not 
impossible. We also need to bear in mind that, as particularly discussed in chapters 
four and five, women’s organisations in Jordan constitute a diverse and complex 
category, and that the representation of gender interests among women in politics is 
very complicated and nuanced as well. Indeed, as long as gender interests continue to 
be defined from a top-down perspective, the risk that they will be instrumentalised is 
high. Employing a bottom-up approach, not only within the politics of the 
organisations, but also in the study of gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment – as I have done by bringing women’s experiences back into the 
analysis – will hopefully help to bridge the gap between feminist knowledge and the 
promotion of gender equality. 
Therefore I argue that attempts at gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment from above will not change institutional practices and norms unless 
they are supported by social movement activism on gender equality, and are subjected 
to the ongoing critical scrutiny of feminist scholars and activists. Even if 
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mainstreaming efforts are hypothetically pushing towards social change, they face 
entrenched resistance in most national and global economic policymaking bodies, in 
which the gender-neutral, neoliberal, rational and male-dominated economic 
framework has been institutionalised, as in the cases of the IRI, the NDI and some 
local (government-related) organisations. In such contexts, feminist intentions and 
objectives might easily become marginalised and instrumentalised. It will only be 
through collaboration in local, national, regional and transnational contexts that 
feminist knowledge will curb the instrumentalisation of gender equality rhetoric. This 
picture becomes even more complicated if we bear in mind that there are just a few 
independent activists and organisations in Jordan; those with the most authority are 
government-supported or under royal patronage, which raises justifiable doubts about 
the premises of their promotion of gender equality in the first place. 
Changing the current understanding of gender equality may require radical and 
difficult interventions. As Charlesworth (2005) has suggested:  
 
Such a change would require a redefinition of the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming so that its focus is on the complexity of gender 
relations in specific contexts. It must mean more than allowing 
women into international institutions; it must require transforming 
the structures and assumptions of the international order. It would 
involve working to change men’s behaviour as much as women’s 
(18).  
 
Indeed, as Charlesworth argues, it is not exclusively a matter of (not) treating 
gender as a synonymous with women – focusing on the biological differences 
between men and women – and of the risk that gender mainstreaming will become 
women’s mainstreaming. More importantly, it is a matter of adopting a more holistic, 
nuanced and less cosmetic approach, even if we focus on women alone.  
This leads to the third contribution I have made with my thesis, which is 
particularly related to the analysis of gender quotas. As stated in chapter one, 
challenging gender inequalities and injustices is a prerequisite for a society that 
respects human rights and democracy. In the case of Jordan, as outlined from chapter 
two onwards, addressing the promotion of women’s rights does not seem to be a form 
of politics favoured by the regime, which prefers to ‘keep the façade clean’ before 
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regional and international eyes through the promotion of women’s political 
participation. The introduction of gender quotas in Jordan may have rapidly increased 
the participation of women in politics, but it has left out of the political agenda other 
more important issues that would improve women’s rights, such as a revision of laws 
against honour crimes, a discussion of the Nationality Law, and a reform of the 
Personal Status Law.  
Although some scholars have previously addressed gender quotas in the municipal 
elections in Jordan (David and Nanes, 2011), I have paid particular attention to gender 
quotas in parliamentary elections and to the methodology employed in the analysis of 
quotas. As described in chapter three, much of the literature on gender quotas 
revolves around positions for or against the adoption of quotas. Throughout the thesis 
I have revealed the extent to which the importance of the specific sociocultural and 
political context, together with the actors involved in the introduction of such a 
measure, needs to be taken into account in the analysis. In chapter three I 
demonstrated that a deeper analysis of the context and material conditions of quotas is 
necessary, as is an analysis of the intersections of candidates’ diverse markers of 
identity, in order to understand how governmental, international and tribal-social 
interests might instrumentalise the introduction and use of quotas. The intersections 
between diverse actors, different interests and multiple socio-political and economic 
factors are fundamental to the analysis of the adoption of policies that address 
women’s rights; being for or against the introduction of quotas is not enough.  
As long as gender quotas are treated as a technocratic and cosmetic tool that will 
not challenge the status quo, the transformative agenda of gender equality may be lost 
once again. Since the concepts of gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment 
are often used as no more than technical, formalistic and bureaucratic tools – as the 
adoption of gender quotas has revealed – it may be worth rethinking the methodology 
to turn gender equality into a transformative project.  
First, a transformational agenda needs to look at wider issues in terms of legal 
rights, access to resources, and social and cultural attitudes, as my analysis of quotas 
has demonstrated. Second, I strongly believe that there should be greater focus on and 
involvement of men in challenges to gender inequality. Women’s political 
participation is not exclusively a women’s issue, but also involves their male 
counterparts. For instance, it requires an analysis of how gender relations in a specific 
context influence a candidate’s decision to run for parliament. Focusing more on 
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men’s experiences at the level of analysis and research, as well as having more men 
involved in empowerment projects and activities, will help to turn women’s political 
participation into a gender issue. Third, while a gender lens will be necessary in this 
analysis, an intersectional approach is also essential.  
This reflection leads me to the last but not least important contribution of my 
thesis. My research contributes to feminist scholarship that not only stresses the 
importance of looking at a particular context, but also seeks ways to link the particular 
to broader issues, be the promotion of gender equality, neoliberal policies, women’s 
empowerment or the representation of women. 
 As I discussed in the introduction, the private and public necessarily come into 
play in the analysis of women’s political participation. However, the focus should 
shift from what constitutes the private and public to an understanding of the 
intersections and complexities of the everyday lives of women (or men) who want to 
pursue a career in politics in the private and public spheres. How do religion, party 
affiliation, place of residence, tribal relations and so on help to shape a woman (or 
man’s) identity in the specific context of their participation in politics? More 
importantly, how does the political economy of the context in which the person lives 
influence their social position?  
Intersectionality has been a multifaceted lens of analysis. It has not only revealed 
the complex and nuanced shaping of personal identity, but has also reflected the 
extent to which different political platforms within diverse contexts of gender 
interests representation intersect. Globalisation, neoliberalism and gender equality 
regimes have doubtless influenced the adoption of gender quotas in Jordan as well as 
candidates’ more intimate decisions to run for parliament.  
In the context of gender equality rhetoric, international and local organisations 
often treat ‘women’ as a homogeneous category, without considering differences with 
respect to social class, place of residence, tribal affiliation and so on. Intersectionality, 
or the lack thereof, also emerges in the articulation of a particular type of politics 
among women’s groups and women’s rights activists, especially given the speed with 
which politics is moving, both in Jordan and in the region. Political platforms are 
themselves intersectional. Being a women’s rights’ activist who is sponsored by the 
royal family or supported by the government, or being a female candidate who 
accepts support from international institutions with neoliberal agendas, may prove to 
be problematic as well. Indeed, activism that is not oppositional to the regime, and 
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women’s rights activism that is uncritical of neoliberal agendas and neocolonial 
encroachment, may follow the same gender equality rhetoric as is promoted 
internationally.  
In a country where, on the one hand, there is an eagerness to appear ‘modern’ or 
‘good’ (as the introduction of quotas demonstrates), while on the other hand there is 
not much effort to challenge gender inequalities (as the laws regulating violence 
against women and citizenship rights reveal), the role of women’s organisations and 
women’s rights activist is now more central than ever. Yet with the exception of a few 
independent groups, the main women’s organisations – which often do not adopt an 
intersectional approach – are walking a tightrope between government co-optation 
and the promotion of women’s rights. As long as the promotion of women’s rights is 
associated with the government and with organisations operating under royal 
patronage, in a context where the role of state is becoming increasingly discredited 
and challenged, there is a danger that this will eventually produce an even greater 
backlash against the promotion of women’s rights’ in Jordan than has already 
occurred in Egypt. 
For these reasons, local and international organisations, as well as individual 
women’s rights activists, might employ a more nuanced methodology in the 
promotion of women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming. By starting to pay 
attention to gender interests, and by addressing the intersections of different contexts, 
they might be able to understand and practise gender equality in substantive terms. I 
think that field practitioners, whether international or local, should try to better 
understand and critically engage with the notions of gender and empowerment in 
order to grasp all the implications of those concepts for the projects they organise. As 
I have demonstrated, an insufficient understanding of both the transformative 
potential of empowerment and the concept of gender will lead to the failure of such 
policies, prioritising neoliberal practices instead of caring about women’s gender 
interests and expectations. Therefore workshops and discussions led by academics – 
and, at best, by activists too – will help to provide in-depth knowledge of such 
concepts. Exchanges and discussions between practitioners, activists, academics and 
donors could potentially help to create a critical and intersectional engagement with 
concepts such empowerment and gender, together with their transformative aspect, 
for all those involved in women’s empowerment projects. In this way gender equality 
will ideally regain its transformative meaning, as well as leading to social change. 
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Reflections on feminist approaches and future research  
 
As has emerged from my approach to the analysis, I have been trying to contribute to 
questions of gender mainstreaming, women’s empowerment and the representation of 
gender interests, not only on a theoretical level, but by attempting to connect theory 
and practice. As I stated in the introduction, I think of my research as feminist. 
According to Millen (1997), research may be considered feminist if it incorporates 
two main aims:  
 
[…] a sensitivity on the role of gender within society and the 
differential experiences of males and females and a critical 
approach to the tools of research on society, the structures of 
methodology and epistemology within which ‘knowledge’ is placed 
within the public domain (6.3). 
 
In line with Millen’s first point, throughout the thesis I have attempted to bring the 
experiences of female candidates and women’s rights activists into the analysis. 
Studying women is not a new phenomenon (Harding, 1987: 8); but studying them 
from the perspective of their own experiences, making women’s lives visible, may 
help us not to ‘reaffirm the dominant ideologies about women and their place in 
world’ (Letherby, 2003: 74). Advocating a research-for-women approach might be 
interpreted as insisting that research should be about women only, but this is not the 
case. Indeed, as Morgan (1981) argues, ‘taking gender seriously’ means bringing men 
back in. Morgan (1981) also stresses that if we accept that ‘man is not the norm nor 
woman the deviation, we need to consider the social construction of femininity and 
masculinity’ (39).  
It is true that in my research I focused extensively on the experiences of female 
candidates and women’s rights activists in Jordan. However, starting from their 
experiences, I attempted to understand how they construct and shape their own 
position within their society, community, tribe or family. The men I interviewed 
worked for international and (in some cases) local organisations, or at government 
level. I decided to focus exclusively on female candidates because of the lack of 
anthropological research on their experiences; as stated previously, I aimed to 
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contribute to debates on gender mainstreaming and democratisation from a bottom-up 
perspective, bringing women’s experiences in.  
However, this was not the only reason for my focus on women. Indeed, when I 
interviewed some male representatives of political parties and former male 
candidates, I encountered some challenges. When I spoke to one of them on the phone 
to schedule an interview, I sensed that he was trying to flirt with me. Feeling 
somewhat uncomfortable after the phone call, I decided to ask my interpreter and 
friend Ahlam to come with me to the meeting. She did so. The impression I had 
gained on the phone was confirmed during the interview, as the interviewee asked 
whether I was married, invited us out for dinner, and did not reply properly to my 
questions. I decided to end the interview after ten minutes. In the car, Ahlam seemed 
very disappointed too, and she told me: ‘Just forget about him, Arab men are not like 
that’ (Amman, 12 June 2011). To be sure, this was an isolated episode, and I met very 
nice and kind men throughout my stay in Jordan. But as I wrote in my field notes, 
interviewing men was extremely challenging: 
 
By now I have interviewed five men involved in politics (within 
political parties, working at the government or in parliament). 
Interviewing men has proved to be more difficult than I thought, 
and a bit useless. To me, it looks like they don’t want to say too 
much, as they don’t trust me. Unlike women, they don’t digress, 
they try to go straight to the point they want to make. However, I 
often had the feeling they were telling me what they thought I 
wanted to hear. I don’t think they were completely honest: I 
expected this, but I think it was worth a try! (Field notes, Amman, 
June 2011). 
 
By interviewing men I aimed to gather different perspectives on life in politics, and 
particularly on women’s participation in the political arena. Reflecting on this after 
the fieldwork, I realised that I had chosen the wrong methodology: the questions I had 
asked about women’s political participation had been too direct. A less direct and 
more nuanced approach would have probably given me different answers. Future 
research on women’s political participation, in particular with reference to Jordan, 
should certainly take men’s experiences more explicitly into consideration. However, 
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I also think that, since I have been addressing an understudied issue in Jordan, a close 
focus on women’s experiences was necessary in order to tackle the topic in question.  
The second point in my quote from Millen on feminist research refers to the 
methodology and approach employed in the analysis, which for me has been central 
to a critical engagement with the phenomenon of ‘gendering democratisation’ in 
Jordan. Gender and intersectionality are lenses through which we see and understand 
the world around us, connecting the dynamics of everyday life to wider contexts. 
They are lenses through which we can better understand feminist knowledge, and 
through which we can also contribute to feminist practice. It is by linking modes of 
thought to actual lived experiences that I can see how feminist knowledge connects 
with practice. 
During the past four years I have been shaping my own positionality as researcher 
in relation to my family, colleagues and respondents. As I am a first-generation 
scholar in my family and come from an ‘ungendered’ international law background, 
this research has been challenging on a personal and professional level: it was 
difficult not only to build my own critical thinking amid my family and friends, but 
also to find ways to make my research useful in practice. To what extent will my 
research contribute to social change among women’s rights activists and female 
candidates in Jordan? This question has been on my mind constantly, both during and 
after fieldwork.  
I am aware that I cannot change the gender equality system all at once through my 
research. In any case, this is not my aim. Most importantly, throughout the thesis my 
aim has been neither to judge female candidates, women’s rights activists, 
international and local practitioners and their work, nor to pretend to have the ‘right’ 
answers to questions of women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming. My aim 
has been to critically engage with the phenomenon of women’s political participation, 
offering (hopefully) new perspectives, which will need further exploration and 
analysis. 
To be sure, one of my goals has been to raise awareness among my interviewees, 
people who are interested in the topic, practitioners in the field and people around me, 
including my family and colleagues. In particular I hope that my thesis will become a 
‘space’ for women’s rights activists and female candidates in Jordan to reflect on and 
think through their experiences from a different angle.  
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Most importantly, my main purpose throughout this research has been to try to 
bridge the notorious gap between feminist knowledge and practice. As I described in 
chapter four, after receiving feedback from female candidates who had participated in 
activities organised by the NDI, I tried to report that feedback to NDI practitioners. 
As that anecdote demonstrated, we all have different perceptions of reality, different 
roles in society and different politics behind our thoughts. However, when I met the 
practitioner at the NDI and we discussed my preliminary findings, I soon realised that 
through this type of dialogue and confrontation my research might indeed contribute 
to some sort of change. Debates and discussions among the diverse actors involved in 
the promotion of women’s empowerment would guarantee a more genuine 
consideration of the diverse interests involved. In order to continue in this direction, I 
intend to disseminate my findings not only to academic forums, but also among 
women’s rights activists in Jordan, and to the female candidates I interviewed. 
Furthermore, I hope that through transnational networks I will be able to disseminate 
my research not only to my own network in Jordan, but also more broadly in the 
region and transnationally.  
Transnational feminism(s) is/are shaping the politics of many civil societies and 
women’s organisations and women’s rights activists around the world, as the story of 
Professor Quawas confirms. When I interviewed her in April 2013, I asked her 
whether, after being dismissed from her post, she had received any type of support 
from women’s rights activists in Jordan. She told me:  
 
Princess Basma publicly stood up for me during a conference. But 
she was the only one. Asma Khader, of the Jordanian National 
Commission for Women, called me, and that’s it. But you know… I 
received so much support from transnational and international 
networks, something that I did not expect at all (Skype interview, 2 
April 2013).  
 
Professor Quawas’s story confirms the complex picture of the diverse agendas and 
interests (royal, governmental, political or social) behind women’s activism(s) in 
Jordan. Her account also confirmed my doubts about the timid approach to the 
promotion of women’s rights and gender issues in Jordan. Although she has now 
returned to teaching her feminist theory class, during the events in question Professor 
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Quawas had a hard time. She has been very thankful for the support she has received 
from transnational feminist networks. Certainly it would have been more effective to 
have a strong local mobilisation, which did not happen. Yet the effectiveness of 
transnational networks in challenging her dismissal, and the relationship between 
transnational and local mobilisation, will certainly require further analysis, with 
reference both to this episode and to the promotion of women’s rights in Jordan more 
generally; this will open space for future research.  
Although further study is needed, I think that it will be through these transnational 
feminist networks that we researchers may be able to bridge the gap between feminist 
knowledge and practice. In the years to come I think that the challenge for us as 
feminist researchers will be to continue to build on scholarship that is globally 
informed, locally grounded and intersectional. Most importantly, we may need to 
think of scholarship that, while crossing borders, does not neglect the importance of 
context for the analysis of the development of activism(s) and/or feminism(s) in 
different locations. We decide where to draw the lines and boundaries of our research. 
We are able to trace a general map on which to address universal patterns in how 
gender inequalities are constructed, shaped and reproduced in different, specific 
socio-politico-historical contexts, which might be local, regional, international or 
transnational. It is only through shared yet diverse accounts of gender discrimination 
that cross-border feminist scholarship will be able to emerge.  
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